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University of Southampton. 
My purpose in the researching and the writing of this thesis has been to investigate, 
and to try to explain, Frank Ankersmifs curious shift from his well expressed and 
firmly held narrativist position of Narrative Logic, to an arguably contradictory, yet 
passionately held counter belief in the plausibility of a form of direct (sublime) 
historical experience - an authentic unmediated relationship with the past. I am, 
accordingly, presenting here what I believe to be the most adequate explanatory 
account of/for Ankersmit's intellectual journey. A journey which, in essence, 
constituted a substitution of his earlier representational, language centred philosophy 
of history for what might be taken as a new and mystical non-representational theory. 
This alternative theory of Ankersmit's (let it be called this for now), lacking cognitive 
foundations, works on the basis of sensations, moods, feelings and therefore a 
consciousness deemed to be received directly from the past itself, and therein - for 
this thesis - lies its fatal weakness as a historical theory. Belief in the mystical may 
be all right at some level, if this is what is wanted, but a mystical experience itself 
cannot produce a historical re-presentation which (tautologically) is the only way 
that the past can be presented historically. Thus, I argue that Ankersmit's journey 
from language to (historical) experience - the latter phenomenon being more 
appropriately situated within the field of sociology/social theory and memory studies 
- is, in the end, a lost historical cause. 
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F. R. (Frank) Ankersmit was not a total stranger to me when I first came to his 
works on historical theory, for his reputation preceded him. As a pre-eminent 
philosopher/theorist' of history- the European Hayden White one might say - he 
had already, for me, assumed a significant status amongst the leaders in his field of 
scholarship, and it was that image which influenced my perception of the Ankersmit 
who I initially began to read, analyse and situate. But, through that reading, 
analysing and situating, it was precisely that Ankersmit who slowly began to melt 
away and mutate as another, quite different Ankersmit emerged out of what became 
my radical re-thinking of him - an Ankersmit whose work(s) do not fully live up 
either to his pre-eminent reputation or to expectations subsequent to it. This re- 
thinking (refiguring(relocating) of Ankersmit, which constitutes the substance of my 
thesis, 'is broadly reflected in its title, `The Journey from Language to Experience: 
Frank Ankersmit's Lost "Historical" Cause', and it is from this governing 
perspective that I have constructed and produced the overall form and content of my 
argument. And so that the reader might know, right from the start, the direction and 
purpose of this argument, I will first briefly summarise it as a whole and then 
discuss its organisation into chapters. 
I open my argument with the proposition that there is in Ankersmit's work(s), vis-ä- 
vis the philosophy of history, a very good (even excellent) Frank Ankersmit of an 
enduring kind. This good/excellent/enduring Ankersmit is the Ankersmit of 
1 Because Ankersmit in various places is both referred to as, and sometimes refers to himself as, both a 
philosopher of history-and a historical theorist (such usage effecting the collapse of any distinction that 
might exist between the terms philosopher and theorist in this particular context), it should be noted here 
that throughout my own text I have also followed this same common usage, using the two terms either 
interchangeably or preferring one over the other depending on, what is perceived as, again, `the context'. 
Furthermore, I should point out at this juncture that, with regard to notations, I will be using single 
inverted commas throughout for footnoted quotations, for phrases drawn for discussion from previous 
"block" extracts within my own text, and for my own rhetorical questions. My use of double inverted 
commas will be restricted to either the problematizing or highlighting of word/phrase meanings. 
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Narrative Logic2 published in 1983. Yet, although the central thesis of that text - 
concerning the representational/propositional notion of the narrative substance - 
can, in my view, withstand all the criticisms that have been, and might be, levelled 
against it, the overall "logic" of Narrative Logic (and Ankersmit is regarded by 
many others, as well as by himself, as an extremely logical thinker) arguably leaves 
much to be desired. Hence it is my contention that whilst Ankersmit's notion of 
narrative substances does indeed stand impregnable, the thinking that underpins and 
underwrites his overall argument as expressed in Narrative Logic (his "means" 
which take him to his desired "ends") is often, in its elements, contradictory, 
incoherent and even unnecessary - faults which Ankersmit scarce seems to notice 
buried, as they frequently are, in an almost intimidatingly difficult and detailed 
erudition. Nevertheless, as stated, the conclusions reached by this early Ankersmit 
remain, I think, utterly convincing, conclusions which (articulated through the 
concept of narrative substances and informed by his central idea of histories as 
being individual proposals about or representations of an absent past) highlight the 
always problematical way in which the evidential traces of the past are transformed 
into history through, and only through, modes of representation. And that the absent 
past, being absent, can only be "known" through-its representations, for there is 
nothing else: `no representation, no pasta3 - Ankersmit's own phrase - says it all. 
I further argue that Ankersmit's early mode of thinking (as epitomised in Narrative 
Logic) was overwhelmingly informed by, and owed its success to, his immersion in 
and reading of twentieth-century linguistics, narratology, textuality and 
representationalism widely construed. That is to say that his position is locatable in 
a language based philosophical context, a location from which he has been 
distancing himself over the last fifteen (or so) years until, in 2005, he was able to 
fully express his new (and for this thesis his current) position4 as articulated in his 
2 Ankersmit, F. R, (1983). Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian's Language. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
3 Ankersmit, F. R, (2006). '"Presence" And Myth' in History and Theory 45 no. 3: p328 
4 There is perhaps an irony here - maybe even a problem - in the fact that 
in 2007 Ankersmit launched a 
new journal, The Jowwi of the Philosophy of History (co-edited with Mark Bevir, Paul Roth, Aviezer 
Tucker and Alison Wylie), which seems (with regard to the contents of its first three volumes at least) to 
give much more room to textualism and intentionality in representation than it does to experience. That is 
to say that the Journal addresses old concerns (the concerns of the early Ankersmit), albeit in an overall 
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summative Sublime Historical Experiences without, as he put it, `recanting' his 
previous position. 6 Ankersmit argued in Sublime Historical Experience? that the idea 
of history as a literary artifact, as textuality (he began to refer to it as that in his own 
shorthand), had been taken-up at too high a price. Matters had gone too far, such that 
the notion of historical/historian's experience had been squeezed out of the 
prevailing language-centred philosophical/theoretical history debates, these debates 
being most recently cast in forms of post-modem types of post-structuralism, 
deconstruction and, therefore, that ubiquitous textualism which now had to be 
"reined-in". As Ankersmit put it epigrammatically: `language is where experience is 
not and experience is where language is not'. ' Accordingly, as Ankersmit explained 
at length in Sublime Historical Experience, he now saw it as his task to rehabilitate 
experience and to establish a juste milieu precisely between language and , 
experience. ' 
Now, in order to begin to understand the nature of the motivational drive which 
propelled Ankersmit in the direction of historical experience, and the style of logic 
with which he sought to validate this "move", a number of points can be made at 
this early juncture. In the first place Ankersmit has always needed history, a deep- 
seated need that, as we shall see, had its origins (not least) in the happy/unhappy 
vacillations which characterised his childhood and to which he himself draws 
attention. However, and this I think is ironic in the circumstances, Ankersmit's own 
critique of mainstream academic history (as laid out in Narrative Logic) was 
critical and disavowing way, yet the curious thing is that experience itself (Ankersmit's current and 
central interest) makes only fleeting, haunting appearances in it. Bearing in mind that this is, after all, the 
Journal of Ankersmit's new `Centre for Metahistory', it appears odd (to me anyway) that it mostly 
concerns itself with arguments that have been going on in historical theory for the last twenty odd years 
and does not tackle sublime historical experience and its derivatives "head-on" as it were. This footnote 
might seem a little premature appearing as it does at this early point in my thesis - and perhaps it is - but 
it might, nevertheless, afford something of a foretaste of ambiguities to come as I work through the 
multiple aspects of Ankersmit's developing theoretical position. 
s Ankersmit, F. R, (2005). Sublimer Historical E perience. California: Stanford University Press. 
6 The extent/nature of Ankersmit's recantation is touched upon at various points in this thesis, but I pill 
together my final thoughts on what I consider to be its unresolved ambivalences in the form of a post 
script (or coda) at the very end of my Conclusion. 
9 And also in occasional related/formative papers which, as I have mentioned, run back ten to fifteen 
years (Ankersmit himself pointing out in the preface to Sublime Historical Experience that that text itself 
was some ten years in the making). 
8 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. p79 
9 Although, as I hope will become apparent, it could be argued that this move to moderate the pre- 
eminence of language took Ankersmit almost to the point of excluding it altogether. 
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arguably so devastating that no empirical, epistemologically-striving history could 
ever again, following this critique of it, be seen to provide access to the kind of 
historical truth that Ankersmit himself had always sought. He had in a manner of 
speaking "burnt his own boats" and there was literally no going back by this route. 
Consequently, in order to get at the past, Ankersmit was forced to look for another 
route to it which, he evidently came to believe, could be found through his 
rehabilitated notion of experience. Ankersmit, accordingly, argued for a form of 
direct experience of the past unmediated by any kind of historical discourse - he 
wanted, in effect, to by-pass representational history - and so in this way (this is the 
crucial point) he could successfully circumvent his own crushing critique of it. 
Hence, it was Ankersmit's desire to satisfy this newly framed need for a form of 
pure, direct contact with the actuality of the past itself - the past "plain" - that led 
him through various contentious (in my view) "means" towards his earnestly sought 
but unworkable (in my view) "ends". It is, therefore, in Ankersmit's arguably 
questionable development of his own theoretical position, driven by a particular 
need, that one can trace (and perhaps explain) his radical move away from the 
comfort and safety of the logic of narrative towards the hazards and perils of a 
somewhat bizarre notion of experience. 
However, leaving that matter there for the moment and continuing with my 
summary, it is my further contention that (whatever else it does) sublime historical 
experience draws Ankersmit into a theoretical cul-de-sac if it is "historical" 
understanding that he really wants - and that is what he says he wants. For though 
Ankersmit establishes his current theoretical position on the basis of (sublime) 
historical experience (most fully expressed in his text of that name), what Ankersmit 
is actually talking about is arguably neither sublime nor historical nor experiential, 
rather it can be seen as a sometimes hyperbolically expressed discourse on the 
subject of existential sensation. 
Furthermore, and finally, I argue (referring now to the `re-locating' or `re-situating' 
of Ankersmit's new style of theorisation as mentioned in my first paragraph) that if 
Ankersmit's work on experience is to be located/situated anywhere at all, then it 
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should be located outside of history altogether, in some comer (a somewhat 
mystical, mythical corner) of social theory or, to be more precise, within a corner of 
memory studies. For it appears to me that Ankersmit's new and current "home" is to 
be found within the embrace of theories of presence and authenticity, of trauma, of 
testimony, of witnessing, of nostalgia, etc., a habitat which has been growing rapidly 
over the last two or three decades. The crucial point here being that, whatever else it 
might be that Ankersmit is now talking about, it is not (strictly speaking) history/ 
historical theory; it is not about the past as history which, I argue, can only be 
produced through modes of textual representationalism. Accordingly, it appears to 
me that Ankersmit's `Journey' towards a pure form of historical experience has 
taken him outside the sphere of history altogether into the complex sociological 
sphere of memory studies. And it is this ironic turn of events - precisely his `Lost 
"Historical" Cause' of my thesis title - that can be construed/troped as (or simply is) 
the tragedy of Frank Ankersmit's move from language to (sublime) experience. 
Now, within the individual chapters which follow this general thesis as outlined 
above is always present; it informs and guides, inter alia, the analysis as a whole. 
However, in addition to this general analysis, I also engage Ankersmit - especially 
in Chapters Two and Three - through a closely textured series of expositions and 
arguments in the particular which address, critically, details of various aspects of his 
evolving position. 10 Accordingly, in order to keep my general arguments foremost in 
the reader's mind, such excursions into the analytical/particular will at intervals be 
"brought back" such that they might be located within the general perspective of my 
overall thesis. And it is to be hoped that this strategy -this constant movement 
between the general and the particular - adds both depth and clarity to my overall 
argument which I unpack and organise within a structure comprising four chapters 
and a conclusion as follows. 
" In Chapter One ('The Good Ankersmit') I establish my very best 
Ankersmit; for this purpose the arguments used focus principally, but not 
10 Although my comments during such arguments are sometime critical and sharp, I hope that they will 
not be taken as disrespectful. 
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exclusively, on Ankersmit's innovative derivation and development of the 
concept of narrative substances. 
" In Chapter Two ('A Moment of Hesitation') I argue, on the basis of detailed 
analyses rather than on the more expository (though still analytical) nature of 
Chapter One, that this good Ankersmit is not so very good after all. For not 
only is his thesis in general (re: narrative substances) supported by a series of 
problematical philosophical and algebraic arguments or proofs deemed here 
to be (in the end) strictly unnecessary, but it also appears that Ankersmit is 
only able to establish the originality of his position on the back of several 
radical misreadings of other people. Accordingly, the point that emerges out 
of this analysis is that whilst Ankersmit's conclusions (as concisely stated by 
him) seem to me to be impeccable and eminently sustainable, the manner in 
which he establishes them is, arguably, flawed. Consequently, Ankersmit - 
who both presents himself as, and appears to be accepted as, the 
personification of philosophical rectitude and logical rigour (with regard to 
historical theory at least) - turns out to be something of a disappointment. 
However, a disappointment or not, Ankersmit himself very clearly thought 
that what he was doing was pretty good, in fact so good that he could see, or 
intuit, that his own ruinous critique of mainstream history was, in effect, 
denying him the only available (albeit problematical) route to the 
"knowledge" of the past that he had (and has) always needed and always 
sought. Ankersmit was therefore compelled to find and then transfer to an 
alternative style of theory that would, without falling foul of his own critique 
of representational history, allow some form of access to the past. And it is 
this transition - this crab-like move from language to experience in search of 
some other route via a "real" history towards a "real" past - that constitutes 
the subject matter of Chapter Three. 
" Chapter Three ('Ankersmit in Transition') can therefore be read as a kind of 
"bridge" between two radically different modes of thought. Hence, in this 
chapter I investigate the arguments which Ankersmit began to develop 
especially (but not only) in the papers collected together in the volume 
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History and Tropology" (and not least arguments wherein he crucially 
distances himself from Hayden White) and which led him towards and began 
to shape his notion of (sublime) historical experience. It is this extraordinary 
idea of the actual possibility of historical experience as Ankersmit construed 
it (subsequently to be developed into sublime historical experience) that leads 
me into my Fourth Chapter which deals directly with it. 
" Accordingly, in Chapter Four ('Sublime Historical Experience'), whilst 
attempting to adopt a more general and discursive style (without, 
nevertheless, losing an analytical "edge" ), 12 I critique Ankersmit's notion of 
sublime historical experience and its dependent derivatives; in particular, 
presence and parallel processing. All of these phenomena (along with 
Ankersmit's fellow articulators of them who represent what I call the 
"Groningen School")13 I shall then remove from the field of history studies to 
the field of memory studies where, as already mentioned, I think they really 
belong. 
" Finally, in my Conclusion, I shall attempt to draw together (without too much 
repetition) the various elements of my thesis into what I hope is a coherent 
whole and locate it in a wider philosophical perspective. 
There are now but two remaining matters which I want to mention in these 
introductory remarks; the first is to do with positioning and reading, the second with 
the uniqueness of this thesis. 
Referring to the question of positioning in general, and taking due notice of one of 
Ankersmit's own arguments, I have to (and I do) take into account that the framing 
and prefiguring of any body of work will always be cast in a certain kind of "mould" 
governed by the point-of-view of its author. I am very aware that other people 
adopting different points-of-view could, would, and do read Ankersmit quite 
11 Ankersmit, F. it, (1994). History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall of Metaphor. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
12 Such an approach, I shall argue, befits a reading of the sometime analytical but more. often 
impressionistic mood of Sublime Historical Experience. 
13 The "Groningen School" and its advocates (for example, Eelco Runia, Hans Gumbrecht et al) will be 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
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differently from me. Nevertheless, it remains my contention that what I am putting 
forward in this thesis, as my thesis, constitutes the very best way of reading 
Ankersmit's oeuvre. And my argument, arising out of this best reading, is broadly 
speaking articulated about what I have already characterised as Ankersmit's tragic 
trajectory of historical/philosophical thought -a trajectory which carried him via 
various texts from his theoretical position as expressed and embodied in the 
narrative substance of Narrative Logic to the mystical, mythical, not even historical 
Ankersmit of Sublime Historical Experience. However, as I have already explained, 
I am quite -aware that relative to different points-of-view other readings of 
Ankersmit are not only possible but inevitable. I am, for instance, quite sure that 
Ankersmit himself would not see his own evolution over the last (let us say) twenty- 
five years as constituting some kind of perverse movement from a good to an 
intellectually impoverished or a tragic version of himself- in fact, quite the reverse. 
Ankersmit would, and indeed does, see himself as being the very best possible 
Ankersmit right now and thus, believing that he has arrived at something of huge 
value and significance to historians and historical theorists, he would see the earlier 
Ankersmit as being, no doubt, still pretty good, but also somewhat passe in the 
context of his now current Position. 14 However, my argument is that the nature of 
Ankersmit's developing position can only be adequately grasped when seen 
completely the other way around. That is to say that since his development of the 
notion of narrative substances he has not been getting better but, rather, he has been 
getting worse, to the extent that he now draws at least some of his theoretical 
arguments from the arguably eccentric and highly subjective world of mysticism as 
he "migrates", apparently without fully noticing it, from history into memory. 
My second and final point concerns the question of the uniqueness (original 
contribution to knowledge, etc. ) of my thesis. During my research into Ankersmit 
In order to justify this conclusion I refer to Ankersmit's introduction to Sublime Historical Experience 
wherein he suggests that whilst not actually recanting his previous narrativist theoretical position he is, 
nevertheless, moving on to a much better understanding of what history is and, indeed, he is even looking 
into how historical consciousness per se came into being. Thus, even though he appears to be retaining 
his previous theoretical position with regard to the historical text, he undeniably offers his new experience 
based thesis as an advance on this previous position. For he presents it as not only a more comprehensive 
thesis but (and this is the main point) also as an unproblematic and authentic direct engagement with the 
actual past - something beyond the capacity of the historical narrative. These matters will 
be fully 
addressed as the thesis proceeds 
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and his current milieu I did not, and nor have I since, come across any lengthy 
comprehensive account or prolonged and systemic analysis of his work(s). Such a 
thing does not appear to exist in any language and certainly not in English. 
Accordingly, there seems to be precious little available in terms of substantial 
literature of the kind exemplified by this thesis. Of course over the years (and 
increasingly so latterly), Ankersmit has undertaken several interviews during which 
he has clarified his views on a range of matters including his own work and its 
"trajectory" as he sees it. There also exists a small number of sometimes incisive 
papers on some or other aspect of his work(s). For example a paper by J. Zammito 
on representation, overviews of Ankersmit's work(s) by E. Domaiiska and K. 
Jenkins, and a few occasionally more abrasive reviews on some of his individual 
publications (for instance, that of C. B. McCullagh and also, although less 
provocatively argued, those of M. S. Roth, T. G. Chorell, et al). 15 But, so far as I am 
aware, this thesis is the first and therefore the only attempt to evaluate Ankersmit at 
length in some analytical and thus critical detail and, therefore, the first to discern 
and expound a different trajectory from those occasionally suggested by others as 
well as that which Ankersmit's would see as his own. Accordingly, it is my hope 
that my arguments here concerning Ankersmit's work(s) will constitute a different, 
worthwhile addition to the extant literature. And moreover that, both in its 
originality and perhaps its persuasiveness, it might be of future use to others 
working in what is, not withstanding my particular critique of Ankersmit's 
increasingly experiential adventure, a vibrant and fascinating sphere of interest. 
13 These commentators and their reviews (along with others) will be evaluated in various places 
throughout my thesis. 
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ChawrOne 
The Good Anketsmit 
The Ankersmit of the title of this chapter is the Ankersmit who emerges from and is 
thus defined by his first book Narrative Logic' published in 1983. In order to 
illustrate exactly what I mean by this I propose to lay out and evaluate the principal 
elements of Ankersmit's essential argument as articulated therein, prefaced very 
briefly by two pertinent considerations. My first is that to appreciate the full 
significance of his somewhat controversially received text (and the disruption that it 
caused within the discipline), one needs to understand Ankersmit's own reading of 
the general state of historical theory at that time. And my second, that one cannot 
ignore - as Ankersmit certainly did not ignore - the earlier huge contribution to this 
field of study by Hayden White, and here I refer particularly to White's publication 
of Metahistory2 in 1973. 
With regard to the first point, Ankersmit held (correctly I think) that before the 
publication of the two above mentioned books historical theory had concerned itself 
almost exclusively with historical research, while the writing up of the product of 
that research -a process that was generally taken to be relatively transparent and 
therefore unproblematic - had, as a consequence, remained largely uninvestigated. 
In short, there was no comprehensive philosophical analysis of the writing of history 
per se, and Ankersmit's precise purpose in the writing of Narrative Logic was to set 
that matter right. This is not to say that some questions concerning the intrinsic 
character of the (ubiquitous) narrative form had not, albeit in somewhat piecemeal 
form, been previously addressed. As Ankersmit pointed out in his Introduction to 
Narrative Logic, such explanatory literature could indeed be found but, disregarding 
for the moment the work of Hayden White, this was more often than not in the form 
' Ankersmit, F. R, (1983). Narnadve Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian's Language- The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
2 White, H., (1973). Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe. Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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of disparate articles (for example, those of Louis Mink, Roland Barthes et al) which, 
collectively he held, could not be seen to constitute `a comprehensive survey 
of.... the nature and task of narrative philosophy'. 3 
But - my second point - with White this was obviously very different, for amongst 
the then literature (even if one includes, say, Walter B. Gallie, Arthur Danto, Morton 
White and Maurice Mandelbaum)4 White was exceptional and, as noted, Ankersmit 
could not and did not ignore him. Indeed, due to Ankersmit's constant harking-back 
to White in what one might see, over time, as a love/hate relationship in his 
sometime association with and sometime rejection of White's position, there is a 
sense in which White might even be seen to have been a constant spectre, haunting 
(and disturbing) Ankersmit's theoretical advances. Certainly, to put it neutrally at 
this early juncture, Ankersmit's work can in some ways (as we shall see) be taken as 
a development of White's own work. Yet, having said that, I still think that it would 
be a mistake to imagine that Ankersmit might have found in White a model for his 
own theorising. For whilst Ankersmit's early arguments, broadly speaking, carried 
him towards some of the same general conclusions as those expressed by White (in, 
for instance, Metahistory), he has nevertheless always been and undeniably remains 
`original and complex in his own right'. 5 
Ankersmit's original project as he saw it himself, then, was to demonstrate that 
contemporary historical theory was inadequate to its undertaking; that it failed to 
satisfactorily account for the nature of the narrative form which was generally taken 
to arise unproblematically out of the product - the facts and singular statements - of 
historical research. Accordingly, through his intervention in the discipline, 
Ankersmit sought to challenge that established position by proposing that the 
hitherto presumed transparent process of historical writing was nothing less than 
opaque. And, furthermore, that almost everything that really mattered in the process 
3 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p1 
4 Gallie, W. B., (1964). Philosophy and Historical Understanding. New York: Liveright Publishing; 
Danto, A., (1965). Analytical Philosophy of History. Cambridge: Cambridge University press; White, M., 
(1965). Foundations of Historical Knowledge. New York: Harper & Row; Mandelbaum, M., (1967). The 
Problem Of Historical Knowledge: An Answer To Relativism. New York: Harper and Row, and also 
Mandelbaum, M., (1971). History, Man andReason. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
5 Jenkins, K, (1999). Why History? Ethics and Postmodernity. London: Routledge. p 136 
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of history production took place between the completion of historical research and 
its writing up into narrative form -a process which Ankersmit referred to as the 
trajectory from evidence to text. It was the express purpose of Narrative Logic to 
scrutinize these matters through philosophical enquiry - essentially an enquiry into 
the nature of the narrative form, the nature of narrative knowledge that emerged 
from it and the role of linguistic instruments in the structure of that knowledge. Thus 
the possibility, or otherwise, of correspondence between the past and its narrative 
representation might be determined. 
Against this lightly sketched background I now turn directly to the text of Narrative 
Logic in order to examine and analyse the principal elements of Ankersmit's 
argument, an argument which is articulated around three propositions or theses, his 
three `essential pillars' (as he called them) which briefly put go as follows6: 
1) That the past has no narrative structure within it - such structures occurring 
only in narratives themselves. 
2) That narrative substances are the primary narrative entities in narrative 
accounts of the past 
3) That there is a relationship between narrative substance and metaphor and that 
the narrative use of language is indeed fundamentally metaphorical. 
Pillar 1 
In Chapter Four of Narrative Logic, Ankersmit draws attention to the distinction 
between the spheres of thought associated with the positions adopted by both the 
`narrative realist' and the `narrative idealist', and it will be necessary to follow this 
argument through in order to grasp the substance of Ankersmit's first essential 
pillar. 
Ankersmit's so called narrative realist accepts the historical narrative as the 
verbalisation of a kind of "picture" of the actual past and since this picture, which is 
presumed to truly correspond with the past, arises out of the various statements that 
6 These three pillars, as expressed here, are contractions of Ankersmit's descriptions laid out on p87, p 100 
and p216 ofNarrative Logic. 
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constitute the narrative itself, then it is taken that the author of that narrative must 
have had at his/her disposal. a set of translation rules in order to effect the projection 
of past events and situations directly into narrative form. The source of these 
translation rules, Ankersmit suggested, could perhaps be found in the models and 
theories of the social sciences, or alternatively - and here he draws on the works of 
various German twentieth century philosophers - they might be found in the notion 
of value (seen here as the driving force of historical enquiry) and thus provide the 
historian with the transcendental structure required to perform this direct translation 
of the evidence of the past into a corresponding narrative form. Ankersmit brings 
together the foregoing as follows: 
.... the historian is offered a set of translation rules, either 
in the form of a value 
system or of socio-scientific theories, which, it is claimed, indicate how to 
translate the historical past into the language of historiography.. . Philosophies 
of history are based upon the (implicit) conviction that historiography is 
essentially a projection in historical language of past reality in conformity with 
these translation rules. 
Now, this verbalised picture theory of narrative realism is dismissed by Ankersmit 
for a number of reasons. In the first place he detects a debilitating terminologically 
generated confusion invading and eliding the quite separate domains of ontology, 
epistemology and the social sciences. For he recognises that these three categories, 
which are central to the philosophy of narrative realism, are at risk of losing their 
boundaries. Put more precisely, Ankersmit's concern is that the narrative realist 
might in error attribute an epistemological status to a particular set of socio- 
scientific rules thus asserting that only these amongst all possible rules can relate the 
past to its narrativised account. Such a strategy would have the effect of erasing the 
distinction between the domains of the epistemological and the socio-scientific, a 
gift to those who would transform history into a social science. Then, with regard to 
hermeneutic theory, which comes complete with its own intrinsic life experience 
translation rules and rests on the notion of ontological equality between the 
historian and the historical agent, a rather similar problem occurs but in this case the 
confusion arises between the categories of epistemology and ontology. And to 
complete this bewildering assortment of elisions, there also exists a confusion of the 
' Ankersmit. Ncarr,, diW Logic. p82 
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ontological with the socio-scientific which would appear to sustain the belief that it 
is indeed the essence of the past that is being translated into its narrative 
representation. At this stage in the argument it is already quite clear that a lack of 
clarity has its uses, and it provokes Ankersmit into writing that `the picture theory 
depends for its very, existence on a confusion of the ontological, the epistemological 
and the socio-scientific'"8 
However, this problematic triple confusion of categories is, for Ankersmit, eclipsed 
by much more fundamental objections to the narrative realist's position. For, as he 
explained, it is difficult to see how the historical narrative can be taken as a 
definitive picture or projection of the actuality of the past when taking into account 
the following two points. First there is the question of category confusion; one 
cannot place a picture and a narrative into the same category simply to establish 
some linking mechanism between them. And, second, it would appear that any set of 
translation rules selected to perform this task of translation must themselves be 
selected and imposed arbitrarily. Indeed, there can never be any consensus on this 
matter, for by what measure can the definitive global translation rules of selection be 
selected to the satisfaction of all interested parties? Ankersmit continued with the 
observation that: 
.... the past 
[is not] like a landscape that has to be projected onto the linguistic 
level with the help of projection or translation rules. For the "historical 
landscape" is not given to the historian; he has to construct it. The narratio9 is 
not the projection of a historical landscape...... the past is only constituted in 
the narratio. The structure of the narratio is a structure lent to or pressed on the 
past and not the reflection of a kindred structure objectively present in the past 
itself. We should reject `the idea that there is a determinate historical actuality, 
the complex referent of all our narratives of "what actually happened", the. 
untold story to which narrative histories approximate'. 1° 
All of which leads Ankersmit to the conclusion that the past does not possess a 
narrative structure; narrative structures -a linguistic matter - occur only in 
8 Ankersmit. Narraliw Logic. p86 
9 Ankersmit favours the use of the word narmlio as a contraction of historiographical nwrMve 
representation of the past. My preference is to stay with its shorter equivalent historical narrative. 
10 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p86. However, in the final sentence Ankersmit cites Mink L. 0. (1978). 
`Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument', in Canary RH and Kozickj H. (ads. ) The Writing of History: 
Literary Form and Historical Understanding Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. pp 129-149 
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narratives themselves. Furthermore, the past and its representation in narrative form 
are clearly separated by fundamental structural differences which deny the 
possibility of the existence of effective translation rules, since such rules would 
necessarily be required to perform the impossible task of linking entities that reside 
in categorically different domains. Hence, the narrative realist viewpoint loses 
credibility, and Ankersmit turns his attention to a matter which will not only be used 
to characterise the `narrative idealist' but will also form the basis of his theory of, 
narrative substances. This is how he introduces his proposal: 
.... the objects in the past so often mentioned 
by historians, objects such as 
intellectual, social or political movements and even nations or social groups, 
have no status in the past itself independent of the narratio: they spring from 
and are justified by the narratio. " 
The point that Ankersmit is making here can be illustrated thus. A historian 
accounting for `The Renaissance' might appear to be describing or investigating 
some thing that actually existed in the past; however, nobody living in Florence in 
1500 would have been aware of any Renaissance as an object of possible study'and 
measurement by future historians. This is simply because the word Renaissance (as 
used in this sense) refers to a 19"` century colligatory term first adopted by 
historians of that period for the purpose of collecting together data which, when 
taken in sum, individuated the notion of a classically inspired rebirth of intellectual 
pursuits, particularly (but not always) artistic pursuits, associated with a loosely 
defined historical period. No two historians are necessarily going to exactly agree on 
the scope of data to be included within the term Renaissance; such decisions will be 
governed by the points-of-view of the historians in question. The Renaissance, then, 
is a concept figured within its narrative representation only, and that is all. 12 The 
" Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p87 
'2 It is interesting to note that the term `Renaissance' was first used, as understood here, by the French 
historian Jules Michelet in his History of France (1855) and he saw it more as a general development in 
the sciences rather than in the arts, occupying the period from Columbus through Copernicus to Galileo 
(the mid 15* to mid 177 centuries) - that is, from the discovery of the earth to the discovery of the 
heavens (see Mansfield, B., (1992). Man on His Own: Interpretations of Erasmus. Toronto: Toronto 
University Press. pp140-143). The tam was next used by the Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt who 
defined the Renaissance as the period from Giotto to Michelangelo (the mid 14th to mid 16* centuries) 
and thus, for him, it was an Italian affair centred on the arts (see the Penguin Books translation of 
Burckhardt's original 1860 text in Burckhardt, J, (1990). The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy. St. 
Ives: Clays Ltd. ) However, more recently the historian and genealogist Randolph Starn has taken the 
view that the Renaissance was a movement of practices and ideas without definitive beginnings, middles 
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central point to be stressed here is that the past is given shape or, better still, 
narratively "illustrated" by means of 
.... entities that do not form part of the past itself and that do not even refer to 
actual historical phenomena or aspects of such phenomena'. This is what I 
would like to call narrative idealism. " 
All this both reaffirms the fundamental structural divide between the past and its 
narrative representation and suggests a certain autonomy of function with regard to 
the historical narrative which appears to be primarily governed by a narrative logic 
informed by linguistic rules and devices rather than the actuality of the past itself. 
The past can thus be seen to underdetermine its historicisation. The historical 
narrative can, therefore, no longer be taken as some sort of "window" through which 
the actuality of some past event might be viewed exactly as it was, rather it has to be 
seen as a proposal about that event. Or, as Ankersmit puts it, a mode of `seeing as' 
cut adrift from the actuality of the past because it is unavoidably mediated through a 
complex of autonomous. narrative devices which, stricto-sense, lack any points of 
reference located in the past itself 
Now, none of this is intended to deny the veracity of facts or singular statements 
which refer to things, events or states of affairs which once "inhabited" the past. 
Nobody is likely to deny that Elizabeth 1' was Queen of England and Ireland from 
17th November 1558 until her death on 24th March 1603. Such matters, which are 
ultimately validated by consensus, are entirely the concern of the field of historical 
research and, whilst Ankersmit has always recognised the value of this field of 
studies, it did not much figure in his thesis. Rather, Ankersmit is talking about 
conjunctions of facts and singular statements and the narrative knowledge that they 
carry by virtue of the manner in which they are structured into a coherent whole; the 
and endings (see Starn, it, (2002). `The European Renaissance', in Ruggiero, G. (ad. ). A Companion to 
the Worlds of the Renaisswace. London: Blackwell Publishing. pp39-54). The point that l wish to make at 
this stage in my argument is that amongst these three eminent historians (one being responsible for 
"coining" the term Renaissance in the first place) we have three radically different ideas about what the 
Renaissance actually was and which period it actually occupied. But (and this is Ankersmit's point) each 
of these accounts is, no doubt, coherently articulated about its own uniquely individuated yet quite 
different na rratiw substance, and it is precisely such coherence which validates each account internally 
with reference to itself and not to the past. This matter will be discussed at greater length below. 13 Ankersmit. Nwratlve Logic. p87 
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structure of the historical text being the key, for as the historian/historical theorist 
Alun Munslow has pointed out, the text 
.... is a structure and, as such, it has a logic of its own. Its logic is not that of 
reflection of the empirical essence hidden in things in the past but, rather, as a 
form of explanation its power resides in its own structure - structure which is 
always more than the sum of its parts. 14 
This structure - the logic of the narrative form - was precisely Ankersmit's subject 
of inquiry. He wanted to investigate the nature of it and understand how narrative 
knowledge (the meanings of narrative accounts of the past generated within the text) 
issued from the whole historical text. To fail to grasp this, as some do, 'S is to miss 
the point of his book. 
In summation then, the past has no narrative structure within it - narrative structures 
occur (tautologically) only in narratives. Objects such as intellectual, social or 
political movements, nations, social groups and so on, have no "historical" status in 
the past itself. They spring from and are justified only by the structure of the 
historical narrative. The past is thus "illustrated" by means of entities which do not 
form part of the past itself, nor do these entities literally refer to the past. Hence, a 
gap exists between the past and its narrative representation which, in effect, not only 
affirms the structural autonomy of the historical narrative as a whole, but it also 
draws attention to the significance of the linguistic devices which govern it. In order 
to investigate the existence of any possible relationship between the actuality of the 
past (a past which does not say how it is to be represented) and the historical 
narrative that is presumed to be its representation, it would be necessary, Ankersmit 
argued, to analyse the logical structure of narrative accounts of the past and the 
precise nature of the narrative knowledge of the past arising from these accounts. 
14 Munslow, A., (2003). The New History. London: Pearson Longman. p 150 
is For instance, Jonathan Gorman, referring both to the historical narrative as a whole and its singular 
statements says that `.... the whole cannot be more than the sum of its parts..... a heroic argument is 
required to establish that indeed the whole is more than the sum of its parts'. This notion is central to 
Gorman's argument as laid out in Gorman J. L., (1997). `Philosophical Fascination with Whole Historical 
Text' in History and Theory 36 no. 3: pp406-415. I have been unable to find explicit expressions of this 
view elsewhere but, nevertheless, I believe it to be part of the discourse in some quarters, in the sense that 
it reveals itself as a presupposition in argument. 
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To adopt a position consistent with these above observations would be to adopt 
Ankersmit's own position which is that of the narrative idealist. And this position' 
rests on the assumption that there exists a narrative logic, uninformed by the past, 
which structures (apparent) knowledge of the past internally within its own narrative 
form. By contrast, and rejected by Ankersmit in his argument, narrative realism rests 
on the assumption that narrative knowledge of the past is directly informed by the 
past itself. 
In the light of the foregoing the question of the veracity of historical facts or 
statements - vis-ü-vis their referential links to the past - loses its assumed centrality 
and urgency. Indeed, it is undeniably the case that scholarly debate between 
historians almost exclusively focuses on the relative merits of different narrative 
interpretations of past events and how they might relate to other key texts that have 
somehow come to occupy authoritative positions on the subjects in question. For 
example, although I have read many reviews of history books by eminent historians, 
I have only rarely encountered any significant challenges to the facts of these 
various texts and, where a challenge is made, it is often in the form of a mild rebuke 
(for instance, sloppy work .... get it right! ). But,, even when 
facts are to some degree 
questioned, the reviewers primary interest always concerns the validity of the text 
viewed as a whole when measured-up against the background context of other 
related texts. All in all history can be seen as an essentially inter-textual enterprise. 
That much taken as understood, Ankersmit then moved on to investigate the nature 
and function of this narrative logic which apparently embodies the capacity to 
generate an endless collection of different historical accounts (sometimes radically 
different but always different) of the same past event. To meet this challenge 
Ankersmit proposed a new linguistic device, the narrative substances, which now 
brings me to his second essential pillar. 
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Pillar 2 
So, what precisely does Ankersmit mean by narrative substances and where does 
this idea come from? Well, I think that the best way to get into Ankersmit's essential 
position is to understand how the concept of the narrative substance emerged out of 
an old idea which Ankersmit had appropriated and then ingeniously reshaped for his 
own purposes. By which I mean that what Ankersmit so successfully did was to take 
the historical theorist W. H. Walsh's exhausted notion of the `colligatory concept', 
sever it from its objective referential entanglements, re-describe it as a `linguistic 
instrument' and then relocate it in language where it had really always belonged. To 
explain exactly what I mean by all this it will first be necessary to have a closer look 
at Walsh's proposition. 
Walsh introduced the concept of colligation (along with its anticipated explanatory 
potential) into the philosophy of history in his paper, `The Intelligibility of 
History', 16 published in 1942. Walsh had borrowed the idea from the nineteenth 
century English philosopher and historian of science William Whewell, and Walsh 
continued to develop it throughout the course of various editions and reprints of An 
Introduction to Philosophy ofHistory 17 before finalizing his argument in an essay 
entitled `Colligatory Concepts in Historyi 18 (Walsh explained in this essay that he 
preferred to use the term `colligatory concepts' rather than its earlier equivalent, 
`appropriate conceptions'). 19 
Colligation, as construed by Walsh, is essentially a form of contextualisation; that is, 
events are placed in a context through the establishment of a web of 
interconnections with other events in a manner that reveals the larger historical 
wholes of which the individual events are constituent parts. Walsh expected that 
colligation would offer the historian a tool of common usage in the sense that it 
might operate in its own right and independently with regard to the existing 
16 Walsh, W. H., (1942). 'The I ne lligibility of History' in Philosophy 17 no. 66: pp 129-143 
17 Walsh, W. H., (1967). An Ini adiection to Philosophy of History. London: Hutchison & Co. p59 
18 Walsh, W. H., (1967). `Colligatory Concepts in History' in Burston and Thompson (ads. ) Studies in the 
Nature of Teaching History. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp65-84 
19 ibid. p72 
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positivist and idealist theories of historical understanding which had been essentially 
articulated through C. G. Hempel's `Covering Law Model' and R. G. Collingwood's 
`Re-enactment Theory' respectively. Walsh's introductory illustrative account of the 
process of colligation was set out as follows: 
If a historian is asked to explain a particular historical event I think he is often 
inclined to begin his explanation by saying that the event in question is to be 
seen as part of a general movement which was going on at the time. Thus 
Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 might be elucidated by 
reference to the general policy of German self-assertion and expansion 
which Hitler pursued from the time of his accession to power. Mention of this 
policy, and specification of earlier and later steps in carrying it out, such as the 
repudiation of unilateral disarmament, the German withdrawal from the 
League of Nations, the absorption of Austria and the incorporation of the 
Sudetenland, do in fact serve to render the isolated action from which we 
started more intelligible. And they do it by enabling us to locate that action in 
its context, to see it as a step in the realisation of a more or less consistent 
policy. To grasp a policy of that sort and appreciate the way in which indi- 
vidual events contributed to its realisation is, at least in many cases, part of 
what is normally involved in giving a historical explanation. 20 
Walsh is thus suggesting here that the historian seeks an intelligible narrative whole, 
realised (in this particular example) through a `unity of plot' arising out of the 
contextualising process of colligation21, and that having achieved this unity any 
particular event within that whole might be thought to have been explained. It should 
also be noted here that Walsh's theory does not incorporate the idea that history could 
be seen as a `rational process...... [or that his theory should be seen as] the only 
explanatory procedure adopted by historians. 22 For 
.... in saying that the historian attempts to find intelligibility in history by 
colligating events according to appropriate ideas I am suggesting no theory of 
the ultimate moving forces in history. I say nothing about the origin of the 
ideas on which the historian seizes; it is enough for me that those ideas were 
influential at the time of which he writes. Thus the only rationality in the 
historical process which my theory assumes is a kind of surface rationality: the 
20 Walsh. An Introduction to Philosophy ojHistory. p59 
21 One should note here (taking this particular example cited by Walsh) that the contextualising process 
would necessarily show a preference for the selection of narrative statements capable of collectively 
individuating the idea that Hitler did in fact have in his mind the unity of plot proposed by the historian in 
question. It is, thus, the central idea that there must have been a particular unity of plot that governs the 
selection of statements which together individuate that very unity of plot notion. Accordingly, it could be 
argued that the 'colligatory concept' functions internally in a circular fashion and, fiuthermore, that it is 
exactly this autonomous mode of operation which is carried into its successor, the narrative substance 
(as discussed later in this Chapter). 
Ibid. p62 
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fact that this, that and the other event can be grouped together as parts of a 
single policy or general movement Of the wider question whether the policy 
or movement was itself the product of reason in a further sense I have nothing 
here to say. 23 
Of course, the colligatory concept relies on hindsight to create the contextualised 
field into which the various individual statements fit in sequence. Or, in other words, 
it is only by knowing how things turned out that historians (who, I think, generally 
distance themselves from hindsight and its traditional accomplice in crime - 
anachronism) can properly conceive of the whole in the first place, and it is therefore 
the directional "goal seeking" sequence of the parts with respect to the whole (as in 
the particular example cited, namely the case of Hitler's expansionist policies) that 
generates a mode of historical thinking'which `proceeds in teleological terms 2.24 It is 
also of interest to note that the events collected together in this particular case are 
related by period and not type and, furthermore, that there does not appear anywhere 
at all in Walsh's work, so far as I can see, an explanation of the event selection 
methodology to be employed by the historian. I presume that this matter was to be 
left to individual judgement and that selection would be a rather personal, and 
therefore obscure, value based affair. 
Other more familiar examples of colligatory concepts mentioned by Walsh were 
`The Renaissance', `The Enlightenment', `The Industrial Revolution', `The Age of 
Reform' and so on. These terms are of a more general nature than that of Hitler's 
expansionist policies and might be characterised as complexes of inwardly related 
events and situations that appear to be unplanned (unlike Hitler's relatively 
deliberate sequence of acts). However, all of these colligatory concepts seem to be, 
in their wholes, of greater significance than the sum of their constituent parts. 
Walsh does not offer any further meaningful analysis of his teleological mode of 
historical thinking, but he does move on in his unfolding explanation to account for 
deviations from his initial expansionist model. Here I quote W. H. Dray on Walsh 
who notes that 
23 ibid. P62 
24 ibid. p60 
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.... historians will be able to discern governing purposes and goals in cases 
where the agents concerned did not deliberately seek to realise them, let alone 
plan to bring them about by stages.... As an example, Walsh cites the way a 
`sense of imperial mission' throws light on much that happened in the political 
history of Great Britain in the late nineteenth century, although few of the 
agents concerned ever articulated such an idea to themselves .... Colligations depending upon the idea of unconscious motivation in this way Walsh calls 
4semi-teleological'25 
.... 
he also lays considerable emphasis ondeviations from 
a straightforwardly teleological paradigm by reason of the intervention of 
chance occurrences or other unintended consequences in most historical 
endeavours. Even when agents are pursuing plans and policies, he observes, 
the latter may often have to be adjusted because of changing circumstances, 
especially those resulting from the uncontrollable actions of others. 26 
Consequently, Walsh found himself forced to devise a complex system of sub- 
categories beneath his colligatory concepts in order that the overall device might be 
seen to remain adequate to its task. Indeed, C. B. McCullagh, who later tried to 
develop Walsh's argument, found it necessary to account for even more different 
sets and sub-sets of colligation. In particular, he introduced the sub-categories of the 
`formal' (relating to the formal structure of historical processes and the changes 
brought to them by the actions of historical agents) and the `dispositional' 
(effectively values or ideas which could be shown to be motivating historical agents 
with regard to specific events or sets of events). 27 And, whilst revising the notion of 
colligatory concepts for his (previously mentioned) 1967 publication, Walsh himself 
recognized that in his earlier writings he had omitted to incorporate the social 
dimension in historical understanding. He accordingly noted that the idea of social 
process 'should have been taken as primary'28 in his earlier works - an unfortunate 
admission after the devotion of some twenty-five years to an intransigent theory that 
had, time and again, effectively evaded the grasp of its advocates. 
However, the point that I am trying to illustrate here is that a number of people 
(more than I have mentioned -a longer list would include such theorists as L. B. 
u For further explanation see Walsh. An Introduction to Philosophy of History. p61 
26 Dray, W. H., (1989). On History & Philosophers of History. Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill. pp37-53 
27 McCullagh, C. B., (1978). `Colligation and Classification in History' in History and Theory 17 no. 3: 
'267-284 
Burston and Thompson (eds. ) Studies in the Nature of Teaching History. p73 
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Cebik, D. Thompson and M. White)29 had, over several years, buried themselves in 
the `huts and bolts" of Walsh's theory in what turned out to be an endless and 
unproductive search for some kind of workable understanding of it. The combined 
efforts of Walsh, Dray, McCullagh and the others had thus failed to arrive at any 
satisfactory understanding of the nature and significance of the valuable "tool" 
which lay before them. An indication of the mode of thought brought to bear on the 
problem is epitomised by Dray's insistence that colligatory concepts must be part of 
the past and not `imposed on the past .... [lest they] constitute a projection of the 
present upon the past rather than an attempt to take it for what it is and to study it for 
its own sake' 30 
And here what I fmd curious is that hardly anyone investigating this matter seemed 
to notice that the notion in question, the colligatory concept, is of course just that, a 
concept, and that as a concept it must surely reside in the mind of the conceiver of 
that concept and not in the past itself. Yet this concept was sought-out and 
investigated as if it were in possession of some form of objective status, as if it had 
once existed in the past as an object to which one might refer. McCullagh, referring 
to The Renaissance in just such a manner, declared it to be of a general rather than a 
specific nature because `historians found reason to speak of renaissances occurring 
in other periods, and even in other civilisations' . 
31 Renaissances were thus presumed 
to occur in the past -just like outbreaks of the plague, 
However, Ankersmit then stepped into the frame with a brilliant idea which finally 
(for me at least) closed down this extended debate. For (as I have said), he 
appropriated Walsh's colligatory concept, cut it loose from its problematic direct 
referential linkage with the past and re-described it under a new name, the narrative 
substance, as a linguistic device. A device which was and is fundamental to the 
logical structure of narrative accounts of the past and hence, all at once, old 
zs Cebik, L. B., (1969). `Coftigation and the Writing of History' in The Monist 53: pp4O-57, Thompson, 
D., `Colligation and History Teaching' in Studies of the Nature and Teaching of History. pp85-106, and 
White, M., (1965). Foun&xiionr of Historical Knowledge. New York: Harper & Row. pp252-254 
30 Dray. On History & Philosophers of History. p37. It is somewhat surprising to note that this comment 
was published in1989 - sixteen years after the publication of Metahistory and six years after the 
publication of Narrative Logic. 
' Ibid. p47 
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theoretical questions evaporated to be replaced by interesting new ones as 
Ankersmit's narrative substance(s) entered the broader discourses of modem and 
postmodern historical theory. 
To understand the manner in which the narrative substance functions, it is necessary 
to consider Ankersmit's observation that, taken in isolation, a constituent statement 
of a narrative account of the past has a double and not a single function. As a 
statement it refers directly to some aspect of the past or thing in the past; however, 
as a component of the narrative viewed as a whole it serves as a property of a 
"picture" of the past. This picture of the past (visualised from a specific point-of- 
view) which is individuated by a particular set of statements chosen and organised 
by the historian in order to produce that desired "picture", might be associated with 
a particular name, The Renaissance, The Cold War, The Enlightenment and so on, 
but often this will not be the case. Nevertheless, this does not mean that pictures of 
the past are not in use when such generally accepted terms fail to appear. Rather, the 
essential point here is that it is the narrative substance (governed by the historian's 
uniquely individuated point-of-view) which embodies overall narrative meaning and 
that this function should not be confused or conflated with (or indeed reduced to) the 
capacity of the narrative's individual statements to describe and, therefore, refer to 
the past. 
Now, where a statement, or sometimes a single word, performs this double function 
within the narrative, it might not be clear which of the two functions is operative at 
any one time. Take, for instance, a historical narrative containing the word 
Napoleon; this word could be used as a direct reference to the man himself 
(empirically acquired biographical details perhaps) or it could embody an 
individuated "picture" of Napoleon from the unique viewpoint of the author of the 
narrative who favours a particular interpretation of Napoleon as this or that type of 
man - the author's Napoleon. One could say, then, that there are two subjects 
intrinsic to the word Napoleon. First there is the narrative subject (the actual man 
about whom verifiable statements can be made which refer directly to this person in 
the past). And, second, there is the narrative substance or the narrative "picture" of 
24 
Napoleon generated within the logic of the text which cannot be subject to truth 
claims precisely because this picture is figured by the historian within the substance 
of the narrative itself and does not refer to anything outside it to which 
correspondence criteria can be categorically applied. The conflation of these two 
functions can lead to confusion and unjustified claims with regard to the status of the 
narrative viewed as a whole, claims such as; `the facts are right so the story must be 
right'. 
It now becomes clear that the essential difference between the position of the 
narrative realist (who recognises narrative subjects only) and the position of the 
narrative idealist (who recognises both narrative subjects and substances) is a matter 
of disagreement over the existence of narrative substances within narratives. 
Narrative idealism thus stakes claim to a third logical entity in addition to the subject 
and predicate of propositional logic and this new entity, the narrative substance, 
carries the narrative meaning of historical accounts of the past and, as such, 
constitutes the primary logical entity within those narrative accounts. Moreover, 
Ankersmit claimed correctly that no one previously in the fields of both the 
philosophy of history and the philosophy of language `ever seriously defended.... 
. [this] 
idea'. 32 
So, when a narrative substance acquires a name (for example, The Renaissance) and 
this name subsequently enters into common usage, an erroneous assumption can 
become attached to it That is, it can acquire the putative status of a known and 
definable entity which is assumed to inhabit the past itself; it could be taken (as 
Ankersmit would say) as part of the inventory of the past such that, as a 
consequence, the clearly demonstrable case that there are as many different 
Renaissances as there are historians who write on the subject is lost from view. To 
further illustrate this point take as an example the narrative substance, The Age of 
Steam', as envisaged by railway historians. One historian might consider that the 
spread of the railway system, from its (steam driven) birth to the ultimate demise of 
the steam locomotive, was a very good thing all round and proceed to demonstrate 
32 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p102 
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this by indicating its contributions to a period of economic and social change which, 
in this case, would be construed or troped as progress. Another historian might take 
a less enthusiastic view and, with some justification, point to negative aspects of the 
social impact of the railways - for instance, the breakdown of village communities. 
Yet another historian might take the view that `The Age of Steam' with its attendant 
pollution, dissipation of finite natural resources, etc., was or is part of a broader 
discourse concerning the degradation of the planet - and so on and so forth. In fact 
one could argue that there must be as many different points-of-view on this subject 
as there are historians writing about it, because each historian will colligate under 
his or her uniquely perceived notion of the meaning of 'The Age of Steam' the set of 
statements which individuate that very notion. The consequence of which is that 
each historian's narrative account of `The Age of Steam' will be, to some degree, 
different, irrespective of the veracity of each of the narrative's constituent 
statements. Debates on the relative merits of such accounts, as mentioned earlier, 
would thus turn on the question of the apparent validity or plausibility of the various 
points-of-view adopted and would not be too concerned with any questions relating 
to the correspondence between individual narrative statements and the actual past to 
which the statements referred - these matters lie within the sphere of the philosophy 
of historical research and can ultimately be resolved in that sphere. 
In practice the narrative substance and the historian's narrative point-of-view which 
governs it (regardless of discursive familiarity) will, then, lack any clear consensual 
identity because there will always be some measure of disagreement over the 
appropriate make up of its individuating statements. Furthermore, narrative 
substances or points-of-view, in order to possess identity at all, will require the 
presence of other competing points-of-view. That is to say that identity itself is a 
relational and thus a relative matter which arises out of differences; the notion of the 
existence of just one single point-of-view is, in a sense, oxymoronic because such 
singularity would constitute a postulated "truth" and not a proposal about it. 
Consequently, because any particular narrative point-of-view will strive to exclude 
all other competing points-of-view, it must follow that any narrative substance gains 
its identity negatively by virtue of what it rejects - by what it is not. Thus, given that 
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competing collections of narrative accounts of past events depend for their existence 
on the various narrative substances within them, then it follows that there could be 
no historical debate without them. Debate in such circumstances could only operate 
at the empirical level of reference, and factual reference alone cannot constitute a 
history at all: no narrative substance... no history! 
To briefly summarise the above at this point. Ankersmit is claiming that access to 
the logical structure of narrative accounts of the past is only possible through a 
newly postulated primary logical entity, the narrative substance, which embodies 
the narrative meaning of narrative accounts of the past. Of central importance to this 
notion, its "key", is the understanding that individual statements within the narrative 
have two functions; they refer to and thus describe things in or aspects of the past, 
however, taken collectively, they become properties of this narrative substance and 
thereby help to uniquely individuate a point-of-view or "picture" of the past which 
has no reference outside its narrative form (it can only refer to its own narrative 
substance). Narrative substances sometimes acquire names, and with these names 
comes a semblance of "visibility", but more often than not they remain unspecified. 
In both cases, however, narrative substances are somewhat nebulous in character 
and consensus regarding the exact nature of any such entity proposed by a historian 
will be hard to attain. 
Bearing in mind all the foregoing, it appears to me that Ankersmit's suggestion that 
the arguments explored in Narrative Logic `might be looked upon as an attempt to 
elaborate Walsh's notion of the colligatory concept'33 is, without doubt, a very 
modest claim. Ankersmit's narrative substance was the product of a brilliant 
paradigm shift in thought which, it would seem, was beyond the compass of those 
working in the old field of colligatory studies. There were clues and intimations, of 
course, as exemplified by this comment from Walsh himself 
Impartial history, so far from being an ideal, is a downright impossibility. In 
support of this we could point out that every historian looks at the past from a 
certain point of view, which he can no more avoid than he can jump out of his 
own skin. We could also maintain that the disagreements of historians, when 
33 Ankersmit. NairattNeLogiC. p100 
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carefully analysed, seem to turn on points which are not matter for argument, 
but depend rather on the interests and desires of the contending parties, 
whether in a personal or in a group capacity. Historical disputes, according to 
this way of thinking, are at bottom concerned not with what is true or false, but 
with what is and what is not desirable, and fundamental historical judgments 
are in consequence not strictly cognitive but `emotive. ' This would go far to 
abolish the distinction between history and propaganda, and therefore to 
undermine the claim that history is (or can become) a truly scientific study. 3a 
A paragraph like this would not look out of place in one of Ankersmit's 
philosophical texts, even the style of writing (if not the register) is somewhat 
similar. However, what is of interest here is that such unexpectedly perceptive 
observations, first published in 1952, were not developed by Walsh in any form 
whatsoever during those thirty-one years prior to the publication of Narrative 
Logic. Dray also seems to have missed something, for having written the following 
he then ignored it - as if the ideas articulated by the mentioned Louis Mink were 
curiosities and of no consequence: 
Of all the writers who have recently urged more attention to the part/whole 
relation in historical thinking, only Mink has explicitly held that tracing out a 
configuration is itself (i. e., even in the absence of an interpretive concept or 
description) a mode of understanding. The most important conclusions 
historians reach, Mink has maintained, are `undetachable' from the works that 
formulate them; for the conclusions are the details in their complicated 
interrelationships. " 
So, the connections were not made, and it was left to Ankersmit to conjure up the 
innovative mode of thought required to successfully lift a thoroughly stagnant 
concept out of the rigid mindset in which it was embedded, radically re-describe it, 
and then successfully relocate it at the cognitive core of the narrative form. This, to 
my mind, is more than plain elaboration. 
Once the idea of the narrative substance is grasped, of course, it all seems so 
obvious - how could it have been generally overlooked for so long? And Ankersmit 
even suggested a wider application of his theory (an application which can be linked 
back to history) as demonstrated by his investigation of the notion of self identity (or 
34 Walsh. An Ind odactton to Philosophy of Htstory. p22 
35 may. On History & Philosophers of History. P49 
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the "internalist" view of oneself), as opposed to personal identity (which he 
associated with the "extemalist" view of oneself). Ankersmit characterised self 
identity as follows: 
This is the sense in which one knows oneself as one ultimate indivisible being 
in the course of having any experience whatsoever, I know myself now as one 
being who just could not be any other. The question of my being some other 
person just could not arise, I am myself whatever my experience is like. But 
there is also a sense in which I am continuously subject to change. Every 
instant I change.... in terms of what I undergo or experience or do I am never 
the same persona 
The problem, then, is to express self identity in terms of a unique and constant entity 
which has the capacity, without compromise to itself, to internally tolerate change. 
Ankersmit's offered an ingenious solution to this problem as follows: 
For Ankersmit, the expression `self identity' signifies a uniqueness or unity of 
experience that can be seen as a `logical entity' which encompasses all personal 
experiences (and consciousness itself) and attributes them exclusively to the self- a 
unity which, nevertheless, embodies the inscription of change occasioned by those 
experiences. Hence, Ankersmit argues that the logical entity self identity refers to a 
narrative substance (per)formed on the self, whilst the statements of which it is 
comprised express all the experiences and perceptions of that self to date and will, in 
the fullness of time, include those to come. Self identity, thus conceived, is not an 
unchangeable property of the self, but a narrative concept which refers to a narrative 
substance individuated by a constantly expanding collection of statements 
expressing experiences and perceptions of the self. It is, then, self identity as a 
linguistic entity that rationalises the concept of the "sameness" of the individual 
throughout the changing experiences of life. Accordingly, self identity cannot be 
reduced to any particular experience or perception, rather it is the case that singular 
experiences and perceptions collectively individuate self identity. 
As such, self identity does not convey knowledge, but rather allows the arrangement 
of knowledge from an evolving point-of-view which, in a circular manner, is itself 
36 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p183 
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its own referent Ankersmit argues that self identity is `the most important narrative 
substance we know and, moreover, prerequisite for our very ability to recognize 
other narrative substances and thus for the narrative writing of history'. 37 The logic 
of the latter statement rests on the recognition that the notion of self identity effects 
a division between the spheres of what does and what does not belong to the self, 
and that this demarcation implicitly presumes the existence of other narrative 
substances besides self identity - the necessary condition for the writing of history. 
Another of Ankersmit's interesting "asides" concerns the 'narrativised self, which 
might be seen to be located somewhere between two extremes. At one end of the 
scale is the solipsist's position from which all reality is seen to be written-in to self 
identity, and at the other end lies the condition of rejection or loss of self identity. In 
the first case the self is all and external reality becomes an empty place, whilst, in 
the second case, the self is lost from view as it dissolves into the immensity of 
external reality. This diversion from his main argument is used by Ankersmit to 
illustrate the nature of psychological disorders which might arise from irregularities 
in, or loss of, self identity leading to distortion of, or loss of, viewpoint on reality. A 
psychoanalyst would subsequently be required for the treatment of these disorders, 
such treatment being effected through the identification and neutralization of the 
problematic individuating experiential statements which happen to be disturbing or 
demolishing self identity. 
On the issue of self identity, then, Ankersmit, with remarkable insight, is arguing the 
point that the writing of history is impossible without it. He argues that the notion of 
self identity logically entails the division of reality into two spheres - that of the self 
and that which is not the self - and that this division is the necessary precondition 
for the recognition of other narrative substances which exist outside self identity. 
Only after this recognition of the existence of narrative substances outside self 
identity, or the history of the self, is it possible to write history at all. It is worth 
mentioning that this point, which I consider to be one of Ankersmit's most striking 
37 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p187 
30 
and which has implications for the history that I am arguing for, seems to have been 
completely overlooked by his many commentators. 
Pillar 3 
With reference to his third proposition or essential pillar (to recall, the relationship 
between narrative substance and metaphor), Ankersmit argued that one cannot 
overlook the conspicuous similarity between the modes of operation of the metaphor 
and that of the narrative substance. This observation suggests that the narrative 
substance - the cognitive core of the narrative form - is of a fundamentally 
metaphorical kind and thus, it follows, that the narrative use of language must also 
be fundamentally metaphorical. He builds his argument to that effect in the 
following way. 
As previously established, narrative statements have a double function. That is, to 
briefly restate, they describe the past (such description being subject to empirical 
falsification) and they collectively constitute an image of the past (an image, seen 
from a particular point-of-view, which logically cannot submit to any form of 
falsification). There is a clear distinction between these two quite different uses of 
language, the empirical referential language of description and the aesthetic 
language (the figuring/shaping) of individuation; nevertheless, they are elided into a 
single structure, the narrative itself. Ankersmit pointed out that this double function, 
which typifies narrative statements, is also typical of metaphorical statements. Take, 
for example, Shakespeare's metaphor `All the world's a stage' from As You Like It, 
(at 2 scate 7). The meanings of the words `world' and `stage' in isolation - their 
signification - would in Ankersmit's argument comprise the literal content of the 
phrase. However, taken in the whole the phrase also constitutes an invitation to the 
reader/audience to visualize the world from a particular point-of-view which, in this 
case, effects the transfer of the attributes of the theatrical stage onto the world. This 
metaphorical use of language (which is crucial for all meaning making) can be seen 
to furnish Shakespeare's phrase with a surphis of meaning which exceeds its 
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aforementioned literal meanings. Ankersmit referred to this surplus as the `scope' of 
the metaphor, which allowed him to make the important observation that the 
metaphor is not part of reality itself but should rather be seen as a linguistic figure 
that imposes or proposes a particular view on/of reality. 
To further illustrate the point, I recall as a schoolboy being told that electricity - the 
mysterious stuff which makes sparks - should be seen as a flow of water, a river, 
where driving force corresponds to electrical voltage and -flow corresponds to 
electrical current. This metaphorical point-of-view, with its implied relationship 
between the force thrusting the river along and the mass of water carried by it, has 
the effect of appearing to explain something about, or of demystifying, the 
phenomenon of electricity. Accordingly, the metaphor's `scope' not only 
familiarizes the notion of electricity but it also provides a model of logic upon which 
problem solving (in this case at that entry level of physics) might be accomplished. 
This example effectively highlights three characteristics of the metaphor: (1) It 
familiarizes but does not explain the unfamiliar. (2) The metaphorical "model" (if 
it's a good one) facilitates problem solving. (3) The metaphor is not part of reality - 
water and electricity don't mix. And I would add, by way of an aside, thatthis 
familiarization process, which appears to be the primary function of the metaphor, 
gives rise to a kind of illusion. The illusion being, that the nature of the familiarized 
new phenomenon might appear to have been adequately explained and understood 
when, in fact, it has only been described in terms of other, older phenomena, which 
are equally assumed to have been understood, but which have themselves been 
placed under description in terms of various preceding and presumed understood 
phenomena, and so on and so forth. It thus becomes clear that the language with 
which we choose to put our world under description (and then use to deduce our 
"knowledge" about it) comprises a complex of receding metaphors - all the way 
down. 
This impenetrable void that separates knowledge from mere description has often 
been vividly articulated, but perhaps never better than by Albert Camus who writes: 
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Of whom and of what indeed can I say: `I know that! ' This heart within me I 
can feel, and I judge that it exists. This world I can touch, and I likewise judge 
that it exists. There ends all my knowledge, and the rest is construction.......... 
you tell me of an invisible planetary system in which electrons gravitate 
around a nucleus. You explain this world to me with an image. I realize then 
that you have been reduced to poetry: I shall never know. Have I the time to 
become indignant? You have already changed theories. So that science, that 
was to teach me everything ends up in a hypothesis, that lucidity founders in 
metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of art. What need had I of so 
many efforts? ......... you give me the choice between a description that is sure but that teaches me nothing and hypotheses that claim to teach me but that are 
not sure. 39 
Metaphor, then, articulates both a literal descriptive function and a seeing as or 
point-of-view function. And it is the excess of metaphorical over literal meaning 
which Ankersmit sees as the `surplus meaning that constitutes the essential logical 
difference between metaphorical and literal statements'. 39 Both the historical 
narrative and the metaphor can, therefore, be seen either descriptively or in the form 
of representations (or proposals) governed by linguistic devices which are 
suggestive of perspectives from which reality might be viewed. Accordingly, as 
Ankersmit pointed out, when we can claim that `description and individuation are 
the two logical operations that embody the essence of the narrative use of language, 
we are justified in ascribing to the narratio a profoundly metaphorical character'. 40 
Underlining this argument in some measure is Hayden White's view of the metaphor 
as a deviation from the literal, a swerve in locution `sanctioned neither by custom 
nor logic'. 41 White observes that `tropics is the process by which all discourse 
constitutes the objects which it pretends only to describe realistically and to analyse 
objectively'. 42 That is to say that it is through tropological (metaphorical) 
description that objects are first constituted before becoming "known" or understood 
within that same imaginative framework of metaphor in which they were first 
constituted (a kind of linguistic tautology). It thus follows by implication that the 
38 Camus, A, (1955). The Myth of Sisyphus. London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd. pp22-23 
39 Ankersmit. Narrative LogiC. p212 
40 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic, p216 
41 White, H., (1978). Tropics of Discourse. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. P2 
42 Ibid. p2 
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linguistic device, the trope, possesses a certain autonomy of operation with regard to 
narrative meaning. There exists, then, a parallelism of thought between White and 
Ankersmit, for Ankersmit also proposed an autonomy of operation with regard to 
the narrative, in this case the historical narrative, the meaning of which appears to be 
governed by images generated by linguistic devices rather than the actuality of the 
past itself. 
This, then, is Ankersmit's central argument which ties metaphor to narrative 
substance and thence to narrative form and, in so doing, draws attention to the most 
conspicuous logical property shared by the metaphor and the narrative; namely, that 
their meanings can be said to be carried by their propositional and not by their 
descriptive modes of articulation. 
Ankersmit concluded his argument with a closer look at the metaphorical structure 
of narrative statements in order to establish some criteria of preference which might 
be used to select the best narrative accounts of the past. He opened his argument 
with the following observation: 
Anyone who has ever tried his hand at writing history will have experienced 
the extreme flexibility of descriptive statements on the past: they meekly fit the 
most disparate accounts of the past. 43 
This flexibility of descriptive statements allows for their requisition as required. 
Thus, any statement might contribute to the individuation of a multiplicity of 
different narrative substances because descriptive statements have no `narrative 
compass of their own'. ` It is only the historian's unique point-of-view which 
endows purposefully selected narrative statements with their capacity to collectively 
illustrate that very point-of-view from which those statements were selected. Seen 
this way, there exists an internal circularity which characterises the nature of all 
historical narrative statements and which, accordingly, affirms the autonomous 
nature of the narrative meaning carried by the whole historical text. This is how 
Ankersmit put his circularity argument: 
43 Ankersmit. Narrativie Logic. p218 
44Ibid. p218 
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The dependence of separate descriptive statements upon the points-of-view 
individuated by them when taken together, their "compasslessness" when 
taken in isolation, underlines once more the circularity so characteristic of historical knowledge. Isolated individual statements of a narratio may indicate 
all conceivable directions - only a narrative "point of view" can give them "narrative direction", yet this "point of view" only comes into being thanks to 
those helpless descriptive statements. 45 
Now, one might not be entirely happy with the idea that this point-of-view only 
comes into being thanks to descriptive statements or, in other words, as if the 
narrative viewed as a whole were not prefigured - aesthetically and ideologically 
positioned (this, of course, being White's point which arguably draws attention to a 
weakness in Ankersmit's third `pillar', 46 albeit a weakness which does not 
necessarily damage his overall thesis). However, one cannot object to Ankersmit's 
argument if he means by it that individual `compassless' statements have meanings 
imposed on them from a prefigured point-of-view (the necessary initial condition for 
the writing of history) in order that they might, in a circular fashion, individuate that 
precise point-of-view. Accordingly, the meanings of narrative statements can be 
seen to be determined by the narrative interpretations in which they reside and the 
meanings which become attached to facts can similarly be seen to be narrative 
dependant. Ankersmit thus concluded that it is indeed the case that `there are no 
[meaningful] facts devoid of narrative interpretation'. 47 
The foregoing argument would, I think, permanently preclude the possibility of any 
definitive selection criteria which might be put to use in order to identify the best of 
any collection of variously construed historical narratives, each purporting to 
properly (truly) represent some past event or situation. However, skirting this 
relativistic conclusion, ` Ankersmit proposed a selection strategy that rested on his 
notion of `scope' which, accordingly, he extended beyond the metaphor to 
encompass the narrative form as a whole and which somewhat deflected attention 
away from his relativistic difficulties. 49 
45 Ibid. p218 
46 This point will be fully explored in Chapter. Two. 
47 Ankersmit. Nwraiiw Logic. p219 
'8 Ankersmit has never liked relativism despite its "logic". 
491 shall be returning to this argument in my Conclusion. 
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As previously explained, the formulation of a metaphorical statement necessarily 
involves the individuation of a point-of-view from which reality (or rather a part of 
reality) could be seen. Thispoint-of-view endows the metaphorical statement with 
the capacity to articulate information in excess of that contained within its meaning 
when taken literally. Hence, the scope of a metaphorical statement is wider than its 
literal descriptive content which, lacking point-of-view, fails to project any 
familiarising metaphorical figure onto that part of reality in question. It should again 
be noted that this figure or way of seeing reality, whilst giving preference to certain 
statements on reality, does not itself constitute any part of reality for Ankersmit who 
thus concluded that: 
.... 
it seems only reasonable to say that the most successful metaphorical 
statements are those in which the dissimilarity between scope and descriptive 
content has been maximalized. Scope-maximalization is the goal of the 
metaphorical dimension in language. 50 
Similarly, the historical narrative's constituent statements will collectively 
individuate a point-of-view - thus suggesting a particular structure or shape to that 
part of the past in question - and, therefore, together these statements will carry 
narrative meaning in excess of the sum of the descriptive meanings carried by each 
statement when considered in isolation. Accordingly, Ankersmit argued that, as was 
the case with the metaphorical statement, the scope of the historical narrative viewed 
as a whole will also be greater than the sum of its parts taken in isolation. It also 
manifestly follows (as I have previously argued) that the narrative meaning, or what 
Ankersmit often refers to as the `historical knowledge' carried by the narrative as a 
whole, will be governed by the unique point-of-view adopted by the historian. This 
is inevitable because to adopt a particular narrative point-of-view is to express a 
preference for the sort of narrative statement that would lend support to the point-of- 
view adopted. 
Now, whenever historical narratives are compared it is precisely their scopes and not 
their points-of-view which form the basis of that comparison because there is no 
common ground against which the comparisons of intangible points-of-view could 
w Ibid. p221 
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take place. Ankersmit, then, contends that the best amongst competing narratives 
must be the one that has most effectively and courageously maximalised its scopes' 
Thus concluding that `Fertility and not truth is our criterion for deciding upon the 
relative merits of narratios'. 52 
For the moment, then, this completes my reading of what I take to be the essential 
elements of Narrative Logic - the same elements that define the good Ankersmit of 
my chapter title. In the next chapter I will, amongst other things, be following 
Ankersmit's scope argument as it is developed by him, but I now propose to bring 
this chapter to a close with an appraisal of the generally unfavourable reviews that 
Narrative Logic has received. 
The Reviews 
It came as something of a surprise - bearing in mind the significance of Ankersmit's 
pioneering thesis and its attendant clarifications of "old problems" - to discover that 
very few reviews of Narrative Logic have actually been published. I have only been 
able to find four (in English) of which the most positive is that of Hayden White 
who recognised that the book represented a `substantial contribution,. not only to the 
literature on philosophy of history, but also that which deals with narrativist 
philosophy'. 53 White accepted Ankersmit's argument that a historical narrative, 
being a representation of or proposal about the past, can constitute nothing more 
than an invitation to view a past event or situation from a particular perspective and, 
furthermore, that its `referent' is the narrative substance governing that perspective. 
A historical narrative is (says White) to be seen `not [as] an "image" of the past nor 
an "explanation" of it.......... [but] always at best an "interpretation" of the kind of 
51 Ankersmit found himself obliged to adds caveats here. For instance, he insisted on the overriding 
stipulation that individuating narrative statements which can be shown to be false are to be rejected and, 
furthermore, that the preferred narrative account is the one that comes closest to propaganda without 
actually becoming propaganda. However (and this matter will be further discussed in Chapter Two, pages 
73 & 74), he made no mention of any adjudicator charged with the responsibility for the identification 
and suppression of either false statements or examples of propaganda. 52 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p223 
53 White, H., (1984). `Reviews of Books' in American Historical Review 89 no. 4: p1037 
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complex entities that can be comprehended only in the extent to which they can be 
"narrativistically" represented''. 
David W. Foster wrote a short review for the literary journal Rocky Mountain 
Review in which he called for further exploration of `the continuities between 
literary and so-called non-literary works, to expand the scope of literary studies to 
include a wide variety of written texts other than the strictly literary', 55 and it is 
against this literary background that Foster finds interest in Ankersmit's explanation 
of historical writing as a specimen to be studied rather than to be accepted or 
rejected. Donald R. Kelley, by contrast, wrote a distinctly negative review, the 
content of which suggests that he had failed to properly grasp Ankersmit's 
argument. Kelley is of the opinion that Ankersmit creates difficulties for himself 
when he grapples with historical teens like `The General Crisis' and especially The 
Renaissance'. He also accuses him of a `.... cursory dismissal of "historical 
research", by which he means not only the whole area of discovery but also that of 
the definition and interpretation of evidence. .. 'S6. Now, Ankersmit has never 
dismissed historical research, on the contrary he frequently comments on its 
importance, as (for example) during an interview with Ewa Domat ska, when he 
pointed out that 
.... 
it may very well be that all true progress in history is progress in historical 
research. If one compares what we now know of civilizations that have been 
forgotten for millennia, or of languages that have not been spoken for many 
centuries, it would be ridiculous to deny that progress is made in the area of 
historical research. So no one should try to look down on historical research; 
that really is the cognitive backbone of history. However, it is not all the 
historian does.... 57 
Consequently, the central point here (and this is not only evident from the book's 
main text but it is also made quite clear by Ankersmit in its Introduction), is that. 
Narrative Logic is not about historical research, it's about historical writing. 
Moreover, referring back to Kelly's `dismissal' comment above, the notion of 
M Ibid. p1037 
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`interpretation of evidence' does not fall into the empirical sphere of historical 
research. To miss this point is to miss a fundamental premise of Ankersmit's thesis, 
and th erefore it seems. to me that any difficulties referred to by Kelly are of his own 
and not of Ankersmit's making. 
Undoubtedly, however, the review that most influenced general opinion about the 
book and, according to Ankersmit, inflicted the most damage to the book's sales, 
was that written by C. B. McCullagh58 and published in History and Theory. Some 
years after the appearance of this review Ankersmit expressed his continuing 
resentment against McCullagh in an interview with Ewa DomaAska: 
.... Narrative Logic never had the slightest impact even 
in the small world of 
historical theorists. Of course, this has much to do with several evident short 
comings of the book itself. I went to the wrong publishing company, the book 
was poorly produced, written in an awkward and stiff English, and contained a 
lot of misprints. On top of that I had the misfortune that McCullagh's review of 
the book in History and Theory was the most hostile and most narrow-minded 
review that was ever published in that journal. The sad irony, by the way, is 
that I had myself suggested to the editors of History and Theory to ask 
McCullagh to write a review -a perfect example, I'd say, of how one can cut 
one's own throat..... what I learned from McCullagh's review was that a 
meaningful debate with positivistically minded people like him would be 
impossible. It was not merely a matter of disagreement; rather you could say 
that all the kind of things that I considered to be the most interesting and 
challenging problems of how the historian uses narrative language to account 
for the past were non-problems for positivists like McCullagh. 59 
With regard to the content of the McCullagh's review I can only agree with 
Ankersmit, for I find it rather shallow and lacking in cohesion. Furthermore, and this 
is really my main point, McCullagh roundly dismissed Ankersmit's central thesis as 
`neither enlightening nor convincing'60 without properly understanding it or 
suggesting anything better. I am not for a moment advocating that everyone should 
accept Ankersmit's argument, but its rejection must, at the very least, be articulated 
on the basis of a considered assessment of his proposals taken in the whole. I found 
what I consider to be some thirty points of contention within McCullagh's text and, 
58 McCullagh, C. B., (1984). `Review Essays' in History and Theory 23 no. 3: pp394-403 
39 Domafiska. Op. cit. pp7l-72 
60 McCullagh. Op. cit. p403 
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since it would be tiresome to mention them all, I have broken down my list under 
three headings and addressed a selection of the more significant points within the 
categories of `misrepresentation', `misunderstandings' and `inadvertent accord'. 
Misrepresentation 
This, McCullagh's inexcusable yet frequent blunder, is typified by his rhetorical 
question; `.... why should the point-of-view of a historian be considered both 
additional to the statements of his or her narratio, and an integral part of that narratio 
as well? '61. Now, in the first place, Ankersmit does not say that the historian's point- 
of-view constitutes some sort addition to the statements in his/her historical 
narrative, rather it is the historian's point-of-view which expresses a preference for 
and therefore governs the type of narrative statement that the historian will be 
predisposed to select out of all possible statements that are available for selection. 
Moreover, Ankersmit repeatedly stresses his wholly logical assertion that a point-of- 
view or narrative substance is not part of (past) reality but a way of looking at it and 
therefore it can be neither a part of reality nor a part of a representation of it. 
McCullagh is also of the view that Ankersmit is in denial over `the reality of states 
and religions because our concepts of these things are mental constructions ...... it 
can be dangerous to believe that the state does not exist just because the authority of 
its offices is not visible'. 621 cannot fmd nor can I recall such a denial anywhere at all 
in Ankersmit's writings. He does, however, make the point that states and religions 
are narrative substances and, as such, the notion of what that state or that religion 
might be is an individual or personal matter which depends on that person's point- 
of-view. There may be some significant degree of overlap between individual 
notions of what these concepts are, but it nevertheless remains the case that each 
individual will have his or her own unique point-of-view on whatever concept it is 
that is under consideration - that is all. And this is not so surprising since, unlike the 
signifier table or chair, a state or religion has no external referent. Or, to put it 
61 Ibid. p397 
62 Ibid. pp398-399 
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differently, one can walk around a chair, point at it, prod it and even sit on it, but 
how can one repeat that performance with a state or a religion? McCullagh, 
however, `cannot see any fundamental difference between the "normal things" [dogs 
and snowflakes] which Ankersmit has referred to and things referred to by general 
colligatory terms' 63 
My next example of McCullagh's misrepresentation concerns `scope' as defined by 
Ankersmit. Here is one of the many things that McCullagh has to say about it: 
Why does Ankersmit think that the bigger the scope of a narratio the better? It 
is not at all clear. He mentions Sir Karl Popper's belief that daring, highly 
falsifiable hypotheses are to be preferred (245). And he writes approvingly of 
some interpretations being more fertile than others in that they enable one to 
synthesize more facts than the narratio expressing them actually describes 
(223-225). 64 
But it is abundantly clear why Ankersmit thinks `the bigger the scope the better', he 
explained it very well as I hope I have shown. But what concerns me here is 
McCullagh's claim in the last two lines of the extract above, for I have looked very 
carefully through pages 223-225 of Narrative Logic and I cannot fmd anywhere a 
statement to the effect that a greater degree of fertility enables one to `synthesise 
more facts than the narratio expressing them actually describes', nor can I work out 
exactly what this is supposed to mean. 
Misunderstandings 
These mostly seem to arise out of McCullagh's failure to grasp the significance of 
what I take to be Ankersmit's irrefutable distinction between the two categorically 
different spheres of narrative representation and narrative description, for he asks 
`What more is there to a picture of the past than those statements which form the 
narratio? i65 wherein the `picture' (representation) has been elided with `those 
statements' (descriptions) which form the narratio. This mistake is then 
63 Ibid. p398 
64 Ibid. p401 
65 Ibid. p395 
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compounded by McCullagh's assertion that `A central theme of Ankersmit's book is 
his denial of "narrative realism", that is of a theory that historical narratios represent 
or describe the past' 66 Again, by his conflation of the two terms represent and 
describe he ignores the fundamental distinction between them. 
In response to Ankersmit's claim that the structure of the historical narrative is 
`pressed on the past', McCullagh states that `.... this conclusion is far to sweeping. 
The descriptions of the past presented in narratios are not "pressed on the past" 
regardless of evidence. If they do not fit the facts, if they do not describe them 
correctly, then th ey are rejected'. 67 But this argument makes no sense to me, for 
description in narrative accounts of the past operates at the level of the fact and the 
individual statement. It would appear that McCullagh is saying that if descriptions 
which are constituted by facts do not fit the facts with which they are so constituted, 
then they are rejected. McCullagh compounds his curious position when he states 
that the historian `has a variety of concepts by which to conceive of the past, and his 
or her job is to find those which correspond most exactly to what is known about 
it'. 68 He seems to be saying here, although it is difficult to be sure, that having 
acquired empirical knowledge of the past the historian's task is then to match that 
empirical knowledge to a preconceived aesthetic concept from a list of such 
concepts available for this purpose - off the shelf. This muddled philosophy does 
not work for me and arguably has little or no bearing/traction in relation to 
Ankersmit's own clear position on the matter. 
Inadvertent accord 
There are numerous instances in his text where McCullagh's oppositional arguments 
seem to be inadvertently paralleling or supporting Ankersmit's arguments; here is 
one of them: 
Ankersmit might have argued that the statements in a narratio can have several 
different kinds of meaning. As descriptions of the past they can have a plain 
" Ibid. p397 
67 Ibid. p400 
68 Ibid. p399 
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locutionary meaning, in accordance with dictionaries and grammar books. 
They can sometimes also be seen to instantiate the historian's general 
conceptions of past events and their causes. And, finally, they can also be said 
to express certain unstated values and interests of the author. If an historian's 
conceptual framework and values and interests constitute his or her point of 
view, then in these ways the statements of a narratio may be said to manifest it. 
Whether Ankersmit would agree with all of this, it is impossible to say. His 
analysis of "point of view" never really gets off the ground. 69 
However, my point is that if `the historian's general conceptions' and his `unstated 
values and interests' were to be, quite reasonably, taken as narrative substances 
(because these elements constitute a point-of-view) and the word instantiate were to 
be understood in the sense of individuate (as, I think, it can), then this statement is 
unintentionally in accord with Ankersmit's thinking on the matter. McCullagh's 
antepenultimate sentence seems to corroborate the position such that, on this 
reading, Ankersmit might well say `yes; I agree with all of this'. 
So, all in all this is arguably a very unsatisfactory review, and I find it difficult to 
understand why McCullagh would have wanted to write something which, in my 
view, could have reflected so badly on his own reputation as a historical theorist. 
However (and perhaps the explanation lies here) one has to consider what might 
have been the effect of the actual publication of Narrative Logic on McCullagh 
himself, bearing in mind that Ankersmit had based his narrative substance on a 
concept that had, over so many years, completely escaped McCullagh's grasp. For 
Ankersmit snatched this thing from beneath McCullagh's nose, turned it on its head 
and relocated it at the cognitive core of the narrative form where it had really always 
belonged, presumably to the embarrassment and annoyance of McCullagh. But then, 
having written his book about it, Ankersmit did something himself which was 
simply incomprehensible, for he abandoned all caution and recommended 
McCullagh as its reviewer. Why Ankersmit should have acted in this (potentially) 
masochistic way eludes me - did he in an irrational moment catch sight of the "high 
road" to general acceptance through McCullagh's possible endorsement of his book? 
If so, his risky strategy rested on a careless miscalculation since it was very unlikely 
69 Ibid. p397 
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that McCullagh could, in the circumstances, have been won-over to Ankersmit's 
point-of-view. The strength of McCullagh's opposition to Ankersmit's thesis 
discounted agreement at any level, even had he grasped the point. But, there again, 
does not McCullagh's incoherent response to Ankersmit's thesis have the 
appearance of a hastily fabricated barrier set-up against the thrust of a superior 
argument? Perhaps McCullagh grasped the point after all because there is no doubt 
that, if taken seriously, Ankersmit's critique of so many epistemological shibboleths 
would have fatally undercut McCullagh's own rigid, epistemological position. Seen 
from this perspective one could argue that McCullagh might have hoped to "shore- 
up" (relatively speaking) his own foundering argument through the demolition, by 
petty trivialisation, of a much better argument from Ankersmit. Seen this way, the 
good Ankersmit looks really very good indeed. 
But be that as it may and moving on, in the conclusion to his review essay 
McCullagh put forward the following complaint: `General accounts of historical 
knowledge and understanding are only illuminating if based upon fine analysis of 
actual examples. The absence of such analysis in this book explains its 
inadequacies'. 70 So, in Ankersmit's absence I now propose to do just that - to take 
up McCullagh's challenge and map out by means of Ankersmit's narrative logic the 
process necessarily involved in the production of a history of, let's say, `last month 
in the UK'. 71 
Now, although an unimaginably huge number of things happened in the UK last 
month, only a very small percentage of the totality of those events will have been 
recorded and thus become available as traces of last month. Nevertheless, this small 
percentage will still constitute a very large body of data which, in order to be usable, 
will inevitably require reduction on the basis of some chosen set of selection criteria. 
On this small (and therefore hopelessly unreliable) remnant or part of the past a 
70 Ibid. p403 
71 My subject for historicisation, `last month in the UK', the month prior to the writing of the first draft of 
this chapter, is that of May 2008 and I have deliberately chosen a very recent past for my example in 
order to illustrate, alongside my main argument, this additional point: If a recent well documented past 
foils all concerted efforts to fix its intrinsic meaning, then how are we to capture with words the essence 
of a more remote and less well documented past? 
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whole is eventually to be presented in narrative form on the general and usually 
unquestioned assumption that a whole can be unproblematically inferred from an 
infinitesimally small part of that whole. 
Compounding this problem is the matter of data selection itself, how is it to be 
done? Or to rephrase, what are the statements or facts about last month that might 
capture its essence - in and for itself (as, I believe, McCullagh thinks is possible)? 
Could last month in some definitive sense, in and for itself, be found in (for 
example) the collapse of Bradford and Bingley's share price, obesity in school 
children, the soaring cost of energy, the collapse of sterling, road rage, escalating 
health care inequalities, the credit crisis, the failure of English cricketers or perhaps 
the weather? What I am trying to indicate here, what is crucial, is the need to take a 
point-of-view on last month in the UK before it is possible to say anything about it 
that carries any meaning at all -a uniform selection of un-colligated statements, a 
kind of month average strung out in a line, would be incomprehensible. 
So if, for instance, I take the view right now (Spring 2008) that Gordon Brown and 
his labour government are painfully acting out some "end game" which is evident in 
the unpleasant odour of sleaze, misused privilege and reactive politics that have 
collectively permeated his administration - an administration which is out of touch, 
out of control and destined for ignominious collapse; and, if I further take the view 
that this "end game" viewpoint (however unlikely it might seem to others) captures 
the essence of last month more effectively than any other possible view on last 
month, then I have a basis for data selection. My preference being, of course, for 
that data which would adequately individuate my own point-of-view when worked- 
up into story form under the governing logic of the narrative substance "end game". 
To now restate the foregoing more in the language of Ankersmit, "end game" is here 
an arbitrarily chosen narrative substance or colligatory device for the express 
purpose of selecting and organising knowledge of the past (in this case the verifiable 
facts or singular statements which refer to or describe aspects of last month). This 
data will be sought out and selected in order to collectively individuate the narrative 
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substance "end game" which is not part of the past but, rather, a viewpoint imposed 
on the past, a violence or a knocking into shape of an actual past that has no 
preference on how it is to be represented. However, despite these intractable 
difficulties, the adoption of a point-of-view will always be a necessary condition for 
any historical writing at all for, and I repeat: no narrative substance - no history. 
To continue with my example (and taking now Ankersmit and White in alliance), 
having adopted a point-of-view and having collected together the statements 
required to individuate it, the next task is to write-up the data into narrative form. 
For this purpose I will need a story line or mode of emplotment, a mode of argument 
and some refinement in position concerning the manner in which the story is to be 
troped such that it carries its intended meaning. These strategies, both conceptual 
and explanatory, will, of course, be coloured by the ideological position that I bring 
to the task - history is always history for someone. Now none of these complex 
considerations, which necessarily come into play in order to establish the form of the 
kind of story to be told, can be seen to have much to do with the past itself certainly 
none of these conditions ofpossibility for any historicisation of the past are in the 
past itself. It is true, of course, that the narrative's constituent statements will refer to 
some aspect of the past but, taken individually, they cannot be representative of a 
narrative proposal about the past. The origin of any proposal about how the past 
might have been lies imbedded in the conceptual apparatus of the historian and 
cannot therefore be taken as part of the past itself. Rather, the historian's adoption of 
a concept of how the past might have been -a necessary condition of possibility (as 
explained above) for the writing of history - is, as Ankersmit puts it, `pressed onto 
the past. It shapes a putative past which correspond with its own internal concept of 
how that past might have been. 
This brief example, I hope, illustrates what I take to be Ankersmit's essential 
understanding of the process of history production and (thus defended) it was as 
good, or better, than any alternative theorisations up until that time. Turning again to 
McCullagh, I cannot find in his critique any better way of thinking through the 
production of history. In fact, on those occasions where he approached a coherent 
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theory on the matter it seems to me that he was inadvertently falling in line with 
Ankersmit's thinking. 
In short, then, the position as. I see it (and as Ankersmit describes it) is this: the 
evidential traces of the contingent actions and situations which once constituted the 
actuality of some past event are drawn/figured together into some or other 
"historical" order by historians through the imposition of some or other story form 
upon them. This story form is a linguistic construct informed solely by its own 
narrative substance. It is a product of the enculturation of its own time and it cannot 
be found in the past itself. The past is thus violated by the very act of historicisation; 
that is to say that the past is ordered, beaten into shape and suitably appropriated in 
order to fit, what is in the end, an arbitrary story form which is retrospectively 
imposed on it whence to serve some human purpose to which the past itself is 
indifferent. Now if McCullagh still believes, as I think he does, that past events have 
their own intrinsic stories to reveal concerning their meanings, purposes, 
trajectories, etc., and that these stories are lying around somewhere awaiting their 
discovery by a historian adequate to that task, then he should ask himself two 
important questions: who is the author of these stories and what is that author's 
authorial intent? 
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Chapt, r Two 
A Moment ofHesitation 
In Chapter One I focused on what I consider to be the very best elements of 
Ankersmit's narrative theory as originally articulated in Narrative Logic (and later 
restated in History and Tropology in the form of abbreviated tabular sets of 
conclusions, collected together under the title `Six Theses on Narrativist Philosophy 
of History')' and which, in sum, constitute the finished "weight" of Ankersmit's 
argument. These conclusions, taken in isolation (that is, divorced from the 
arguments that produced them) are, I think, coherent and complete in themselves. 
They embody the very substance of what I have termed `The Good Ankersmit' and, 
unquestionably, I have no wish to subvert them. However I do have reservations 
about the structure, the philosophical style, and the intent of some of the arguments 
that even this good Ankersmit used to support or prove his conclusions. And these 
reservations will, vis-ä-vis my thesis, allow me to argue that `The Good Ankersmit' 
is not, on analysis, as good as his conclusions might suggest. 
In this Chapter I first address several preliminary observations in connection with 
my own thesis which, of course, is not in itself exempt from the many considerations 
explored here (and in the previous chapter) in relation to Ankersmit's own 
arguments. These matters are laid out below in `Section One: Introductory 
Comments'. I then collect together my various reservations about Ankersmit, as 
indicated in the paragraph above, under the subsequent subtitles: `Section Two: The 
Illusion of Proof, `Section Three: A Further Question of Misrepresentation', 
`Section Four: Historiography and the Art of Gardening' and `Section Five: Fact and 
Value' (these reservations collectively constituting my `moment of hesitation'), 
before drawing matters to a close in `Section Six: Concluding Observations'. 
Ankersmit, F. R, (1994). History and Tropology. The Rise and Fall ofMetaphor. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. pp33-43 
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Section One: Introductory Comments 
Ankersmit's argument,. as laid out in Chapter One, is centred on the notion of the 
narrative substance as a linguistic instrument which performatively expresses the 
preference for narrative statements of a particular kind (exactly those which, in a 
circular fashion, contribute to the individuation of that very same narrative 
substance). Now my title for Chapter One, `The Good Ankersmit' is, of course, 
itself a narrative substance which, accordingly, expresses a preference for the 
selection of those statements capable of collectively individuating my particular 
notion of what it is about the good Ankersmit that is good. To look at it another way, 
my choice of that particular title (worked-up from my own point-of-view) in effect 
prefigured the overall meaning and direction of the subsequent text, hence setting-up 
the condition(s) to be satisfied with regard to statement selection. I therefore took 
with me to my source - the book Narrative Logic -a prefigured notion of the 
meaning that I wanted my narrative critique to carry, and this prefigured notion (a 
narrative substance governed by my own point-of-view) directed me in the end to 
exactly those statements which could be utilised in support of that viewpoint. Had I 
prefigured my narrative from a different point-of-view (that is with a different kind 
of story in mind, thus generating a different narrative substance and a different title) 
then I would, or could, have settled on a different selection of individuating 
statements. 
Now, with this second chapter of my thesis I have introduced another and a 
somewhat indistinctly delineated narrative substance in the form of an enigmatic 
title, `A Moment of Hesitation', which suggests that all is not well with Ankersmit's 
argument but it does not afford the reader the anticipation of any specific narrative 
shape or direction to the subsequent text. Nevertheless, my point-of-view and thus 
my authorial intent is uniquely clear to me prior to the narrativisation of my data 
regardless of the title chosen, or indeed in the absence of any title at all. For, of 
course (as previously noted), the point-of-view assumed by a narrative's author is 
not necessarily "visible" to the narrative's reader. Indeed, on occasions it might be 
very hard for the reader to pin it down at all. 
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Moreover, one has to consider that there are many possible different points-of-view 
from which the detail of any text, in this case that of Narrative Logic, might be 
approached, and each one of the possible resultant explanatory accounts of that text 
would, no doubt, appear to be validated on the basis of its own particular verifiable 
collection of individuating constituent statements. Thus the plausibility of any 
explanatory account of an original text (each one being, in essence, a proposal for a 
particular explanation of that text) can only be judged within the "frame" of its own 
internally functioning narrative substance. One therefore has to conclude that the 
preference for this rather than that explanatory proposal , 
bereft of any common 
empirical basis upon which competing proposals might ultimately be judged, will 
come down to a matter of usefulness and aesthetic appeal arising precisely out of 
what Ankersmit calls its narrative scope. Thus, in order to "sell" a particular thesis 
the author of that thesis must, by `maximalising its scope' (that is its ability to 
generate new insights, as Ankersmit argued), make it more useful and attractive than 
all competing theses. 
Now, I am directing attention towards the foregoing Ankersmitean position and 
some of its consequences in order to rationalise what might appear to be an 
inconsistency arising out of the juxtaposition of my own two oppositional points-of- 
view, as expressed in each of the first two chapters (chapter headings) of this thesis. 
So, to make this clear(er), the point that I am making and addressing here is that the 
good Ankersmit of my first chapter (the Ankersmit of his conclusions taken in 
isolation) is, and continues to be for me, utterly defensible. However, I cannot 
extend that point-of-view to embrace all of the various arguments which Ankersmit 
employed in support of his so-called proofs. Thus, in relation to these latter 
considerations I have taken a completely different point-of-view which (I am 
arguing) can, without contradiction, co-exist with the former. They simply constitute 
two different perspectives on Narrative Logic which are each coherent in themselves 
and (this being the point) their logical co-existence, having already been accounted 
for within Ankersmit's theory of narrative substance, is unproblematic. 
50 
My final observation at this stage is that Ankersmit's convoluted philosophical style 
of proof (evident in Narrative Logic and equally so, as I hope to show, throughout 
many of his works) which he endeavours to bring to bear on his subject matter, is 
not only problematic but also strictly unnecessary. For his thesis arguably constitutes 
a proposal for a new rhetorical explanatory model, the purpose of which is to 
account for the nature of the historical narrative, and as such it stands in its own 
category with its own new descriptive (metaphorical) use of language. It is thus, in a 
sense, disconnected from any attempt at establishing its logical or scientific proof 
in the general terms of an older or a current language -a matter which will be 
explored below. Furthermore, my argument is that Ankersmit's general thesis can 
only be assessed on its utility; if it is found to be more useful than all competing 
theses, and I believe that it is, then it stands on that merit only. 
With these points made I can now set about my aforementioned critical assessment 
of the negative elements of Ankersmit's often misleading but always idiosyncratic 
style and structure of argument; a "dissection" of Narrative Logic which, in its 
sustained critical form, is something to which Ankersmit, as far as I know, has not 
previously been subjected. 2 
Section Two: The Illusion of Proof 
With the help of Richard Rorty, Donald Davidson, Mary Hesse and others, I propose 
to argue here against what I take to be Ankersmit's firm (and ironic) belief that his 
thesis can be privileged with some logically assembled proof of an absolute and 
irrefutable kind. Central to my argument is the rejection of the notion that language 
can be seen as a medium that stands between the self and a reality which it presumes 
2 For instance, although John Zammito offers a critique of Ankersmit (Zammito, J., (2005 ). `Ankersmit 
and Historical Representation' in History and Theory 44 no. 2: pp155-181), his argument is limited to a 
rethinking of the notion of colligatory concepts only. Also Ewa Domabska (Domaiiska, 
E., (2009). `Frank 
Ankersmit: From Narrative to Experience' in Rethinking History 13 no. 2: pp175-195) is critical of 
Ankersmit's Narrrativve Logic but, again, from a limited perspective. Neither of these two papers, nor 
others that I have examined during my research, aspire to the all encompassing style of close reading and 
analytical dissection that I am, at least, attempting here. 
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to accurately describe. Such a notion presupposes a world in possession of an 
intrinsic nature which can be captured in a linguistic expression or representation 
thus revealing a truth which lies `out there'. Now, I am not suggesting that there is 
not a world out there which is common to the sensory perceptions of all of us, 
however, there is no truth located out there. Here is Rorty on the matter: 
To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say.... that 
most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include 
human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that 
where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of 
human languages, and that human languages are human creations. Truth 
cannot be out there - cannot exist independently of the human mind - because 
sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but 
descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or 
false. The world on its own - unaided by the describing activities of human 
beings - cannot. ' 
Rorty is claiming that the notion of truth is language dependant. Or, to rephrase, 
human beings make languages within which sentences reside and it is only these 
sentences - shaped and articulated within the descriptive capacities of their own 
languages - that can be true in relation to the language in which each is framed 
(thus to change one's language is to change one's network of common sense truths). 
On this understanding it follows that not only is truth made by human beings but 
that it is also of a tautological kind. The philosopher Donald Davidson also takes an 
anti-foundationalist position with regard to language which he sees as a `token' of 
what is out there; something that cannot reach `what knowledge seeks': 
We should banish the idea that language is epistemically something like sense 
data, something that embodies what we can take in, but is itself only a token, or 
representative, of what is out there. Language does not mirror or represent 
reality, any more than our senses present us with no more than appearances. 
Presentations and representations as mere proxies or pictures will always leave 
us one step short of what knowledge seeks.... ° 
And the theorist of rhetoric, Thomas Kent, in the preamble to his report of `A 
Conversation with Donald Davidson' for the journal JAC, clarifies Davidson's 
position and links it to Rorty's thus: 
3 Rorty, R, (1989). Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p5 
4 Davidson, D., (2005). Truth Language and History. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p 130 
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Davidson's philosophy of language constitutes the first systematic treatment of 
language which breaks completely with the notion of language as something 
which can be adequate or inadequate to the world or to the self. For Davidson 
breaks with the notion that language is a medium, "a medium either of 
representation or of expression". If language does not mediate between us and 
the world, as Davidson claims, and if we cease to imagine that a split exists 
between an inner world of thought and feeling and an outer world of objects 
and events, as Davidson advocates, then nothing exists "out there" or "in here" 
that will serve as an epistemological foundation for either a theory of meaning' 
or a theory of truth; all we have to authorize our utterances are other 
utterances. As Rorty puts it, "only sentences can be true... and... human beings 
make truths by making languages in which to phrase sentences". 5 
To collectively summarise these positions, the world is known only to the extent that 
it is placed under some form of description (an inscription set within the 
metaphorical potential of the particular language of description in use), which causes 
beliefs about how it is. Thus, the notion that there can be "true knowledge" of the 
world is an illusion - nothing more than an internally generated language effect. 
With regard to this collective view concerning language of use, and taking Rorty's 
position in particular, the difference between literal and metaphorical use of 
language can be expressed in terms of the difference between its familiar and 
unfamiliar use. Or, the literal (old metaphors having acquired a certain familiarity of 
use) is that which can be handled within the current language network. But the 
metaphorical - or new - as yet unfamiliar use of language, having no fixed place 
within that current language network, stimulates the imaginative search for its own 
meaning which, on successful acceptance and habitual use, will eventually subside 
into the familiar and unthinking language of the literal (a nebulous conglomeration 
of dead and dying metaphors). 
To develop his position on the performative nature of the metaphor, Rorty draws for 
the most part on the work of Davidson. However, he is also attracted by the work of 
the English philosopher of science Mary Hesse and for my particular purpose here I 
am going to use Rorty's summary of Hesse, s approach to the notion of scientific 
progress; this is the way he puts it: 
S Kent T., (1993). `Language Philosophy, Writing and Reading: A Conversation with Donald Davidson'. 
JAC 13 no. 1 
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The replacement of one set of rhetorical concepts [metaphors] by another, 
concepts which cannot themselves be defined in terms of an overarching 
observation language, is essential to the attainment of greater predictive 
success, but there is no way to see such replacement as "getting closer to the 
way things really are" unless this means simply "getting more predictive 
power". If that is all that it means, then one cannot explain the success of 
science in terms of the notion of corresponding better to reality. ' 
Hesse, then, takes the view that scientific theories should be taken as metaphors and 
she underlines this view when she concludes that `rationality consists just in the 
continuous adaptation of our language to our continually expanding world, and 
metaphor is one of the chief means by which this is accomplished'. 7 
Hence, the way that I read Hesse could, I believe, be illustrated thus. In the later half 
of the 17'x' Century and the early 1811' Century, Isaac Newton re-described the world/ 
universe. The descriptive' language that he used was radically different from and 
possessed a much greater predictive power than the then generally current language 
of Aristotle (as articulated in his theories on the nature of physics) which, 
consequently, fell out of use as the superior utility of Newton's new language (or 
use of metaphor) became apparent. During the following two hundred or so years, 
repeated experiments and measurements confirmed the efficacy of Newton's 
predictive model and the once exciting new metaphors of the "Newtonian" 
language died into literal modes of expression - its common sense truths. Then in 
walked Albert Einstein with a new set of descriptive metaphors in the shape of his 
special and general theories of relativity, the predictive capacities of which 
pragmatically turned out to be vastly superior to those used by Newton which were 
thus dispatched to the periphery of Einstein's model and reduced in status to "local 
effects" (approximations within a much larger whole). Accordingly, the scientific 
world adopted the new and exciting language of Einstein. 
On this view - which is, Hesse's view - the ongoing scientific process cannot be 
seen in terms of incremental movements towards some form of absolute knowledge 
6 Rorty, R, (1991). Essays on Heidegger and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p103 
7 Hesse, M., (1980). Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. p123 
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or truth, but rather in terms of the general adoptions of successions of improving 
metaphors or predictive models with which the world is put under description. Not 
only are there no necessary linkages between these various metaphorical models of 
the world, but also there can be no ontological linkage (entailment) between any 
model and the world in itself. The idea that there can be a collective convergence of 
such metaphorical models on some ultimate knowledge of the unmediated 
/unprocessed world in itself is an illusion because improvements in the utility of 
predictive models can lead to nothing more than better predictions. It would also 
appear that scientific "progress", thus conceived, cannot and does not move 
forward and upward in a linear regular developmental fashion, but rather it moves in 
a series of irregular (metaphorical) "steps" where the "uprights" coincide with the 
adoption of each radical new description of the world and where the "treads" might 
be seen as plateaus of ratification and consolidation of current descriptions - their 
literalisation. 
In summation then: 
" Language is not a medium that stands between the self and the world (it is 
not a window on reality) and it is, therefore, imperative to break free from 
what appears to be the common sense wisdom, or conviction, that language 
can somehow put one in touch with reality. 
" Language is the medium in which the human world is constituted by placing 
it under description, and however sophisticated that metaphorical description 
might be or become, it cannot lead to a knowledge of the world in itself. 
" Knowledge of the of the world in itself is arguably unattainable. However, it 
is possible to pragmatically advance ever better predictive metaphorical 
models of the world to the extent that we have the potential to get around in it 
more effectively/successfully, sustained by the comforting sense of an ever- 
increasing familiarity with it. 
" If successful (and thus adopted), new metaphors will acquire familiarity and 
eventually subside into literalness; they will "die" into a new language 
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which, in due course, becomes the literal common sense (the real) of its own 
time. Language, then, is essentially metaphorical all the way down. ' 
Now, since on this view our so-called knowledge of the world has no ultimate reach 
beyond the metaphors that we use to describe it, it must follow that this presumed 
knowledge is of a rhetorical, and not empirical, kind - all of it. Rhetoric is thus the 
bottom line and must apply across all disciplines (literature, philosophy, the 
sciences, history and so on) and the acceptance of such a "linguistic" notion carries 
with it" inescapable implications, not least for the discourse of history itself and the 
various theoretical arguments which are confidently wheeled out in support of it: 
history is logocentric. 
Moreover, it must now be clear that meaning as we humans construe it is not a 
property of the world but just an effect caused by the language. - the metaphors - we 
impose on the world in order to give it a semblance of familiarity. The world in itself 
has no language preference for its own description; it does not choose between the 
languages of Aristotle, Newton or Einstein, nor, for that matter, does it choose 
between the languages of the sloth, sperm whale or the garden slug; each species 
gets along as best it can within the frame of its own self referenced world. Now, to 
impose an arbitrary metaphorical language and thus an arbitrary rhetorical meaning 
on the world is, as Derrida pointed out, an arbitrary act; an act of violence. Of course 
such acts of violence are commonplace - they pass largely unnoticed - and, with the 
onset of familiarity of usage, language generated meanings (the product of these acts 
of violence) acquire the generally unquestioned shape of common sense -a 
communal meaningful view on reality. Keith Jenkins puts this point thus: 
To make (to realize) a meaning, to bring a meaning into the world is ultimately 
an act of violence--a violence of "writing" that can be called first-level vio- 
lence. Since there is no one-to-one natural correspondence between word and 
world, no literal entailment of signifier to signifier and thence to the signified 
and thence to the putative referent, to get the actuality of the world into a 
language it never asked to be put in is always to establish both a power and a 
metaphorical relationship (a tree as if it was a tree, the past as if it was history 
... ). Yet, accurate as this is, Derrida thinks the notion of a metaphorical 
8 The significance of this for (or the counter-part of this in) history being that `.... dead historical 
metaphors become the reality of the past'. (Munslow, A., (2003). the New History. London: Pearson 
Longman. p 170). 
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relationship still runs the risk of carrying realist overtones, in that it may 
suggest that there is a meaningful reality to which the text refers, albeit 
figuratively. 9 
Moreover, since meanings in the world can only arise through the imposition of 
language onto the world - meanings being language or use of metaphor dependant - 
it follows that such an imposition or act of violence is a necessary condition for the 
possibility, of meaning. In an interview with the philosopher Richard Kearney, 
Derrida extended this argument with the observation that metaphor implies a 
relation to an original property of meaning whereas, by contrast, the `act of 
violence' implies a violent production of meaning (or an abuse) -a break bereft of 
anterior sanction which Derrida characterises as `catachresis'. I am reproducing 
here both Derrida's answer and the question which prompted his response since, in 
addition to explaining this distinction between metaphor and catachresis, both 
underline the rhetorical nature of philosophy and, in particular, they both expose the 
debilitating flaw that lies right at the conceptual core of metaphysics: 
KEARnY: Is there not a sense in which philosophy for you is a form of 
literature? You have, for example, described metaphysics as a "white 
mythology", that is, a sort of palimpsest of metaphors (eidos, telos, ousia) and 
myths (of return, homecoming, transcendence towards the light, etc. ), which 
are covered over and forgotten as soon as philosophical "concepts" are 
construed as pure and univocal abstractions, as totalizing universals devoid of 
myth and metaphor. 
Derrida: I have always tried to expose the way in which philosophy is literary, 
not so much because it is metaphor but because it is catachresis. The term 
metaphor generally implies a relation to an original "property" of meaning, a 
"proper" sense to which it indirectly or equivocally refers, whereas catachresis 
is a violent production of meaning, an abuse which refers to no anterior or 
proper norm. The founding concepts of metaphysics - logos, eidos, theoria; 
etc. - are instances of catachresis ..... 
10 
Now all the foregoing is constitutive of my position on these various considerations 
at this moment. Or, to put this another way, the foregoing arguments are in my view 
the best possible arguments on this matter in that they have the widest degree of 
utility, or apparent "fit", and are arguably the most defensible. That is not to say that 
9 Jenkins, K., (2000). `A Postmodern Reply to Perez Zagorin' in History and Theory 39 no. 2: p192 
10 Derrida, J., (1995). `Deconstruction and the Other' in Kearney, R. (Ed. ) States of Mind: Dialogues with 
Contemporary Thinkers. New York: New York University Press. p 153 
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my point-of-view is fixed, rather, drawing on Rorty, I might say that this is my `end 
language' which must always be seen as provisional pending better metaphors to 
come. Accordingly, it is against this background (this axiom)" that I now turn back 
to Ankersmit and to some aspects of his philosophical position which are not overtly 
expressed in his writings and which, therefore, have to be inferred from the content 
of his sometimes obscure and contradictory arguments. Before proceeding, however, 
it would be worth pointing out that what I take to be the confused philosophical style 
of argument which Ankersmit brought to his writing of Narrative Logic effected an 
underlying weakness in its structure. This weakness, which by Ankersmit's own 
admission (whilst being interviewed by Ewa Domac ska) arose out of his 
incongruous use of an `Anglo-Saxon philosophy of language.... to demonstrate 
Continental conclusions', " generated a curious language mix that neither the Anglo- 
Saxon philosophers of language nor the Continental structuralists/poststructuralists 
liked very much (and nor did they much like Ankersmit as user of it). In the same 
interview Ankersmit also explained that, in the hope of gaining increased readership 
with respect to future publications, he had found it expedient to `adopt the rhetoric 
of deconstructivism and of the relevant French theorists'. 13 But I see no evidence 
that this ploy of Ankersmit's met with any degree of success, and this is not so 
surprising since these two different styles of philosophy reside in categorically 
different structures of thought which are fundamentally opposed to each other. That 
is to say that Anglo-Saxon philosophy is essentially conceptual and foundationalist 
whilst Continental philosophy is, from top to bottom and in every respect, rhetorical 
and anti-foundationalist. '4 Thus, and this strikes me as being somewhat absurd, 
" This is not to say that various attacks (neorealist for example) have not been made on what I might call 
"Rorty's position" (for example, the objections raised by a dozen philosophers including J. Habermas, H. 
Putnam and M. Williams in Brandom, R. B. (ed. ). (2000). Rorty and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing in which central features of Rorty's views are critiqued: i. e. his conviction that communal 
practices can best be characterised as justification driven and are not in need of any `transcendental' 
governing concept, no truth goal, and that the world in itself cannot be known independently from how 
we talk about it etc. ). But, my judgement is that none of these critiques is convincing, not least relative to 
Rorty's own accompanying replies to Williams, in particular, but also to Habermas, Putnam et al. 
12 Domabska. Encounters. p71 
13 Ibid. p71 
14 Broadly speaking I take the view that Anglo-Saxon philosophy is characterised by its predisposition 
towards clarity of argument on the basis of a modern formal logic, its respect for the sciences and its 
belief in the possibility of some form of actual knowledge about what is out there. By contrast, and again 
very broadly speaking, I take continental philosophy as being of a rhetorical kind which centres on the 
human condition. It also stands opposed to scientism and the possibility of absolute knowledge. 
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Ankersmit appears to have adopted a radical shift in position both to meet a 
marketing contingency and also to appease (or be accepted by) the French theorists. 
Such a project was not only entirely unrealistic but was also bound to generate 
contradictions. For (leaving aside the doubtful notion that one might, as a matter of 
expediency and with untroubled ease, be able to accomplish such a fundamental 
change of theoretical position) there exists a lingering residue of "certaintism" in 
Ankersmit's writings which could never be taken seriously by any anti- 
foundationalist. 
My first indicator of Ankersmit's philosophical position is taken from the 
introduction to Narrative Logic and reads as follows: 
Most of the reliable scientific knowledge we possess and its astonishing 
growth in the past two hundred years, are the result of the scientists' attempts 
to discover something general in those very diverse phenomena of reality. So 
why shouldn't we follow the same course in philosophy? 15 
The unmistakable assumptions embodied in this statement are (1) that reliable 
(meaning in this sense, I think, unchangeable) scientific knowledge exists as an 
incontrovertible fact, (2) that it is growing rapidly and (3) that it arises through the 
attempted discovery of `general' features located in the `phenomena of reality'. This 
does not fit Hesse's much more useful "model" in which she attributes scientific 
progress to random (as opposed to linear) successive replacements of rhetorical 
concepts `which cannot themselves be defined in terms of an overarching 
observation language'. 16 Hesse, then, has no general unifying concepts, she simply 
has sets of metaphors which cannot either refer to reality or refer to other sets of 
metaphors and, hence, their adoption or rejection turns on the sole basis of their 
predictive usefulness. Furthermore, the concept of knowledge in an absolute sense is 
rejected by Hesse in favour of the more passive notion of predictive knowledge; that 
is, "knowing" something only in relation to a metaphorical model from which its 
behaviour can be predicted. For example, scientists have models to predict how 
gravity behaves with a high degree of certainty and precision (models which, for 
example, can be successfully used in the fields of astronomy and space exploration), 
1,5 Ankersmit Narrative Logic. p5 
16 Hesse. Revolutions and Recon iructions in the Philosophy of Science. p 123 
59 
but that does not mean that scientists know what gravity actually is in itself. Now, 
Ankersmit may have used the word `knowledge' rather loosely here but, 
nevertheless, his statement taken in the whole has the ring of certaintism about it and 
he proposed to carry this position with him into his thesis on the philosophy of 
history. So my answer to his question, `why shouldn't we follow the same course in 
philosophy? ' is that - `we shouldn't because Ankersmit's interpretation of the 
course of science rests on a metaphorical view of the world which is incoherent and 
thus invalid'. 
This notion that the nature of objects of scientific enquiry can somehow be referred 
to directly, that some stable link exists between word and world, is positively loaded 
with presuppositions that cannot be sustained. In current discourse there seems to be 
some generally accepted common sense idea that descriptions of the world should be 
seen or shown to be adequate to the world which they describe. But how can this 
adequacy be demonstrated without stepping outside language? In order to find 
descriptions adequate to the objects which they describe, one has to postulate 
something both fixed and prior to language against which the world (on one hand) 
and its linguistic description (on the other) might be compared in order to determine 
the latter's adequacy with regard to the former -a sort of transcendental adjudicator 
(and what language does the adjudicator speak? ). In short, then, there appears to be 
no escape from the world of language with its internally referenced webs of 
circulating'statements which carry the appearance of actually knowing what they can 
only metaphorically describe. Accordingly, I argue that the very idea of the 
possibility of proof across all disciplines is an illusion (a deception arising out of a 
tautology) and I cannot, therefore - and this is my point - see the point of 
Ankersmit's protracted attempts to prove his theory of narrative substances. Yet, on 
page 105 of Narrative Logic Ankersmit announces this endeavour thus: 
In the remaining part of this book I will attempt to prove that Nss [narrative 
substances] do indeed play an all important role in narrative historiography, so 
I have no intention of basing my case on mere postulation of some "virtus 
narrativa" in order to explain narrative historiography. '? 
17 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p105 
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Ankersmit's declared strategy, then, is to devote the rest of his book (pages 105 to 
252) to the construction of a scientific style of proof in order to validate what he sees 
as a mere rhetorical proposition which, by his implication, lacks proper status until it 
has'been so proven. He initially sets about this task by describing in detail four 
objections to his proposal on narrative substances which he then "knocks down" 
one by one, leaving his proposition as the winner of the contest. Ankersmit may 
claim that all this is a clarification process, 'g but he presents his selection by 
elimination argument is if it were part of his proof, and I think that this should be set 
aside right away, for how can it be possible to defend and, by implication, validate 
one's own position solely through the negation of a small number of competing 
positions? With this matter dismissed, I can now move on and look at what I take to 
be the essential character of Ankersmit's so-called proof of the existence and nature 
of narrative substances. 
For each of the three `pillars' or `theses' about which Narrative Logic is articulated, 
Ankersmit found support in the theoretical writings of the Dutch historian Johan 
Huizinga, who looked upon historical knowledge as essentially aesthetic, subjective 
and intuitive. Indeed, Ankersmit has frequently expressed his admiration for 
fluizinga's work which, he says, contains `the best analysis of the nature of 
historical knowledge available as yet'. 19 And it is this `analysis' of Huizinga's, 
combined with a certain logic of the mathematician and philosopher Gottfried 
Leibniz, that Ankersmit put to use in furtherance of his search for the proof of the 
theory of narrative substances. 
Leibniz himself believed that the process of reasoning could be reduced to a form of 
mathematics -a universally valid structure of calculations which could collectively 
function as the "last court of appeal" for the resolution of differences of opinion in 
argument. Enrico Pasini explains the matter thus: 
The same concepts are repeated ever and again in Leibniz's countless 
manifestoes...... : 
18 Ibid. p2 
19 Ibid, p251. (footnote 3). In this lengthy footnote commencing on page 250 Ankersmit also explains, in 
some detail, the relationship between Huizinga's work and his own. 
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"Since when I had the pleasure to considerably improve the art of discovery, or analysis, of the mathematicians, I began to have certain 
new views, that is, to reduce all human reasoning to a sort of calculus, 
which would be of use in discovering a truth in so far as it is possible ex 
datis, i. e. from what is given or known" (Leibniz GP, VII, 25). 20 
A universal writing would also result of it, that "would be like a sort of general 
algebra, and would give the means to perform reasoning by calculation": such 
a calculus would not only be an instrument for learning and research, but it 
would be an infallible judge of controversies as well, offering a way to solve 
disputes by simple reckoning. 21 
Now, it is this universal writing (a kind of algebra of thought likened to, and 
including the notational system of, conventional algebra), along with an unshakable 
belief in it, that Ankersmit seems to have imported, as one of his instruments of 
proof, into his Huizinga inspired mode of historical theorisation (for there are a lot 
of algebraic-like symbols and formulae in use throughout Narrative Logic). 
Occasionally, however, Ankersmit drifts away from this algebraic form of notation 
in preference for something reminiscent of the configurational formulae of the 
chemist in which individual symbols represent ideas directly in diagrammatic or 
graphic form - as is also the case with Egyptian or Chinese characters - and it is 
pertinent to note in this connection that the significance of symbols in language was 
also the subject of Leibniz's attention. Of course, Ankersmit interest in Leibniz is 
not just confined to his `language of algebra' for he fords, amongst other things, that 
`Leibniz's use of the concept of substance or monad is most easily adaptable to the 
narrative philosophy advocated [in Narrative Logic] ..... 
22 and this, Ankersmit later 
explains, is primarily why he proposed the term narrative substance. 
Within the notion of the monad Ankersmit thus found (what he said was) a 
`resemblance between Leibniz's logic and the historist philosophy of history 
20 This, Pasini's reference, refers to Leibniz G. W., (1875-1890) in Gerhardt, C. I. (Ed. ). Die 
Philosophischen Schri, ften on Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Berlin: Weidman. V1Ip25 (7 vols Cited by 
volume and page). 
21 Pasini, E., (1923). `Arcanum Artis Inveniendi: Leibniz and Analysis' in Psychology and Philosophy 
no I. pp268-272 
22 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p105. It should also be noted that, vis. ä-vis Ankersmit's quite considerable 
use of logic in Narrative Logic, that he was able to state very clearly the whole thesis of that text in his 
`Six Theses on Narrativist Philosophy of History' (the substance of Chapter One in History and 
Tropology) without a single use of logical symbols at all; hence my view that such logic was unnecessary 
in Narrative Logic itself. 
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defended in ... [his] book'. To understand what he meant by this one must first 
appreciate that, for Ankersmit, the historist - and Ankersmit was favourably 
disposed towards historists and historism - took the view that historical phenomena 
should be situated in, and understood from, the context of a unique process of 
historical change. Ankersmit, as he himself explained, recognised that `historism 
erroneously situated narrative logic in the past itself . 
24 But, as he further explained, 
this matter could be put right by translating `traditional historism from a theory on 
historical objects into a theory of historical writing'25 and, in this way, the historist's 
`uniqueness of historical change' could be displaced from aspects of the subject 
matter to aspects of narrative substances. The subject of change thus becomes the 
linguistic entity narrative substance, which in its fully individuated form is not itself 
changing as a concept, but rather has "historical" change (now seen as the product of 
the historicisation of the past) locked up inside it. It is this idea, as far as I can tell 
from my reading of Ankersmit, that he found mirrored in Leibniz's monads. 
However, valid or not, I do not propose to go into this particular theory since, in 
itself, it is not relevant to my argument. All I want to say is that Leibniz's universal 
language of algebraic reasoning along with his monadic substance and Huizinga's 
analysis of the nature of historical knowledge (none of which have attracted much 
general support) are in essence metaphorical models which, in common with all 
theories, can (as I have argued) either be adopted or rejected on the basis of their 
attractiveness and utility. I cannot therefore see how Ankersmit's direction/style of 
argument, worked-up out of old rhetorical positions, can add to or constitute the 
kind of certain proof he sought. 
So, in order to bring this particular argument to a close, I put forward the following 
observations. In the first place I think that in Narrative Logic Ankersmit attempted 
to use an outmoded language of proof which could only be it odds with his new 
rhetorical position as expressed in his theory of narrative substances. That is to say 
that he brought with him into his proof a worn out, died into literalness (or 
23 Ibid. p 141 
24 Ibid. p123 
25 Ibid. p 124 
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sometimes dead), old language of outmoded styles of (generally) positivist 
philosophies, the character of which provoked a form of narrative contradiction 
which undermined the book's coherence -a matter which went pretty much 
unnoticed by its critics. Nevertheless, within Narrative Logic there are inspirational 
elements which, when collected together, constitute a particular point-of-view on 
Ankersmit; my `Good Ankersmit' of Chapter One. However, the rest of Narrative 
Logic (more than half of it) is arguably not so good, and any point-of-view governed 
by these questionable elements of it (the elements critically assessed in this chapter) 
could not, by me, be shown to be good at all. Furthermore, Ankersmit is mistaken in 
his belief that he can demonstrate proof of his theorisations. The notion of proof 
(verification) implies something absolute or universal, something "fixed" to which 
his theory might be anchored, but this is to suggest that there is something of a 
permanent/stable kind outside his theorisations and hence outside his language. The 
contradiction here is that the language Ankersmit used to construct his proof is 
also the language in which his theory is constituted, and thus his so-called proof is 
just an internally circulating language effect, not a proof at all. Indeed, can any 
theory really be proved in an absolute sense? Is not the overriding criterion of 
preference for one theory rather than another simply that of utility? - use it for now 
(if it works better than others) whilst awaiting the arrival of even better metaphors to 
come. 
Or (and finally) to make this point from another angle, we have seen that 
Ankersmit's thesis rests on his three `essential pillars', the third pillar of which 
concerns the fundamentally metaphorical nature of all language. Thus it follows, by 
Ankersmit's own logic, that his ubiquitous proofs (not just his propositional 
sentences) can only be constituted metaphorically. So, the question that has to be 
asked, a question which is nowhere addressed in Narrative Logic, is this: `What 
exactly is the ontological status of a proof which is, of necessity, structured within a 
framework of internally referenced metaphorical figures of speech? '. The word 
`proof might be suggestive of a validating fixed authority situated outside 
(independent of) its own language of description, but (as I have argued here) it can 
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very easily be shown to be just another form of rhetoric - and Ankersmit should 
have known this. 
Section Three: A Further Question of Misrepresentation 
In Chapter One I considered the essential differences between the two spheres of 
thought associated with the theoretical positions taken-up by first the `narrative 
realist' and then the `narrative idealist'. The former position resting on the 
supposition that narrative knowledge of the past is informed directly by the past 
itself, whilst the latter presumes a narrative logic, uninformed by the past, which 
structures narrative knowledge of the past. To adopt this latter position, as 
Ankersmit does, is to affirm the fundamentally autonomous nature of the historical 
narrative and, moreover, to categorically reject the idea of the existence of 
translation rules which would necessarily be required by the `narrative realist' in 
order to effect the projection of the actuality of the past directly onto the structure of 
the narrative itself With all this in mind I will now turn back to Chapter Four of 
Narrative Logic and Ankersmit's misrepresentations of Hayden White's position 
with regard to translation rules. 
Now it is my contention, as already noted, that Ankersmit (whether he realised it or 
not) repeatedly misrepresented White and, moreover, that these misrepresentations 
had the effect of elevating the status of his own theoretical arguments relative to 
White's arguments (a matter to be further considered towards the end of this chapter 
and in the next such that it becomes a sort of "sub-thesis" of my thesis). However, in 
order to substantiate my claim of misrepresentation it will be necessary to take apart 
the content of page 83 of Narrative Logic, to break it down and scrutinise its parts in 
search of evidence, for this is a "crime scene" and it needs close attention. Here is 
the first part of Ankersmit's argument: 
White..... explicitly rejects all claims as to the nature of historical reality and 
thus comes closer to narrative idealism. Nevertheless, he cannot bring himself 
to abandon the translation rules of narrative realism....... The past, as such, 
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White argues, cannot be understood by us: in itself the past is a meaningless 
myriad of facts, states and events, an amorphous chaos of data that 
successfully resists "conscious apprehension" by the historian6. Therefore the 
historian has to translate the "prose" of the historical past into the narrative 
"poetry" of historiography. The four rhetorical tropes: metaphor, metonymy, 
synecdoche and irony are capable of achieving this translation. These four 
tropes, each in its own way, make a selection or abstraction from the initial 
chaos of historical reality and thus succeed in making history intelligible to 
us.... Unfortunately, White fails to explain why the four tropes possess the 
remarkable capacities he credits them with. This is probably due to his partial 
abandonment of narrative realism. On the basis of an assumption on the 
nature of historical reality and the relation between its constituent parts, he 
could have made out a good case for his tropes. As it is now, his opting for 
the four tropes to action as the translation rules that enable the historian to 
translate the past into the narratio remains entirely arbitrary. 26 
Thus, Ankersmit emphatically maintains (this is the central matter at issue) that 
White has opted to use his tropes to translate the past into narrative form. Now there 
is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that White has never suggested that the tropes 
might function in such a. way. He has always maintained that narrative accounts of 
the past (the worked-up products of historians) are not (in that working-up) informed 
by the past itself but rather by linguistic devices. in the form of tropes etc. That is, as 
White puts it, `one utilizes the tropes of language....... in order to figure it [figure 
forth the discourse] 927 and that tropes might thus be seen as `the "theory" guiding the 
articulation of the discourse'28 and, moreover, that these tropes constitute `the only 
conceptual protocol we have'. 29 To propose the existence of translation rules is to 
suggest a kind of "linear flow" from the evidence of the past into its narrative form 
(no `conceptual protocol' required here), but White, in conspicuous contrast to this 
notion, is talking about the "projection" of the tropes and other linguistic 
instruments onto the evidence of the past in order to figure forth that evidence into a 
narrative form. This is an imaginative conceptual act by the historian and the flow is 
the other way round. In short, White does not entertain the notion of translation rules 
here or anywhere else. 
26 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. pp82-83 
27 White, H., (1978). Tropics ojDiscourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. p115 28 Ibid. p115 
291bid. p115 
66 
Furthermore, the statement that the past is `an amorphous chaos of data that 
successfully resists conscious apprehension by the historian (6)' is attributed to 
White, but I cannot find any such reference to this on page 34 of Metahistory (the 
page to which Ankersmit's footnote (6) refers). However, this statement is consistent 
with White's position, so I will move on to the following sentence which also 
appears to be attributed to White and which reads, `therefore the historian has to 
translate the "prose" of the historical past into the narrative "poetry" of 
historiography'. White then, according to Ankersmit, argued that the past 
`successfully resists conscious apprehension' yet, through the agency of the four 
rhetorical tropes acting as translation rules, this `successful resistance' is broken 
down such that the `prose of the historical past' can be translated into the `poetry of 
historiography' and that all of this can be found on page 34 of Metahistory - which, 
as it happens, it can't. I am not sure how a past that `successfully resists' can then 
`yield' to translation rules - is this not unsuccessful resistance? However, ignoring 
this contradiction, my focus here must be on the notion that (and remember that this 
is Ankersmit purporting to interpret White's position) the historian is necessarily 
obliged to `translate the prose of the historical past'. For it seems to me that if the 
historical past is to be found in the form of prose then someone must have already 
translated it. However, be that as it may, what I would really like to pin down here is 
the significance of the word `historical' in the construction `historical past'? Does 
Ankersmit mean `the historicised past'? If so it ties in with his use of the word 
prose, but it contradicts the translation requirement and does not fit with the rest of 
the sentence. If the word is redundant and Ankersmit is referring to the actual past, 
then he certainly will not find any prose out there (or back there). This statement 
remains something of a mystery to me and it is at odds with my reading of White. 
Ankersmit then goes on to suggests that had White dropped the translation rule idea, 
then he could have made a good case for his tropes, since 
... there is still another way out for White. 
He could have offered a 
"transcendental deduction" (to use a Kantian term) for his four. tropes: i. e. he 
could have tried to prove that knowledge of the past is only made possible by 
these four tropes...... We shall discover that, unlike the translation rules of 
narrative realism, the transcendental narrativist rules do not pretend to guide 
the historian in solving the problem of how to "translate" the past into a 
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narratio, but that they only determine the logical structure of narrative accounts 
of the past. Of course, such rules can no longer be said to be translation rules. 30 
Now, if one were to replace the ambiguous construction `knowledge of the past' 
with `narrative knowledge' (understood as a narrative proposal about the past) then I 
think that this statement does approximate to White's argument which deals 
exclusively with the linguistic structure of the narrative discourse and does not 
anywhere refer to, or allude to, translation rules. Under a smokescreen of 
misinformation Ankersmit is simply restating White's position as if it were his own 
and, for me at least, he fails to "pull it of'. 
I now propose to extend my "crime scene" in order to include this extract from 
Chapter Two of History and Tropology, in which Ankersmit reaffirms his claim 
against White as follows: 
The linguistic turn announces itself unambiguously in White's philosophy 
when he compares the historical past itself with a text. 62 Just like a text, the 
past possesses a meaning that we are trying to discover, it needs interpretation, 
and consists of lexical, grammatical, syntactical, and semantic elements. 
Therefore, what the historian essentially does is translate the text of the past 
into the narrative text of the historian 6 This translation procedure is always 
guided by either-one or more of the four tropes: metaphor, metonymy, 
synecdoche,. or irony. 31 
This citation refers to page 30 of Metahistory (Ankersmit's footnote 6Z) and the first 
point that I want to make make is that the word `text' does not appear anywhere on 
that page. No doubt the word text has its place in Ankersmit's argument, but, cited 
thus, it already constitutes a deviation from White's actual use (on page 30) of the 
associated word language. This is what White actually says; `.... the historian 
confronts the historical field in much the same way that the grammarian might 
confront a new language'. 32 Or, in other words, White is talking about the manner in 
which the historian confronts the historical field (as if it were a new language) and 
not the intrinsic character of the historical field (as if, in Ankersmit's words, it were 
a text). This twist in meaning is further compounded when Ankersmit shifts from his 
30 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. pp83-84 31 Ankersmit. History and Tropology. P64 32 White, H., (1973). Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe. Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press. p30 
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initial erroneous statement that White `compares the historical33 past itself with a 
text' to his even more astonishing inference that White actually views the past as a 
text, as follows; `what the historian essentially does is translate the text of the past 
into the narrative text of the historian'. And this is not the end of it, for the second 
sentence of this citation (which Ankersmit also appears to attribute to White) simply 
beggars belief, here it is again; `Just like a text, the past possesses a meaning that we 
are trying to discover, it needs interpretation, and consists of lexical, grammatical, 
syntactical, and semantic elements'. But White is not searching for a meaning 
possessed by the past, for he knows (and frequently expresses the belief as 
Ankersmit himself has already noted) that the past in itself is `a meaningless myriad 
of facts, states and events, an amorphous chaos of data that successfully resists 
conscious apprehension' - so, what is Ankersmit's point? He appears to base his 
extraordinary argument on the following two sentences from page 30 of 
Metahistory: 
In short, the historian's problem is to construct a linguistic protocol, complete 
with lexical, grammatical, syntactical, and semantic dimensions, by which to 
characterize the field and its elements in his own terms (rather than in the 
terms in which they come labelled in the documents themselves), and thus to 
prepare them for the explanation and representation he will subsequently offer 
of them in his narrative. This preconceptual linguistic protocol will in turn be - 
by virtue of its essentially prefigurative nature -characterizable in terms of the 
dominant tropological mode in which it is cast. 34 
But, it is evident that White is referring very clearly here to the linguistic protocol 
which the historian projects onto the historical field in his own terms in order to 
prefigure (as a preparatory stage) what will eventually become the basis for his 
representation of that field in narrative form. Translation of an imagined `text of the 
past' does not come into it at all, and why should it? There is no "shape" in the past 
- no formal structure or language to which one might apply translation rules, even if 
such rules could ever be found. Or, to rephrase somewhat, translation rules can only 
be applied to an existing language or structure in order to find its equivalent in a 
different language or structure. So, what is this entity situated in the past to which 
33 In this particular context the adjective historical is redundant -a frequent recurrence in Ankersmit's 
texts. 
34 White. Metahistory. p30 
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these putative translation rules might be applied? Well, the answer to this question is 
that there is no such entity ready and waiting to be translated, and that the use of the 
word translation is therefore inappropriate in this context. 
Let me explain my objection to Ankersmit's use of the word translation (in this 
context) with a brief illustration. Suppose that I have a pile of bricks outside my 
house and that, after a little thought, I decide to build myself an office extension = 
I've always wanted one. Having completed the project and with nothing better to do, 
I might reflect on the nature of the principal components (the bricks) that together 
make up my new office. There is nothing intrinsic to a brick that has the capacity to 
endow it with a predisposition towards constituting, along with other bricks, a 
building of a particular kind (I might have preferred to build a garage or a pigsty). So. 
this emergent form, that of an office extension, is solely the product of my 
imagination (and labour) - it is imposed on the bricks by me and the bricks 
themselves do not, in the normal sense, inform this process35. Now, with regard to 
that original pile of bricks one might say with justification that a transformation has 
taken place, and indeed it has, but it would be inappropriate to refer to this 
transformation as a translation because there was nothing to be translated - there was 
no original coherent form within my pile of bricks that might submit to translation 
rules. Now this metaphor "translates" with ease into the sphere of historical theory - 
all that is required is the substitution of evidential traces for bricks - and it becomes 
equally apparent that the word translate is as inappropriate for evidential traces as it is 
for bricks because, just like bricks, evidential traces are lying around without any 
structure or form prior to their purposeful appropriation and use. 
I propose to round off this argument with an amusing afterthought concerning the 
conveyance of a hidden message by the unlikely method of footnote exchange. My 
33 This metaphor even works to the extent that it mirrors the limitations imposed on historical discourse 
by its own data. That is to say that one cannot write anything about the past - narrative accounts of the 
past will always be "circumscribed" by the historian's data. However, situated within such defining 
limitations the possibilities for the presentations of different yet plausible historical accounts of the past 
appear to be endless. Likewise, it is possible to find endless uses for bricks but the construction of a hot 
air balloon is not one of them 
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story opens with this remark which appeared in the first essay (originally published 
in 1988) of White's Figural Realism: 
A history is, as Ankersmit puts it, less like a picture intended to resemble the 
objects of which it speaks or a model "tied to the past by certain translation 
rules" than "a complex linguistic structure specifically built for the purpose of 
showing a part of the past. "() my teothote 36 
White's footnote 0) refers rather loosely to a range of pages which coincide with the 
whole of the second chapter of Ankersmit's History and Tropology. However, there 
is little doubt that the statement referred to regarding translation rules is this one: 
The historian's task is to offer us not a reflection or model of the past tied to 
that past by certain translation rules, (69) but the development of a more or less 
autonomous instrument that can be used for understanding the past. 37 
Now, this statement embodies precisely the `narrative idealist' position which 
Ankersmit sets up in opposition to White's supposed position. It also contains its 
own footnote (69) which refers, in turn, to White's essay `The Historical Text as 
Literary Artifact' published in Tropics of Discourse (having originally appeared in 
the June 1974 edition of Clio). 38 The pertinent extract reads: 
But it is wrong to think of a history as a model similar to a scale model of an 
airplane or ship, a map, or a photograph. For we can check the adequacy of 
this latter kind of model by going and looking at the original and, by applying 
the necessary rules of translation, seeing in what respect the model has actually 
succeeded in, reproducing aspects of the original. But historical structures and 
processes are not like these originals; we cannot go and look at them in order 
to see if the historian has adequately reproduced them in his narrative. 39 
Thus, in this ingenious circular fashion, White referred back to himself and in so 
doing he indirectly pointed at Ankersmit's extraordinary error - does Ankersmit not 
read and understand the documents to which he refers? White dismissed the 
possibility of the existence of translation rules nine years before the publication of 
Narrative Logic and that should have been an end to the matter for such a careful 
(logical) reader as Ankersmit. 
m White, H., (1999). Figural Realism: Studies in the Mimesis Effect. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. p6. This extract is from the Book's first chapter, `Literary Theory and historical Writing' which 
first appeared in print in Cohen, R (ed. ), (1988). The Future ojLiterary Theory. London: Methuen. 
37 Ankersnºit. History and Tropolog. p 66 
38 White, H., (1974). `The Historical Text as Literary Artifact' in Clio 3 no. 3: pp277-303 
39 White. Tropics of Discourse. p88 
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Section Four: Historiography and the Art of Gardening 
This argument, which rests on Ankersmit's notion of scope as outlined in Chapter 
One, first appeared in Narrative Logic as a tentative proposition. In Historical 
Representation its status was upgraded to "firm" and then more recently, in an 
interview with Ranjan Ghosh40 in the journal Rethinking History, the argument 
surfaced again with a certain ease of articulation - the sort that presumes 
membership of the established discourse. 
To recap. In Narrative Logic Ankersmit proposed that the wider the narrative's 
scope (the more the whole exceeds the descriptive meaning of its individual 
narrative's statements) the more successful that narrative will be from a narrativist 
perspective. Moreover, it is the historian's goal to maximalize narrative scope 
because scope offers the only criteria available on which to assess the relative merits 
of competing narrative accounts of (some aspect of) the past. The narrative with the 
widest scope, Ankersmit explains, is likely'to be the least conventional and most 
original of a competing set of narrative accounts, and thus `the essential duty of the 
historian is to be original and refrain as much as possible from repeating what his 
predecessors in the investigation of a particular topic have said'. 41 Furthermore the 
scope of any narrative substance is defined by its comparison with other narrative 
substances -a single point-of-view on the past would constitute "finality" or 
"closure" and hence preclude historical debate. Debate is generated through the 
opposition of two or more positions and it is only against this background texture of 
positions taken (or the scopes of narrative substances proposed) that the relative 
merits of competing narratives might be ascertained with reference tQ Ankersmit's 
criteria of selection which are as follows: 
40 Ghosh, R, (2007). `Interdisciplinarity and the Doing of History: A Dialogue Between F. R. Ankersmit 
and Ranjan Ghosh' in Rethinking History 11 no. 2: p244 
41 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p239. This is an interesting statement because it suggests that the 
historian's `duty' is to go on producing more, but always different, historical accounts of the past. Or to 
put it another way, the historian's duty is one of proli, feration of historical texts. However, in Chapter Six 
of History and Tropology Ankersmit takes a despondent view of the escalating overproduction of 
literature within the discipline of history which, he says, constitutes a `present-day intellectual 
alcoholism..... in which historiography itself impedes our view of the past' (p163). Now, this damaging 
overproduction viewpoint may be well founded, but Ankersmit never "squares" it with his earlier 
imperative of `duty' incumbent on the historian. 
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1) The best narrative of a set of competing narratives is the one whose 
statements `individuate the "narrative substance" in which the scope of the 
narrative beyond the descriptive meaning [of its statements taken 
individually] is relatively largest'. 42 
2) That all the individuating statements in a narrative `correspond to actual 
historical reality'. 43 
Ankersmit goes on to make the point that the narrative account of the past which 
best meets these requirements will be the most daring and courageous of the set 
under consideration. On this view it thus follows - ignoring for the moment item (2), 
the product of diligent research which should apply equally to all historical 
narratives - that the selection of the best narrative account out of a set of competing 
narrative accounts of the past will turn on the matter of scope - on aesthetic 
considerations alone. Now that is all very well but, unfortunately, Ankersmit adds 
some caveats as follows: 
1) He points out that it will be argued that the `obligation to maximalize the 
scope of the narratio requires the historian to suggest as much as possible, but 
explicitly to say as little as possible...... [and that this might] seem to reduce 
historiography to "propaganda"'. " This prompts Ankersmit to apply a new 
condition for the application of the above rules, namely that the narrative to 
be preferred is the one that `comes closest to propaganda (however, without 
ever becoming propaganda)' . 
4s 
2) That the individuating statements included in the narrative `should be true'. 
3) That historical debate must be `open-minded and uncensored'. 47 
It is at this point (and this. is by way of an aside) that I can already see problems 
ahead, for how does one deal with borderline cases which are bound to arise out of 
the application of such rules. Who exactly is going to be the disinterested 
adjudicator summoned (presumably) by Ankersmit to resolve such issues? Is this 
person Ankersmit himself or rather some transcendental "umpire" endowed with the 
unerring capacity to precisely define the boundary between innocent discourse and 
42 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p245 
43 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p245. I do not like the construction `historical reality' (as noted before), 
however, the meaning is clear enough in this context. 44 Ibid. p243 
45 Ibid. p243 
46 Ibid. p245 
47 Ibid. p243 
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propaganda and between meth and falsity with regard to narrative statements and 
facts? This matter is not addressed anywhere in Ankersmit's arguments. 
But, to continue with my main point, Ankersmit observed that successful narrative 
accounts of the past (those with the widest scopes) are often inspired by ethical or 
political values and that it would be 
...... both unnecessary and unreasonable to demand of the historian that he 
should shed all his ethical and political commitments when he starts to write 
history: adherence to an ethical position may occasionally yield narratios with 
an unusually wide scope....... [historical points-of-view] may often be 
inextricably tied up with political or ethical values. Many narratios lose their 
internal consistency when robbed of the political values which structure 
them..... the narratio is the trait d'union between description and 
normativeness: on the one hand we have a set of descriptive statements, on the 
other a course of action is recommended. We might even toy with the idea that 
historiography may enable us to test ethical and political values. 48 
This is the extent of the argument as expressed in Narrative Logic. However, the 
notion embedded in the last sentence of the above extract was significantly 
expanded in Historical Representation such that it formed the central concern of the 
book's second chapter. Rather than attempt some sort of reductive representation of 
the argument, I have decided to reproduce the bulk of it from Ankersmit direct: 
.... this brings me to the main thesis that I wish to defend in this chapter, 
namely, the uncommon thesis that narrative or historical discourse is what we 
had best rely upon when we wish to decide what moral and political standards 
we had best adopt To put it differently, the procedure for finding out what 
should be our most recommendable moral and political values is as follows. 
We must begin by collecting a large number of historical texts that have 
clearly been written from different moral or political points of view and let us 
take care, furthermore, that more or less the same historical phenomena .... are discussed in all these texts. We should observe, next, what has been the verdict 
in the history of historical writing on all these texts. Or to express it more 
solemnly, what will the application of the essentially aesthetic criteria used for 
assessing the merits of historical representations tell us about the qualities of 
these texts? Which of these texts satisfy these aesthetic criteria best? If we 
have ascertained as much, we should ask what moral and political values are 
dominant in the preferred set of historical texts. These, then, will be the moral 
and political values we should adopt and use as our compass for our present 
and future individual and collective action.... Aesthetics (the criteria that 
obtain in historical discussion) thus decides about ethics - and it can do so 
48 Ibid. p242 
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since aesthetics has a logical priority to ethics in the logic and the practice of 
historical writing. Hence, it is in historical writing, not in rationalist, a priori 
argument of whatever variant, that we will fmd our most reliable gauge for 
choosing political and moral values. Historical writing is, so to speak, the 
experimental garden [my emphasis] where we may try out different political 
and moral values and where the overarching aesthetic criteria of 
representational success will allow us to assess their respective merits and 
shortcomings. And we should be most grateful that the writing of history 
provides us with this experimental garden, since it will enable us to avoid the 
disasters that we may expect when we would have to try out in actual social 
and political reality the merits and shortcomings of different ethical and 
political standards. Before starting a revolution in the name of some political 
ideal, one had best begin with assessing as accurately and as dispassionately as 
possible the merits and shortcomings of the kind of historical writing inspired 
by this political ideal.... [hence we should not] demand that historians lay 
aside all their moral and political commitments when they write 
history..... such a commitment to moral and political values will often result in 
the kind of historical writing that is of greatest use to us for our orientation in 
the present and towards the future .... It may equally well 
be that all truly 
important historical writing will require the adoption of certain moral and 
political standards... 49 
Furthermore, Ankersmit affirmed that insight into the past, and orientation in the 
present and towards the future, would be impaired by historical writing that seeks to 
avoid the moral/political dimension and, therefore, subjectivity should be welcomed 
as an `indispensable contribution both to our knowledge of the past and to 
contemporary and future politics'. 50 Ankersmit brought his argument to a close with 
the following two conclusions: 
1) That we have discovered (through the theory of the nature of historical 
representation) `the logical priority of the aesthetic criteria of representational 
adequacy to criteria of what is right from an ethical and political point of 
view', 51 and that the reassuring insight to be derived from this is that `we 
may trust the discipline in how it will, in the long run, succeed in dealing 
with ethical and political values.... '. 52 
2) That `we may safely assign to history the most important and responsible 
task of distinguishing recommendable from objectionable moral and political 
values.... 9.53 
49 Ankersmit, F. R., (2001). Historical Representation. California: Stanford University Press. pp98-100 
30 Ibid. p 100 
51 Ibid. p102 
52 Ibid. P102 
53 Ibid. P102 
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Since, as I have already mentioned, this argument was restated by Ankersmit in the 
Ghosh interview of 2007, I will (not unreasonably) assume that it remains 
Ankersmit's position on the matter. 
Now what does this add up to? It seems to me that Ankersmit is claiming that, in 
spite of his earlier devastating critique of mainstream history, all is not lost. For he 
argues that given a sufficient number of narratives of some past situation or event, 
then the best of that selection can indeed be identified - but on aesthetic grounds 
only, thus working around his own critique of historians' epistemological 
assumptions. And, furthermore, that this "best" narrative once identified is good 
enough to properly inform (in relation to similar situations and events) ethical and 
political decisions of today. 
Ankersmit's extraordinary proposition appears to be founded (once more) on the 
theorisations of Leibniz - in particularly those concerning the concept of the 
`monad' and the `narrativist universe'. Briefly, Leibniz's theoretical narrativist 
universe contains all known narrative substances (seen here as monads of an 
aesthetic kind) and when "full", or in its perfect form, it is presumed to meet the 
`requirement for complete historical knowledge'. ' The structure of this perfect, or 
full, (imaginary) narrativist universe is likened by Ankersmit to a kind of 
overlapping/adjoining universal network of substances without gaps, where each 
substance is a reflection of and in communication with all other substances. Being 
complete, the historical knowledge which it contains (also being complete) is taken 
to be fixed and theoretically knowable. Now, for me, not only is this an unattractive 
rhetorical model but also (and this is more to the point if indeed I have understood 
the point) there appears to be a flaw in Ankersmit's use of it. Ankersmit wishes to 
apply his aesthetic criteria of selection to a very large (even complete) number of 
competing narrative accounts of some past event (read here as monads/narrative 
substances) in order to yield the "knowledge" he seeks about it. But the problem 
here is that very large can never be large enough, for I cannot see how a finite 
54 Ankeramit. Narrative Logic. p240 
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selection of histories of the event in question can approach the `fullness' required to 
meet the defined condition for `complete historical knowledge' of it. The exact 
problem here is that even if it were possible to somehow collect together all relevant 
narrative substances known to date, what of narrative substances to come (new 
histories of that event)? Ankersmit has already drawn attention to the explosive 
nature of the expansion of historical literature (footnote 41), and he knows that each 
new piece of literature introduces further unique narrative substances. Now, if any 
one of these new narrative substances turns out to be exceptionally good - 
articulates the most contentious and daring of all possible scopes - then a whole 
chunk of historiography might well "lean over" and proliferate into as yet 
unimagined landscapes of thought. How can this exponentially expanding, unknown 
historiography to come be recuperated back into the `narrativist universe' in order to 
perfect it and, thus, validate its historical knowledge now? There is a sense in which, 
to do what he wants to do, Ankersmit must think in terms of historical closure where 
none is possible: d(erance aprrs Derrida is, it seems, the ironic final word on this 
fantasy of closure 
I now leave this particular theory behind for a moment and turn back to Ankersmit's 
reflections on his initial investigation of the narrative substance (as he first 
described it in Narrative Logic). For surely it is undeniably the case that Ankersmit 
(along with Hayden White, Louis Mink, Roland Barthes et al. ) has been 
instrumental in the disclosure of the hitherto scarcely observed function of the 
narrative form in historiography. And (as a consequence of this theoretical work) 
history, which had once appeared to embody the capacity to discover (or at least 
move towards) the "truth" about the past, was exposed as an empty signifier or 
empty vessel available for requisition and for the imposition of arbitrary meanings 
on it or into it, by anyone, for multiplicities of different purposes. But this 
understanding of history (as an endlessly re-describable medium, an adaptable 
politico/ethical tool available to anyone) does not sit easily with Ankersmit's 
`experimental garden' notion of it in which history itself becomes the final arbiter - 
the final authority - with the capacity to justly and properly inform ethics and 
politics. It is difficult to see how (and Ankersmit does not explain how) he can 
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reconcile these conflicting positions. Perhaps he was taking a step back from the 
persuasive (anti-history) logic of his narrative substance and thus, in a perverse 
sense, he might have been trying to "claw" back some of the ground lost to what 
was arguably his best and most innovative work. Or, perhaps, he hadn't noticed the 
problem at all. 
Section Five: Fact and Value 
In Chapter Two of Historical Representation Ankersmit gave an account of the 
relationship between fact and value in narrative accounts of the past; it is this 
account that I now want to address and relate back to Narrative Logic. 
On the basis that narrative representations constitute proposals for textual 
replacements of (or substitutions for) parts of the past, and that such substitutes can 
only be adequately evaluated against the kinds of circumstances to which the 
proposals were related, Ankersmit concluded that all proposals must inevitably be 
inextricably mixed-up with the social and political circumstances onto which those 
proposals are projected as historicised replacements for parts of the past. Along 
these general lines he worked-up an argument to the effect that there exists within 
the historical narrative a certain continuity between fact and value and his argument 
finally led him to this conclusion: 
.... 
historical representation truly presents us with the much sought-after trait 
d'union between the "is" and the "ought. " We begin with merely a set of true 
statements and move then, automatically and naturally, toward an answer to 
the question of how to act in the future. The transition is completely natural, 
and at no stage can we identify a point where pure knowledge becomes pure 
action.... "fact" and "value, " the "is" and the "ought", are merely the extremes 
on a continuous scale. " 
Ankersmit illustrated this `continuous scale' by comparing the likely style of debate 
that might spring from (a) matters concerning the contributions made by the Dutch 
state to the economic and political success of the Dutch republic in the seventeenth 
century, and (b) discussions centred on the nature of the totalitarian state during the 
ss Ankersmit. Historical Representation. p94 
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time of the `Cold War'. In the former case the historian's moral and political 
standards would not have much bearing on the debate, however, in the later case 
such standards would define the character of that debate. These two examples, then, 
would lie towards the extreme ends of a logical scale (Ankersmit's `continuous 
scale') embracing all possible fact/value combinations. 
Now, the particular position which Ankersmit adopted here in relation to facts and 
values appears to rest on the assumption that there exists a link (an entailment), of a 
fixed and permanent kind, between fact and value. Or, to rephrase, in order that true 
statements might (as Ankersmit argued) move automatically and naturally toward an 
answer to the question of `how to act in the future', those true statements must each 
have fixed values embedded within them -a multiplicity of possible values could 
only indicate a multiplicity of possible actions and thus fail to answer the question of 
`how to act in the future'. But the idea that facts have values fixed within them is at 
total variance with Ankersmit's own central concept concerning narrative 
substances which relies on the particular understanding that facts and individual 
statements are, as he puts it in Narrative Logic, 
.... 
"compassless" when taken in isolation.... `only a narrative "point of view" 
can give them a "narrative direction".... the variety of narrative meanings one 
and the same statement may have in different narratios suggests that what the 
historical facts are.... always depends on what narrative use is made of the 
narrative statements in question. Thus there are no facts devoid of narrative 
interpretation in Narratios. -% 
This statement is very clear. Ankersmit is saying that the meanings (and therefore 
the values) attached to historical facts are to be found only in relation to their uses 
when organised into narrative form and, thus, on this matter Ankersmit has 
positioned himself as a relativist. However, by contrast (and presumably without 
noticing his adoption of conflicting positions) he became a foundationalist when 
presenting his `continuous scale' fact/value case which operates on the basis of an 
assumed fixity of value to fact. However (and this appears to me to be the central 
issue negating Ankersmit's fact/value argument and, for that matter, further 
56 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. pp218-219 
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disrupting his `experimental garden of historiography' argument), empirical facts 
and aesthetic values are of different ontological kinds and therefore the idea that 
some sort of `continuous scale' (or any sort of linkage) could be constructed 
between them is logically flawed. 
However, I shall leave the final word on the fact/value debate to Keith Jenkins: 
In the history of philosophy there has been no successful attempt - though 
many people have tried and some have indeed claimed success - to derive 
value(s) from fact(s) logically. This is not to say that we do not seem 
effortlessly to draw values from facts all the time in our everyday lives, but 
this is not what the philosophical argument is about. For although we routinely 
interconnect facts and values all the time we can never show a logical 
entailment from the one to the other; the fact-value argument is the argument 
that we can never logically draw from one fact, or one set of facts, one and 
only one value. For example, we might say that going to war hurts people and 
is therefore wrong; on the other hand we might say that even though it hurts 
people war can often be morally justified. Accordingly, if it is possible either 
to justify or not the act of war then it follows that there is no necessary 
entailment of values from the fact that war hurts people. Thus we are free to 
decide to draw (on undecidable grounds) whatever values, significance or 
meaning we like about facts (including the facts of the past, the present and the 
future). Until someone can show that there is a logical entailment -I doubt 
there is much chance of that happening - then we remain inescapably ethical, 
moral and historical relativists. 
Section Six: Concluding Observations 
I now propose to gather together the main points of this chapter, along with some 
related final thoughts, such that they constitute, I hope, a cohesive account of the 
principal negative elements within Ankersmit's early theorisations. It is my view 
that these elements damage Ankersmit's thesis and therefore should never have been 
part of it. 
First of all there is the matter of language which is shown by Ankersmit to be 
metaphorical all the way down' and this observation, applicable to all texts, must 
37 Jenkins, K., (2003). Refiguring History: New Thoughts an an Old Discipline. London: Routledge. p43 
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equally apply to his own texts. However, he loses sight of this when he presents 
proofs of his theories which, of necessity, can only be expressed in the metaphors of 
language and thus he is confronted with (but does not notice) the untenable concept 
of proof resting on metaphor. 
But, what if one were to cleanse Ankersmit's Narrative Logic of its proofs? Over 
half of the text would (of course) vanish, so what would be the new status of this 
leaner version of his book? 58 Would it, for instance, reflect (albeit in Ankersmit's 
unique style) the substance of, in particular, White's Metahistory, or would it be a 
kind of Metahistory plus/minus something? To put it another way, is there anything 
at all in Ankersmit's general conclusions as expressed in Narrative Logic (and 
summarised in his `Six Theses) which either does not directly reflect elements of 
White's Metahistory or is not an extension of some implicit notion within White's 
theorisations? 
Take, for example, Ankersmit's fundamental and central concept of the narrative 
substance which, I am now going to suggest, could be seen as an incomplete 
abstraction from the works of White. I shall illustrate what I mean by drawing on 
White's essay, `The Historical Text as Literary Artifact', 59 wherein he argues that 
historians both constitute and pre-figure their subjects as possible objects of 
narrative representation within the language used to describe them. Accordingly, the 
different kinds of historical representations that we can have of the same set of past 
events can be seen to be engendered out of the projections of the different linguistic 
protocols used to pre-figure those events. On this view, descriptions of events 
already signify preparatory interpretations of their own dispositions prior to the 
figuration of these events into the narrative proposals which presume to explain 
38 I would question again (see footnote 22 on page 62) at this juncture the function that logic plays in 
Ankersmit's theory. For in order to azticWate and prove his arguments Ankersmit often uses formal logic, 
yet, in his own reading or summary of Narrative Logic (in his `Six Theses') his position is, indeed, 
accurately presented without any logic appearing anywhere in it. Did he then need logic at all? Well, I 
think that the answer is "no" because his logic is superfluous to his texts and, therefore, I believe that his 
book Narrative Logic would have been better served with the title Narrative Substmrce. 59 This argument of White's, briefly sketched above, can be found in its complete form in White, H., 
(1974). 'The Historical Text asLitera, yArtifact'. Clio no. 3: pp277-303 (or White, H., (1978). Tropics of 
Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticiser. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. pp81-100) Also 
we White, H., (1973). Metahistay. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. p30 
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them. There are, then, two figurative levels at work here in the production of 
histories; first, the level ofpre-figuration itself which establishes the description and 
hence constitution of, and the relationship between, the objects which inhabit the 
field of enquiry and, second, the specific figuration of those objects through modes 
of emplotment, argument, etc., into coherent, meaningful story forms in order to 
transform and explain the apparent historical problems to be solved which arise out 
of relationships pre figured at the first level of figuration. 
White further explains that the historical narrative per se might be taken as a system 
of signs, in the sense that it 
.... points in two directions simultaneously: toward the events described in the 
narrative and toward the story type or mythos which the historian has chosen 
to serve as the icon of the structure of the events. The narrative itself is not the 
icon; what it does is describe events in the historical record in such a way as to 
inform the reader what to take as an icon of the events so as to render them 
familiar to him. The historical narrative thus mediates between the events 
reported in it on the one side and pregeneric plot structures conventionally 
used in our culture to endow unfamiliar events and situations with meanings, 
on the other.... [and that, therefore] as a symbolic structure, the historical 
narrative does not reproduce the events it describes; it tells us in what direction 
to think about the events and charges our thought about the events with 
different emotional valences. The historical narrative does not image the things 
it indicates; it calls to mind images of the things it indicates in the same way 
that a metaphor does 60 
In consideration of this more detailed account of historical writing, it might appear 
that Ankersmit used just part of White's wider theoretical argument. That is, 
Ankersmit only observed White's second level offiguration, for there is nothing in 
Ankersmit's description of the narrative substance to account for the pre-figured 
natures and relationships of the kinds of objects which come to occupy the 
historian's field of enquiry in the first place. One could then say that the narrative 
substance, as conceived by Ankersmit, is always governed by a point-of-view 
concerning objects which have already been linguistically constituted and pre- 
figured before he gets at them. And, furthermore, that in his own theory Ankersmit 
moved from the narrative's individuating statements directly to a "picture" of the 
'60 White. Tropics ofDiscourse. pp88-91 
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past without accounting for that process in itself. White, however, in his brief yet 
more comprehensive argument (which accounts for both the referential and the 
aesthetic components of historical writing), explained that the historical narrative 
does not directly "image" the things that it indicates, but rather that (as a culturally 
dependant semiotic system) the historical narrative indicates the direction in which a 
culturally recognisable, familiarising image might be found; an important 
consideration for historians engaged in, for instance, transcultural studies. 
Now, Ankersmit, as a close reader of Hayden White, should have at least registered 
White's argument. Had he done so his attention would have been directed not only 
to the cultural dimension of the narrative form but also to the arguably deeper level 
of pre-figuration which runs beneath, and has a bearing on, the mode of operation of 
his own narrative substance. 61 In fact, the nature of Ankersmit's so-called point-of- 
view (which governs the narrative substance), is only investigated by him to the 
extent that he points out that people have them, that they are all different, and that 
they are often hidden from view. But, as I have explained (and this is ironic), a 
point-of-view in itself must be tropologically figured within explanatory strategies 
(modes of emplotment, argument and ideology) and, therefore, it could be argued 
that White's conceptual and explanatory linguistic mechanisms reside unnoticed 
beneath (as pre-figuration) and scarcely noticed within Ankersmit's narrative 
substance which is, after all, a figurative device. 
Now, if all the propositions advanced in Narrative Logic, or at least the general 
conclusions arising from them, could be similarly traced back and matched, or 
linked-up in some form or another, to White's conclusions as outlined in his preface 
to Metahistory 62 (and broadly speaking I believe that they can) then Narrative Logic 
61 Why this omission one might ask? Well, my speculative suggestion is that Ankersmit harbours an 
instinctive suspicion of the notion of pre-figuration, for he argues that it is the `Whitean counterpart of 
Kant's transcendental aesthetics and transcendental analytics' (see Ankersmit, F. R, (2009). `White's 
`Neo-Kantianism': Aesthetics, Ethics and Politics' in Ankersmit, F. R, Domafiska, E. and Kellner, H. 
(eds. ) Re-Figuring Hayden White. California: Stanford University Press. p27) and everything associated 
with Kantianism is, for Ankersmit, to be avoided at all costs. This anti-Kantian/anti-prefiguration position 
adopted be Ankersmit will be further examined in Chapters Three and Four. 
62 White. Metahistory. pp xi-xii, wherein White states that `The general conclusions I have drawn from 
my study of nineteenth-century historical consciousness can be summarized as follows: (1) there can 
be no "proper history" which is not at the same time "philosophy of history"; (2) the possible 
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might appear to be little more than an abridged re-description of, or perhaps 
supplement to, an existing text and could best be read as such. 
Turning now - with the above in mind - to Ankersmit's perplexing manufacture 
and subsequent demolition of misrepresentations of White's texts, which (if 
uncritically accepted) would have had the effect of elevating Ankersmit's own status 
relative to that of White's, the following extract from a thought provoking interview 
might be of interest. The interviewer, Gary Olson, asked the interviewee, Jacques 
Derrida, to comment on misrepresentations and misunderstandings of his own work 
and this was his answer: 
First, there are no simple misunderstandings. Each time you read a text - and 
this is my situation and the situation of every reader - there is some 
misunderstanding, but I know of no way to avoid this. Misunderstanding is 
always significant; it's not simply a mistake, or just an absurdity.. It's 
something that is motivated by some interest and some understanding. 
Sometimes the most ferocious Critics who react vehemently and passionately 
and sometimes with hatred understand more than supporters do, and it's 
because they understand more that they react this way. Sometimes they 
understand unconsciously, or they know what is at stake. Sometimes I think 
that this enemy, because he's so ferocious, so nervous, is more aware of what 
is at stake than a friendly ally is. So, sometimes misunderstanding is 
understanding, and the other way around. 63 
There is no doubt that Ankersmit's concept of the narrative substance as he 
described it (despite my identification of it with part of White's wider thesis) was 
and is of significant value. But with regard to his general theoretical conclusions 
(taken in the round) I am not convinced that Ankersmit can be seen to have detached 
modes of historiography are the same as the possible modes of speculative philosophy of history; (3) 
these modes are in realityjonnalizafions of poetic insights that analytically precede them and that 
sanction the particular theories used to give historical accounts the aspect of an "explanation"; (4) there 
are no apodictically certain theoretical grounds on which one can legitimately claim an authority for any 
one of the modes over the others as being more "realistic"; (5) as a consequence of this, we are indentured 
to a choice among contending interpretative strategies in any effort to reflect on history-in-general; (6) as 
a corollary of this, the best grounds for choosing one perspective on history rather than another are 
ultimately aesthetic or moral rather than epistemological; and, finally, (7) the demand for the scientization 
of history represents only the statement of a preference for a specific modality of historical 
conceptualization, the grounds of which are either moral or aesthetic, but the epistemological justification 
of which still remains to be established'. 
63 Derrida, J., (1990). `Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition: Interview by G. A. Olson' in JAC, 
10 no. 1 
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himself much from White's position, although the impulse to do so is evident; a 
persistent "undercurrent" running beneath the structure of his arguments. For 
instance, Ankersmit frequently promotes his own style of theory as the "real thing" 
because it addresses the problem of `how the historian accounts for or represents 
past reality', ` whereas he distances himself from White's literary theory which he 
characterises as `wholly useless as a theory of history'65 in that it fails to `account 
for the historian's representation of past reality'. 66 It seems to me, however, that 
White's formalistic literary theory is performing this task which Ankersmit denies it 
- that is, it satisfactorily accounts for the imaginative, aesthetic construct of history. 
Furthermore, it would appear that, in spite of his ruinous critique of narrative 
historiography, Ankersmit was unable to "let go" and submit to his own narrative 
logic. The idea that history, having had its old positivistic, epistemological stuffing 
effectively critiqued to death by him, could still retain, its putative capacity to 
properly inform ethical and political decisions in the present is a strange and 
puzzling manifestation of Ankersmit's inability to observe the consequences of his 
own arguments. Of course, with this notion in particular Ankersmit does indeed 
succeed in establishing a degree of detachment from White whose theorisations 
could not, I believe, ever support such an idea. 
Finally, then, to complete this Chapter with a question. Could all the above 
mentioned anomalies be symptomatic of a kind of paranoia which might be 
expressed as Ankersmit's flight from the formula, "Ankersmit = White"? Well, I 
think that it could, and this theme of detachment (Ankersmit's desire to separate 
himself from White, from the spectre of White) will run, as a continuous thread, into 
and right through the content of my next "bridging" chapter. 
64 Ankersmit. Historical Representation. p68 
6s Ibid. p74 
66 Ibid. p68 
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ChapterTlme 
Aukasmit in Transifim 
Ankersmit's shift from the theoretical position that he brought to his writing of 
Narrative Logic to the very different theoretical position that he brought to his 
writing of Sublime Historical Experience is the subject of this Chapter. However, 
before launching my investigation into the exact character and purpose of this 
transition, I begin by way of a general reflection on `where I am now' and an 
indication of where, in Chapter Four, `I intend to go'. 
In Chapter One I collected together various arguments drawn from Ankersmit's 
Narrative Logic which individuated the governing narrative substance' of that 
chapter's title, `The Good Ankersmit'. In Chapter Two, however, I argued that I had 
found in those very same arguments various deviations from and contradictions to 
what I would call "good theory", evidenced through positions which (I tried to 
show) were not only sometimes at odds with each other but which also failed to act 
as those supports and proofs of Ankersmit's main arguments in ways he clearly 
imagined that they would. It is, of course, somewhat speculative to say that these 
deviations and contradictions, which variously undercut the relativist conclusions 
logically issuing out of his idealist theory of narrative substances, were 
unconscious or subconscious retreats from a generally radical position, possibly an 
untenable position -a "step too far" - for a man who saw and sees himself as a 
conservative liberal. For Ankersmit has never been fully at ease with the 
postmodern/textual "turn" (as exemplified in Narrative Logic) which he became so 
famous for championing in his exchanges with Perez Zagorin in the pages of History 
and Theory in 1989-90. Indeed, this championing has by now - in 2009 - almost 
sunk without trace as Ankersmit moves, again in a somewhat contradictory way, 
between historical experience on the one hand - which vis-a-vis the mainstream 
looks like another radical move (albeit to save "history" from a now rampant 
86 
textualism) - and the sometimes toyed with comfort-zone of a learning from the 
past sort of historism. ' 
But, be all that as it may, the point that I'want to make here is that in the ten years 
following the publication of Narrative Logic, Ankersmit's increasing uneasiness 
with what was for him an overplayed (perhaps stretched to extremis) linguistic 
textualism became evident in his various essays and papers, the most important of 
which - along with a specially written synoptic Introduction - appeared together in 
his History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall of Metaphor (1994). To be sure, from 
the later vantage point of (post) Sublime Historical Experience, the essays in (and 
around) History and Tropology only intimate, quite understandably, Ankersmit's 
"experience" text which was to be published eleven years later in 2005, a text that 
(he explained in its Preface) took a decade in its making. Consequently, History and 
7ropology contained only an embryo of what was later to emerge, fully grown, in 
Sublime Historical Experience. Nevertheless, ' it will be argued here that History and 
Tropology articulates and thus marks a new stage in Ankersmit's trajectory from 
language to experience -a launching pad for a new "goal". This goal was not of a 
kind that one might associate with the everyday work of the historian, for it was in 
r Ankersmit's credentials as a postmodern history theorist were most definitively "nailed to the mast" in 
his exchanges with Perez Zagorin in the pages of History and Theory (see Ankersmit, F. R., (1989). 
`Historiography and Postmodernism' in History and Theory 28 no. 2: ppl37-153, Zagorin, P., (1990). 
'Historiography and Postmodernism: Reconsiderations' in History and Theory 29 no. 3: pp263-274, and 
Ankersmit, F. R, (1990). 'Reply to Professor Zagorin' in History and 7heoty 29 no. 3: pp275-296). I owe 
my depiction of Ankersmit as a conservative liberal to a conversation with Keith Jenkins who informed 
me that in his own conversation with Ankersmit this is how he had styled himself. Post 2005 this 
conservatism has manifested itself historically (politically Ankersmit is active in right wing liberalism in 
Holland) in various ways both in and in addition to his central desire to ground a real past in 'direct 
experience' safe from relativistic peradventure. For instance, in the foundationalist agenda of the 
Introduction to the first publication of the Journal for the 'Centre for Metahistory', Groningen, which he 
co-edits (see Ankersmit, F. R., Bevir, M., Roth, P., Tucker, A. and Wylie, A., (2007). 'The Philosophy of 
History: An Agenda' in Ankersmit, F. R, Bevir, M., Roth, P., Tucker, A and Wylie, A., (eds. ). Journal 
of the Philosophy of History 1 no. 1: ppl-9) where postmodernism was dismissed as the `.... soon to 
become dated debate on extreme relativism and scepticism, sometimes called after a recent architectural 
style, postmodernism' (p1). And also in the widely recognised conservative manifesto which Ankersmit 
wrote for Manifestos for History wherein (on page 222 in the Afterword to that volume) Hayden White 
noted his surprise that Ankersmit now'... councils a return to the good old ways of Ranke and traditional 
historians, in order to restore history to its traditional task of teaching (political) philosophy by example 
(see Ankersmit, FR., (2007). 'Manifesto for an Analytical Political History' and White, H., 'Afterword' 
both in Jenkins, K., Morgan, S., Munslow, A, (eds. ) Man festäs for History. London: Routledge. pp 179- 
196 & pp220-231). 
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fact quite literally categorically different. Thus, as Ankersmit himself pointed out in 
Sublime Historical Experience, his new theory would have: 
.... no 
bearing whatsoever on what historians actually do and on the question 
of why they do. what the do.... [and that the issues he now deals with are] .... as useless as they are meaningless from the perspective of the practice of 
historical writing .... 
[and furthermore that] .... some readers (as I hope) may conclude that this book has helped to deepen their intuitions, whereas others - for reasons that are easy enough to predict - will consider the book useless, "hyperbolic", or simply nonsensical. 2 
Now, it might appear that I am getting somewhat ahead of my own argument here, 
and perhaps I am, but not without good reason. For it is clear from the above 
assortment of statements, drawn from the Preface of Sublime Historical Experience, 
that Ankersmit's new theorisations were indeed to constitute a radical departure 
from his previous language governed, representationalist style of historical theory 
(as articulated in Narrative Logic) which he has marginalised thus: 
the lingualism of the philosophy of language, of hermeneutics, of 
deconstructivism, of tropology, of semiotics, and so on has become by now an 
obstacle to, rather than a promoter of, useful and fruitful insights. The mantras 
of this now so oppressive and suffocating lingualism have become a serious 
threat to the intellectual health of our discipline. 3 
As will become apparent in my next chapter on Sublime Historical Experience, this 
departure eventually transports Ankersmit into a new sphere or style of enquiry (a 
far cry from the best Ankersmit of Narrative Logic) operating on the basis of 
nostalgic longings, sensations, feelings, impressions, atmospheres, intuitions and so 
on; a move from `the rationalism of "theory" to a new romanticism', 4 as he himself 
puts it. We, his readers, are thus invited to `enter the dark and sometimes even 
sinister Romantic world of the profoundest and quasi-existentialist layers in our 
relation to the past.... S. In short, Ankersmit had(s) an agenda, perhaps longstanding 
(as already noted, in Sublime Historical Experience he explained that his book was 
at least ten years in the making) and which I am deliberately highlighting at this . 
stage in my argument in order to help clarify my particular reading of History and 
2 Ankersmit, F. R., (2005). Sublime Historical Experience. California: Stanford University Press. pp(xv- 
xvi) 
3 Ankersmit, F. R., (2006). `Presence and Myth' in History and Theory 45 no. 3: p336 4 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. p7 
5 Ibid. p 10 
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Tropology. For, to repeat, it is in (and around) the essays of History and Tropology 
that Ankersmit arguably moves - largely via (as we shall see) a critique of Hayden 
White6 - from his "historical" theorisations of Narrative Logic to his "historical 
experiential" theorisations of Sublime Historical Experience, and it is this 
movement I argue, which precipitates his fall from the good to the lost Ankersmit of 
this thesis. 
Ankersmit's repositioning of himself within historical theory thus involved a certain 
trajectory of argument, and it is my contention (my thesis) that whilst its point of 
departure resides in one category (the discourse of history), its point of arrival 
resides in quite another (the discourse of memory studies, memory not being of a 
historical kind). Now, I cannot see how a trajectory of argument can 
unproblematically move between two different categories in this way, nevertheless, 
it would appear that Ankersmit (if he was aware of the problem at all) found its 
solution in their conflation into a single category. It is also of interest to note here in . 
passing that the American history theorist, David Carr, is also currently working 
towards a similar conflation of categories and, together, these "moves" would 
appear to be symptomatic of a wider shift from history to memory'. Carr, to be more 
specific, wishes to combine historical representation and memory into a single study 
of experience. He recently pointed this out in his paper, 'On the Different Meanings 
of Experience', delivered at an International Conference in Ankersmit's home 
university of Groningen, at the `Centre for Metahistory' (a sort of "Groningen 
School" of experience related studies to which Carr has attached himself). Carr also 
6 On reflection, having re-read my whole thesis, I have again considered why Ankersmit was (and still is 
- as will be argued below, especially in Section Three) so anti-White whilst, at the same time, being in 
some sort of a need of him to both measure and to validate his (Ankersmit's) own works (what I have 
referred to as Ankersmit's lovelhate relationship with White). This is, I think, because everything that 
Ankersmit wished to distance himself from in the writing of Sublime Historical Experience was already 
deeply engrained in White's own theorisations. For instance, when Ankersmit argued against 
postmodernism, poststructuralism, rhetoric, language, textualism and the linguistic turn etc., he was 
arguing against everything that White had happily embraced. And therefore my particular emphasis on 
White here, and elsewhere in this thesis, is not only because of Ankersmit's specific use of White to 
advance his own position but also because, all matters considered, Ankersmit's journey from language to 
experience might equally be seen as his journey from White to experience. Or perhaps better still, as I 
have already intimated, Ankers mit's journey from the spectre ' of White to experience. 
This matter will be more fully explored in Chapter Four and the Conclusion. 
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made the very same point in a brief rdsume of his paper, which appeared in the 
conference program notes, as follows: 
For several decades, philosophy of history has been dominated by two themes: 
representation and memory. Reflection on these two themes has revealed some 
important things about history, but it'has also raised certain problems that it is 
incapable of solving. As a way of overcoming the weaknesses and solving the 
problems of this dual focus on representation and memory, I propose to put 
experience in their place. In proposing this approach to the philosophy of 
history I am joining hands with a development that is already vigorously under 
way. In the work of F. R. Ankersmit and Eelco Runia, similar themes are being 
stressed. I read these new works with a certain shock of recognition, because 
they seemed to be undertaking something I had myself been attempting in 
recent work under the title of a phenomenology of history. " 
Ankersmit and Eelco Runia were both present at this conference (they were also key 
figures in connection with its conception and organisation) and neither of them 
raised any objection to Carr's statement - nor, for that matter, did anyone else - so I 
presume that this is the position of them all and, therefore, that history and memory 
are taken to be "of a kind" in Groningen. 9 This position, however, which (it should 
be stressed) appears to be the collective position of Ankersmit and all his colleagues 
(whatever their location) engaged in memory, presence and experience studies, is 
fundamentally untenable for reasons that I will fully explore in the following 
chapter. I am introducing the matter at this juncture because it is of vital importance 
to my argument; perhaps I should go further and suggest that it is at its very centre. 
But I return now to the detail of History and Tropology, the text of which is made up 
of five previously published essays along with a new introduction, a new conclusion 
and a tabular arrangement of the main argument of Narrative Logic entitled `Six 
Theses on Narrativist Philosophy of History' (to which I referred in the opening 
page of Chapter Two and that chapter's footnotes 22 & 57). The bulk of the text is thus 
composed of essays which were not originally written with an "integrated whole" in 
mind and, therefore, Ankersmit relied substantially upon his Introduction to the 
8 From page 13 of an explanatory pamphlet titled Moved by the Past and published by the `Centre for 
Metahistory', Groningen for its International Conference of Sept 27th & 28"' 2007. 
9 This conclusion of mine is not derived only on the basis of the documents cited here - it is, in fact, 
axiomatic to all literature concerning `historical experience' as construed by Ankersmit and the 
Groningen School (and I include presence, parallel processing etc. ). This matter will be covered in the 
following chapter. 
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volume to make apparent the underlying theme connecting the various essays 
together. Consequently, it is in Ankersmit's Introduction to History and Tropology 
that one might be able to more readily discern both the substance and the new 
direction of his evolving project. A project which I will argue is founded on a 
critique of, and a distancing from, Hayden White's methodological arguments 
/positions as expressed in Metahistory (and other texts) and which, accordingly, I 
will look at here in some analytical detail. Consequently, this critical analysis which 
is, as I say, a somewhat finely tuned close reading of History and Tropology, is the 
primary subject of this chapter. For once this argument is established, then 
Ankersmit's transition or journey from language to experience will be understood. 
This understanding will then be summarised and contextualised in the last two 
sections of the chapter where the "trees" of the previous ones will, I hope, be seen to 
fall almost naturally into the shape of a "wood". 
My account of Ankersmit's transition from language to experience is laid out in Six 
Sections: `Section One: Ankersmit on Metahistory', `Section Two: Language 
Revisited', `Section Three: Ambivalence: An Unlikely Story', `Section Four: The 
Case of the Vanishing Tropes', `Section Five: Consolidation' and `Section Six: An 
Explanation', and it might help the reader if at this point I offer a brief explanatory 
clarification of these various subtitles. Hence, in Section One I look at Ankersmit's 
idiosyncratic and sometimes quite extraordinary reading of Hayden White's 
Metahistory. Then, in Section Two, I place History and Tropology within the book's 
own 1980's "frame". Sections Three and Four focus on single arguments which, 
taken together, constitute (in my view) the basis upon which Ankersmit articulates 
his constituting position within History and Tropology. These two arguments which 
initially appear to be quite separate can, I argue, be linked together to provide the 
platform from which Ankersmit propels himself into his radically new style of 
historical theory which, eventually, finds its full expression in Sublime Historical 
Experience. In Section Five I summarise all the preceding arguments (including 
those of Chapters One and Two) and prepare the ground for Section Six which 
contains (and again summarises) my own particular explanation for Ankersmit's 
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deviation from radical *historical theory as currently conceived10 and to which the 
good Ankersmit seems to indeed belong. 
Section One: Ankersmit on Metahistorv 
An understanding of Ankersmit's idiosyncratic interpretive reading of Hayden 
White's Metahistory is of crucial explanatory assistance in connection with the 
arguments which are to follow in the subsequent sections. Metahistory, Ankersmit 
explains: 
.... can be read and interpreted in two ways that are fundamentally opposed. Indeed, we can read it as the unmasking of the historian's effort to get hold of 
historical reality and historical truth ...... 
but the book can also be interpreted 
as follows. Precisely by focusing on and by problematizing the historian's 
language, White demonstrates not that it is impossible to get hold of past 
reality, but the naivete of the kind of positivist intuition customarily cherished 
in the discipline for how to achieve this goal. More specifically, what these, 
positivist intuitions proudly present as historical reality itself is a mere spectral 
illusion that is created by the historical discipline itself. Surely, there is a 
historical reality that is, in principle, accessible to the historian. But historians 
have forgotten about this historical reality and mistaken the product of their 
tropological encodation of the past for the past itself. Within this reading, not 
the practicing historian criticizing White but White himself is the realist who 
reminds us of the difference between reality and mere intellectual 
construction. ie 
This is a dense extract and it needs to be broken down in order to grasp the nature of 
Ankersmit's two fundamentally opposed interpretations of Metahistory. The first 
interpretive position solely accommodates the notion that White is `unmasking' the 
historian's (hopeless) efforts to get hold of `historical reality' and `historical truth'. I 
am rather uncomfortable with regard to both of these last constructions - `historical 
reality' might be better expressed as `the actuality of the past' and `historical truth', 
as I have previously pointed out, is an oxymoron. However, the distinction that 
Ankersmit is making here is clear enough and my own reading of Metahistory was 
undoubtedly also from this `unmasking' point-of-view. Ankersmit's second 
10 By this I mean a current style of historical theory of the kind informed through the works of people like 
Hayden White, Richard Rorty, Keith Jenkins, Sande Cohen, Alun Munslow, Jacques Derrida, Elizabeth 
Deeds Ermarth ei al. '' Ankersmit, F. R., (2001). Historical Representation 
, 
California: Stanford University Press. p254 
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interpretive position rests on the notion that White is `problematizing the historian's 
language' expressly in order to demonstrate that a confidently presumed grasp of 
`past reality' can only be a `spectral illusion' -a `tropological encodation of the 
past' rather than the past itself. So far so good, but Ankersmit's interpretation of 
White's position does not finish at this point, since he then attaches to this `spectral 
illusion' concept the governing notion that there is, after all, a historical reality 
accessible to historians, but that they have lost sight of it. This is because they are 
mesmerized by their own `intellectual constructions' which contrive to obscure it. 
Nevertheless, it is "right there" if only they could see it (this "it" already being the 
idea of the past "plain" at the centre of Sublime Historical Experience). In this 
interpretation of Metahistory Ankersmit finds in White the realist who has taken 
upon himself a certain task, namely that of educating historians to the extent that 
they might perceive the difference between a reality (which is in principle accessible 
to historians) and their own `intellectual constructions' (which are constituted within 
the discourse itself and form a barrier to the perception of an otherwise accessible 
reality). 
This second interpretation of Metahistory, which accommodates the notion of an 
accessible past, is at variance with my reading of White's text(s) and, to the best of 
my knowledge, it is unique to Ankersmit. Nevertheless, this is the reading which he 
favours and he supports it with the following two arguments: 
1) To the great late eighteenth and nineteenth century historians/philosophers 
investigated by White (Gibbon, Tocqueville, Macauley, Michelet et al. ) the 
past was: 
.... a sublime and quasi-divine spectacle 
that required the whole of their 
powerful personalities in order to become expressible in their writings. 
To them the past was not yet that tamed and domesticated reality that is 
the product and counterpart of the methods and canons of contemporary 
disciplinary historical writing. To them the past was a past that can only 
be rendered if it resonates in the depth of the historians own soul and 
evokes there the essentially poetic response testifying to their actual 
encounter with past reality. ' 
12 Ibid. p254 
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Additionally, Ankersmit maintains that White was fascinated by the manner 
in which these historians and philosophers of history related to (what 
Ankersmit calls) `historical reality itself , and it would thus be, he says, a 
perverse interpretation of Metahistory to read it primarily as an account of 
how the poetics of historical writing blinded these great historians and 
philosophers to the reality of the past 
.... for their poetic grasp of the past did not remove them from the past, did not create an insurmountable distance between the past and 
themselves - on the contrary, it was only thanks to their poetic genius 
that they caught a glimpse of it and could inform their readers about their 
experience of the past. 13 
Ankersmit thus manages to find within White's Metahistory the presumption 
of a past actuality which was exclusively accessible to those great historians/ 
philosophers of poetic genius who somehow avoided the nineteenth century 
disciplinisation of history. The nature of this access to the past and its mode of 
operation is the subject of Ankersmit's next argument. 
2) This argument centres on White's observation that the greatness of the 
aforementioned historians originated, as Ankersmit puts it, 
.... in the easy freedom with which they moved through the tropological 
grid, while defying those "elective affinities" to which mediocre 
historians ordinarily submit their encodation of the past.... White 
[proposed his] stylistic or linguistic protocols only to demonstrate how 
historical reality can be made visible not by a docile submission, but by a 
subtle and poetic evasion of these protocols. White's tropes will indeed 
often function as a screen between us and historical reality, as will be the 
case when the mediocre historian obediently submits to the dictates of 
one trope only. '' 
Accordingly (Ankersmit continues), White's tropology shows us how these 
great eighteenth and nineteenth-century historians 
. -... succeeded in finding and exploiting the cracks and 
fissures in the 
tropological screen, and how precisely through these cracks and fissures 
they managed to get a glimpse of past reality that remained inaccessible 
to their less gifted colleagues. This also explains why irony is so 
prominent in White's tropology. Irony is the trope that confronts us with 
131bid. p255 
14 Ibid. p255 
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the limitations and shortcomings of the other tropes; it is, so to speak, the 
trope that is the natural ally of historical reality itself and that enables it 
to reassert its rights against the pressure of the other tropes. Irony 
naturally situates itself in these cracks and fissures between the other 
tropes, and is therefore the trope of historical reality itself 15 
It should be noted here that none of the statements or ideas attributed to White by 
Ankersmit in the preceding extracts from Historical Representation are referenced 
to White's texts. To. be sure Ankersmit prefaces his argument with a statement (a 
kind of "let-out" clause) to the effect that he is focusing on `general trends' 16 which 
connect White's various texts; however, there is no way of knowing in any 
particular instance to which of these Ankersmit is referring. This is a very 
unsatisfactory state of affairs, particularly in view of the radical nature of some of 
the claims made. 
Now, in contrast to these arguments put forward by Ankersmit, my own reading of 
Metahistory turns on the understanding (unquestionable in my view) that the book 
was intentionally written as, and only as, a formalist critique (drawing on literary 
theory and linguistics) of the nature of the historical narrative. On this reading I have 
not been left with the impression that White was reminding me of the difference 
between, on one side, an `accessible' past and, on the other, `a mere intellectual 
construction'. For me, White was highlighting the hopelessness of the historians 
self-appointed task - to find meaning, direction, understanding and so on, in the 
chaos and contingency of a past that has gone forever. Moreover, this is a past which 
does not at all indicate how it is to be "told"; it only leaves behind traces which are 
not to be confused with the past itself (as happenings, occurrences, events etc. ) and 
which can be variously appropriated. 
Furthermore, nowhere in White's writings can I find any textual evidence that he 
actually believed that any of the historians that he studied caught glimpses of past 
reality through either their defiance of, or their exploitation of, the elective affinities 
within his (White's) tropological grid. Indeed, in Narrative Logic Ankersmit states 
15 Ibid. p255 
16 Ibid. p254 
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White's general position very differently as follows: `the past is an amorphous chaos 
of data that successfully resists conscious apprehension by the historian'. " What is 
more, I cannot grasp the logic that leads Ankersmit to the conclusion that irony must 
be the trope of historical reality (meaning, in this instance, the actuality of the past 
itself). " Nevertheless, all of this definitely appears to be part of Ankersmit's 
interpretation of Whites position and, as such, it provides an essential insight into his 
developing arguments which, resting very much on this and other curious 
misreadings/interpretations of White's texts, will (as we shall see) lead Ankersmit 
himself to think that he "also" could access the real (the past "plain"). 
Section Two: Language Revisited 
Twentieth-century philosophy, Ankersmit observes in History and Tropology, was 
fascinated by the phenomenon of language. Philosophers such as Russell, Carnap, 
Wittgenstein, Strawson et al., had described the nature of language in different ways 
yet, despite the diversity of their arguments and their inevitable conflicts of opinion,. 
these philosophers of language appeared to share a common underlying position; 
namely that they all reasoned from the singular assumption that 
.... 
language is the principal condition for the possibility of all knowledge and 
meaningful thinking, and that therefore an analysis of language is of as much 
importance to the contemporar y philosopher as an analysis of the categories of 
understanding was for Kant of the first Critique. 19 
Furthermore, Ankersmit continued, it is precisely this comparison with Kant's 
Critique which gave rise to the notion that contemporary philosophy of language 
17 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. pp82-83 
is I find the repeated construction `historical reality' confusing for reasons already explained. However, I 
do not think that there is any doubt that Ankersmit (in this instance and in most cases elsewhere) is 
referring to the actuality of the past. Now, to attach a trope to the actuality of the past simply does not 
make sense, for a trope is a linguistic instrument. One can talk of the trope irony in connection with a 
narrative construct like history, or as a master trope governing historiography (construed here as a body 
of propositions about the past, presented in the form of stories) but it is meaningless to attach this 
linguistic instrument to the chaos/contingency of past events and situations which have no trope or story 
form within them. The troped story form is a product of the enculturation of its own time and it is 
retrospectively imposed on the past - hence, it is a mistake to turn this process on 
its head and presume to 
discover that trope (and/or that story) in the past itself. 
19 Ankersmit. History and Trapology. pp 1-2 
might best be seen as `a new and more fruitful phase in the transcendentalist 
program that was inaugurated two centuries [earlier] by Kant' -'O 
Ankersmit then drew attention to two interconnected underlying assumptions upon 
which this new language centred phase of philosophy, in part, rested. In the first 
place, a kind of reductionist methodology was uncritically adopted or, to rephrase, it 
was thought that nothing essential to the comprehension of complex issues would be 
lost when reducing such issues to their constituent or component parts. This 
theoretical position can be associated with Bertrand Russell and `logical atomism 21 
a philosophical belief which originated in the early twentieth century but which had 
lost favour by the later decades of it. However, although this belief was eventually 
thoroughly discredited, for Ankersmit the philosophy of language remained `atomist 
as far as method [was] concerned'. Z2 Thus, it was taken to be self-evident within the 
contemporary philosophy of language that only the investigation of propositions 
(these being, of course, the professional concern of historians) and their constituent 
components would lead to the discovery of the overarching conditions governing 
truth and meaning. 
Given the foregoing, I think that the second of the two assumptions will logically 
follow. For the adoption of the essentially atomist methodology just noted informed 
the philosophy of language in such a manner that it could only remain blind to the 
possibility of narrative meaning carried at the level of the text viewed as a complex 
whole. Or, to put this another way, the complex whole was regarded as a "non- 
problem" from the point-of-view of a philosophy of language which failed to 
register any philosophical "stumbling block" at this level. Accordingly, all problems 
20 Ibid. p2 
21 Principal exponents of 'logical atomism' were (in addition to Russell) Rudolf Carnap and a pupil (later 
a colleague) of Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Central to 'logical atomism' was the notion that the 
"world" can be unproblematically explained with reference to fundamental logical facts, or atoms, which 
cannot be broken down any further. 'Logical atomism' thus stood in opposition to 'logical holism' -a 
belief articulated about the notion that the world operates in such a way that no part can be known 
without the whole being known first. (Both Russell and Wittgenstein were eventually to reject the atomist 
theory). 
22 Ankersmit. History and Tmpology, pp2-3 
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were taken to be reducible to those encountered in the analysis of singular 
propositions and their constituent parts. 
These two interrelated assumptions - the validity of the reductionist method coupled 
with its logical counterpart, the non-problematic nature of the text viewed as a 
complex whole - were then, Ankersmit explained, transported out of the 
philosophy of language and superimposed onto the philosophy of history to the 
extent that 
.... in the fifties and sixties, philosophy of history preferred to focus on the 
elements of the historical text, like singular statements about historical states 
of affairs, statements expressing causal connections, ....... The historical text 
as a whole was rarely, 'if ever, the topic of philosophical investigation. This is 
all the more to be regretted since the fortunes of philosophy of history self- 
evidently lie with the historical text and not its parts. Only a philosophy of 
history concentrating on the historical text as a whole could contribute 
importantly to contemporary philosophy of history and go beyond a mere 
application of what had already been discovered elsewhere. 23 
This unsatisfactory state of affairs, Ankersmit believed, might well have been 
explained by the general reluctance amongst philosophers of history to attach any 
significance to the distinction between historical research and historical writing -a 
distinction which, as I have already shown, was "pivotal" to Ankersmit's earlier 
theorisations. Historical research is an essentially empirical/epistemological pursuit, 
the results of which are typically expressed in the form of verifiable individual 
statements about the past. However, historical writing is arguably of an aesthetic 
kind; an imaginative activity which cannot be subject to truth claims at the level of 
the text. Its product, the historical narrative, embodies the facts and individual 
statements arising out of historical research but is underdetermined by them (as was 
explained in Chapter One). Thus, in this sense, within historical writing there exists 
a certain autonomy of activity with regard to the use of the product of historical 
research, and it was precisely this crucial point that was missed by twentieth century 
philosophers of history who focused on the philosophy of historical research to the 
exclusion of the philosophy of historical writing. I offer this following quotation as a 
23 Ibid. p3 
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perplexing (to me at least) endnote regarding Ankersmit's absolutely clear and 
fundamentally sound distinction between these two quite different categories; 
In Narrative Logic I started with the traditional, but now almost universally 
condemned, distinction between historical research and historical writing. 24 
It is Ankersmit's own description of the reception of his distinction between 
historical research and historical writing which invites comment. He says that it was 
almost universally condemned, but surely Ankersmit's distinction, once articulated, 
becomes conspicuously self-evident and beyond condemnation. 
However, leaving that matter aside, my primary purpose here is to make it clear that 
the foregoing "in sum" constitutes the well conceived backdrop against which 
Ankersmit offered his very individual and, from my point-of-view, poorly conceived 
ongoing assessment of Whites theoretical position. 
Section Three: Ambivalence: An Unlikely Story. 
In the closing paragraph of Chapter Two - and fleshed out a little in footnote 6 of this 
chapter (page 89) -I suggested that the evolving shape and style of Ankersmit's 
theorisations might be seen to be driven by a kind of paranoia evidenced through his 
all pervasive compulsion to detach and distance his own work from that of the 
spectral Hayden White. It was, of course, Ankersmit's misfortune (one of timing) 
that he arrived on the field of historical theory only to find that it had already been 
comprehensively "staked-out" by White, whose earlier well established intervention 
in the field had been monumental to the extent that there remained little space for 
any further original "narrativist" influence on the fundamentals of historical theory 
(as opposed to more technical matters). 25 And indeed (as I have already argued), in 
terms of substantial theory Ankersmit had little new to offer at that time: the work 
24 Doma. nska. Encounters p73 
25 I recognise here that White's essentially pragmatic "staking-out" of the historical field did, of course, 
leave space for a more detailed investigation of the linguistic and poetic elements constitutive of 
historical narratives (see Munslow, A, (2007). Ncsrative and History, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 
and in particular the section on `Tense/time: Mimesis, order, duration and frequency'. pp51-59). 
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he was doing might best be seen as a re-working of, or supplement to, the existing 
narrativist position in historical theory. Ankersmit's narrative substance was an 
innovative and useful device, of course, but my point here is that it was worked-up 
from Walsh within a wider sphere of understanding developed, in particular, by 
Hayden White and Roland Barthes. It is therefore, for me at least, not surprising that 
Ankersmit's aspiration or quest for originality motivated him to move away from the 
"Whitean" position, but I am surprised by the poverty of the arguments which he 
employed to establish that separation. The first of these arguments concerns the 
notion of a presumed ambivalence in White's use of literary theory, two separate 
instances of which were cited by Ankersmit in History and Tropology. 
In the first place Ankersmit believed that Metahistory would, for most readers, 
present only a singular point-of-view on its subject matter. Or, to rephrase, White 
might be seen to offer only a theory of historical writing in the proper sense of the 
word. However, for Ankersmit Metahistory is 
.... not primarily a book about how historical truth can be attained and tested, 
et cetera .... but about how we should read history 
books. It was part of 
White's enterprise to read the great texts of the nineteenth-century historians as 
if they were novels something no theorist had ever done before.... 
.. [furthermore] since historiography answers historical instead of 
philosophical questions, it might seem that Metahistory had no bearing on 
the kind of topics discussed by philosophers of history. Nevertheless, 
Metahistory did also imply a theory of history in the traditional sense.... the 
book is a theory on historical representation as much as one on how to 
proceed in historiography. It is true that the major theses of this theory (one 
may think here of White's thoroughgoing relativism, his advocacy of a 
linguistic turn for historical theory, and the way he argued his views) 
pointed toward a new phase in the history of historical theory; but as such 
these theses undeniably fell within the scope of what traditionally was. 
perceived as the task of philosophy of history. Hence, Metahistory was 
ambivalent in that it tended to render historiography more philosophical 
and philosophy of history more historiographical; the borderlines between 
the two disciplines were effectively blurred. 26 
This, the first of Ankersmit's demonstrations of ambivalence in White's work, is 
arguably confusing and unsatisfactory. The confusion might be partly attributed to 
the many peculiar statements within it. In the first place, I do not think that 
is Ankersmit. History and Tropology. pp7-8 
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Metahistory is `primarily a book about how historical truth can be attained and 
tested'. I would suggest, in fact, that it is exactly the opposite. Nor is it presented 
as a normative discourse on `how we should read history books'. Furthermore, I 
do not think that it was White's `enterprise' to read the great historical texts of the 
nineteenth century `as if they were novels'. To be sure, White exposed the fictive 
nature of the historical narrative; that is, he explained the manner in which 
meaning is imposed onto the data of the past through the imposition of a 
culturally specific imaginary story form on it (the fictive process), but this is quite 
another matter. 
Moreover, Ankersmit's notion that Metahistory is constituted as `a theory on 
historical representation as much as one on how to proceed in historiography' 
ignores a distinction which White frequently makes. This following quote from an 
interview with Ewa D omahska can stand in for all of those occasions: 
.... when people say to me, "I love Metahistory. I am applying 
its principles to 
my own work", I say, "It's not meant to be applied. It's analytical. It does not 
tell you how to do something! " Psychologists write to me and say that they use 
the theory of tropes which I developed to treat their patients. So they will talk 
about the metaphoric mind or consciousness, or metonymic; and I say, "That's 
being very literal-minded, I only used the concept of the tropes metaphorically. 
It's not supposed to be taken literally". 27 
Hence, Metahistory does not (and was never intended to) indicate `how to proceed 
in historiography'. And the rest of Ankersmit's above extract, his first (so-called) 
example of White's ambivalence, can also be readily dismissed because it is 
immediately apparent that Ankersmit has missed something fundamental to White's 
thesis. White explains the matter thus: 
... every history presupposes a philosophy of 
history. So in the same way that I 
seem to collapse the distinction between fact and fiction, so too the distinction 
between history and the philosophy of history. 28 
27 DomaIiska, E., (1993). `The Human Face of a Scientific Mind. An Interview with Hayden White' in 
Storia delta Storiografia 24 no. 2: pp5-21 
28 White, H., (1997). `Facts, Fictions, and Metahistory: A Discussion with Hayden White by Richard J. 
Murphy ' in Revue d'etudes Anglophones no. 2: pp 13-30 
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Nevertheless, Ankersmit set-up an imaginary opposition between (what he construed 
as) the separate disciplines of, on the one hand history and, on the other, the 
philosophy of history, and in so doing found his ambivalence in what is a single 
entity. To sum up this particular issue, Ankersmit's interpretation of White's 
position stands in contradiction to White's clearly stated view, which is that history 
presupposes a philosophy of history without which the writing of that history could 
not take place. A philosophy of history is, then, an integral part of history itself and 
there are no boundaries to blur. There is no ambivalence here. 
Ankersmit then turned (for his second example of ambivalence) to the role of the 
tropes in the writing of history; here he identified within White's conceptual theory 
or tropics what he called a more interesting and important ambivalence. According 
to Metahistory (Ankersmit observed) historical writing is always informed by one 
of the four tropes - metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, or irony and the 
acceptance of this tropological position of White's implied `a rapprochement29 
between history and literature [because] the use of figurative language is what 
both have in common'. 30 White's Metahistory, then, challenged historians to think 
of historiography not as a science. but as a form of literature and; thus conceived, 
history would become the subject of forms of literary rather than scientc analysis. 
It was from this exchange between science and literature that Ankersmit's second 
idiosyncratic example of ambivalence was to emerge as encapsulated in the 
following complicated extract: 
Metahistory transformed historical writing into literature..... [however] ..... on 
the other hand, we should recall that Max Black already recognized the 
significance of metaphor for the sciences; and Mary Hesse even went so far 
as to assert that concept-formation in the sciences is essentially 
metaphorical. In other words, when focusing on tropology White happened 
to single out precisely that aspect of historical writing which one, for good 
reasons, could say is shared by literature and the sciences. This, then, is the 
ambivalence in White's theory .... Surely Metahistory 
inaugurated the 
. swing of 
historical theory toward literature, yet it managed to do so in such a 
way as not to preclude a scientistic interpretation of historical writing. One 
might object, at this stage, that the ambivalence is merely apparent. That is 
29 Ankersmit, of course, uses the word `rapprochement' here to suggest a return to the style of history 
which pre-dated its nineteenth century professionalisation. 
30 Ankersmit. History cad Tropology, p8 
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to say, arguments like those of Black and Hesse should not be interpreted as 
an indication of the scientism of metaphor (and, hence, of White's tropol- 
ogy) but rather as an indication that philosophers of science are now pre- 
pared to recognize "literary" elements even in the sciences. What we see in 
the arguments of Black, Hesse, and White is, it might be said, an un- 
equivocal agreement to move away from science and toward literature. Cer- 
tainly this objection makes sense. However, in reply to this objection, I now 
want to point out that in White's own view tropology does not necessarily 
mean a radical break with science and scientistic cognitive ideals and, 
moreover, that an independent argument can be conceived to show that 
tropology even lies at the heart of these scientistic cognitive ideals. 31 
At the risk of sounding pedantic I must first comment on the opening statement of 
this extract. Surely, it must be the case that it is not literally historical writing that is 
being transformed; historical writing is, after all, written down in the form of marks 
which remain constant. Rather, it is in the "grasp" of the intrinsic nature of 
historical writing that the transformation takes place: no doubt Ankersmit's 
sometime puzzling style of expression leads to much confusion and 
misunderstanding. 
Turning now to the theoretical positions of Max Black and Mary Hesse which (I 
believe) can be taken together for the purposes of this argument, I need here to 
simply refer back to my relevant explanation and conclusion under `The Illusion of 
Proof (laid out Section Two, Chapter Two). To briefly restate, I take the view that 
all disciplines are of a rhetorical kind. That is to say, that all so-called "knowledge" 
of the world (the human world) is contained within the metaphors that we humans 
use to describe it - knowledge is constituted in language. And meaning, as we 
humans construe it, is not a property of the world but rather an effect caused by the 
language - the metaphors - which we impose on the world in order to endow the 
world (not least for our own psychological needs) with a semblance of familiarity. 
It follows then that Ankersmit's statement, `when focusing on tropology White 
happened to single out precisely that aspect of historical writing which one, for 
good reasons, could say is shared by literature and the sciences', reveals nothing 
new, for both literature and the sciences are of a rhetorical kind. Therefore, it 
31 Ibid. p9 
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seems to me that right at the outset Ankersmit's second example of ambivalence, 
which presupposes a rhetoric/science distinction, is erased with the collapse of 
that very distinction. 
Now, I want to make it clear that for me this argument is closed at this point, and 
I would prefer to let the matter rest here. However, for Ankersmit (who maintains 
that `this, then, is the ambivalence in White's theory .... surely Metahistory 
inaugurated the swing of historical theory toward literature, yet it managed to do 
so in such a way as not to preclude a scientistic interpretation of historical 
writing') the argument clearly continues, and this argument of Ankersmit's 
should be examined because buried within it are certain conclusions/ideas which 
are central to his developing theoretical position (and thus my thesis on it). 
So, to continue with my critique of the argument as laid out in the above extract, 
Ankersmit momentarily concedes that `one might object, at this stage, that the 
ambivalence is merely apparent' (thus suggesting a slight shift towards my 
point-of-view) and that `Black and Hesse should not be interpreted as an 
indication of the scientism of metaphor (and, hence, of White's tropology) but 
rather as an indication .... that philosophers of science are now prepared 
to 
recognize `literary' elements even in the sciences'. However, Ankersmit 
immediately negates this interpretation because he believes that he can 
demonstrate that `in White's own view tropology does not necessarily mean a 
radical break with science and scientistic cognitive ideals and, moreover, that an 
independent argument can be conceived to show that tropology even lies at the 
heart of these scientistic cognitive ideals'. 
To again offer a brief summary. It seems to me that Ankersmit is arguing that 
White's thesis (in opposition to the Black/Hesse theses) implies `the scientism of 
metaphor and, hence, of tropology', and that linked to this is the (not exactly 
parallel) attendant notion that White's theory of tropology reveals the wholly 
literary nature of the historical narrative without implying a break with `science 
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and scientistic cognitive ideals'. Furthermore, Ankersmit believes that this 
interpretation of White's position can be shown to be implicitly embodied within 
White's texts. In order to demonstrate this Ankersmit now puts together yet 
another complex and convoluted argument. 
Metahistory, Ankersmit first explains, carries the implicit notion that `historical 
insight and meaning are only possible thanks to the tropes'. 32 (If Ankersmit has 
in mind here narrative insight and meaning as tropologically constituted within 
narrative construct called history, and I believe that he does, then I would say 
`yes, exactly so'). However, he continues, it follows that 
.... precisely tropology can show us how the discipline of history truly is part 
of the Western, Faustian effort to conquer cognitively the physical and the 
historical world we live in. In one word, tropology is for history what logic 
and scientific method are for the sciences. 3 
Now, there is nothing at all in this extract that makes much sense to me, and in 
order to explain what I mean I want to comment on the various notions/ 
propositions contained in it. 
" In the first place history has no status with regard to definitive knowledge 
about the actual past and, therefore, cannot add anything to worldly 
knowledge about it. This is not to say that individual statements within a 
historical narrative cannot, by consensus within the discipline etc., be 
taken to be true. But, of course, individual statements "in the raw" (prior 
to their organisation into narrative form) do not constitute a history. 
Ankersmit knows all this - it is, after all, central to his thesis as laid out in 
Narrative Logic. 
" Taking the next point, tropology is the process by which `all discourse 
constitutes the objects which it pretends only to describe realistically and 
to analyse objectively' 34. Tropes generate figures in speech or thought and 
they do so by their deviations, or "swerves", from the normal or the 
32 Ibid. p9 
33 Ibid. p 10 
34 White. Tropics of Discourse. p2 
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predictable. Consequently there is no prior logic or convention 
determining the manner in which tropes might function and I therefore 
have difficulty with the notion that tropology, seen as a process in itself or 
as a figure of swerve, might directly or literally indicate how one entity 
can be `truly' part of another. 
" Furthermore, the world itself cannot be historical. Historical means 
pertaining to history and a history can never aspire to being anything more 
than just one of a group of ultimately unverifiable competing propositions 
(of an aesthetic kind) about how some aspect of the past might have been. 
Histories are retrospectively worked-up accounts, generally in written 
form; the past isn't. Hence, the use of the adjective `historical' to describe 
the world as it presents itself to us constitutes a category blunder (since 
history - as fictive narratives etc. - and the world are ontologically 
different) and, thus, makes no logical sense at all. 
" Finally (in the last sentence of the extract), Ankersmit appears to be 
working-up some unjustifiable comparison between two quite different 
relationships. The first of these two relationships (between tropology and 
history) operates internally. That is to say that tropology is a conceptual 
strategy which resides and functions from within the historical narrative 
and, depending on its governing mode of operation, endows that narrative 
with a particular meaning. Thus, tropology as an enabling device has the 
capacity to generate an apparently endless variety of different narrative 
meanings out of a single set of data. But, the relation of logic and method 
to the sciences appears to be of a quite different kind. Science is a 
structure which is constituted in, and thus determined in relation to, its 
language of description. There is, then, a certain "fixity" to science, albeit 
of a temporary (relative) nature. Logic and scientific method necessarily 
inhabit that same language of description and, together, they may be 
applied to the structure of science, or some aspect of it, to produce (unlike 
history) repeatable results. Such results would add to the collective 
knowledge of the world, bearing in mind that knowledge of the world is 
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always in relation to its overarching language of description. To briefly 
restate, the former internal relationship is multifarious with regard to its 
data which can be variously construed. Whilst, by contrast, the latter 
relationship, which refers to an external submission to a fixed structure, 
moves towards a "knowledge" relative to a specific framework of 
language. Thus, Ankersmit's conviction that these two relationships may 
have a common ground for comparison seems to collapse. 
Now, my immediate purpose in the working through of certain Ankersmitean 
confusions in some detail is to illustrate a general observation with regard to 
Ankersmit's own arguments. That is, many of them (all the above being 
examples) are problematic because they are handicapped by a lack of internal 
coherence which arises out of contradictions, category errors, misrepresentations, 
misunderstandings, and so on. In the particular instances critiqued above, 
Ankersmit was attempting to establish a foundation for his own position based on 
flawed assumptions/propositions on which his subsequent argument was to be 
built. And the general observation to be noted here is that the bulk of 
Ankersmit's supporting arguments, certainly to this point in my thesis, can 
equally be shown to be informed and argued on the basis of unworkable 
positions. However, it should be quickly pointed out that Ankersmit's 
philosophical perspective, however argued, cannot be assumed to preclude the 
validity of his own theoretical conclusions. His conclusions as "ends", which 
stand apart from his philosophy as "means", must be assessed on a pragmatic 
basis - that of their usefulness rather than their mode of derivation. But the 
question that nevertheless remains is `why did Ankersmit bother with proofs at 
all when, arguably, they cannot ever reach closure? ' 
Returning now to the argument at hand which, to recall, concerns Ankersmit's 
two putative instances of ambivalence35 in White's use of literary theory (the 
33 Both of these `instances' have already been rejected by me but, as I have pointed out, I will follow 
his second argument through because within it can be identified the development of other 
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second of which is under consideration here). Ankersmit, then, is suggesting that 
White initiates `the swing of historical theory towards literature' but does so in 
such a way as `not to preclude a scientistic interpretation of historical writing', 
the latter of these two consideration being seen by Ankersmit as the `scientism of 
metaphor' and thus the `scientism of White's tropology'. Moreover, Ankersmit 
maintains that it can be demonstrated that White's theory of tropology, in White's 
own view, `does not constitute a break with the scientistic and cognitive ideals of 
science' and that tropology in a scientised form `lies at the heart of these 
scientistic cognitive ideals'. 
Believing to have established these contentious points, Ankersmit then brought 
Jean Piaget into the picture in order to substantiate his claim that White himself 
can be shown to support a scientistic interpretation of Metahistory and of 
metaphor. Piaget is mentioned by White in his Introduction to Tropics of 
Discourse and the significance of his appearance needs some clarification. 
White's argument is, in fact, very clear on this matter; its central purpose being 
to establish sufficient reason for treating the theory of tropology (more precisely 
the fourfold pattern of the tropes) as a model of discourse and of consciousness 
in general. It was in the writings of three radically different thinkers working in 
different disciplines - Piaget, Freud and E. P. Thompson (along with others, but 
these three were the primary exemplars) - that White found theoretical 
structures analogous to the structure of the tropes as described within his own 
theory of tropology. These cross-discipline structural similarities were 
highlighted by White because they were suggestive of a certain (generally 
unnoticed) ubiquity with regard to the tropological model itself. Now, the point 
that must be made here is that White was not adopting or appropriating Piaget's 
theoretical work (which concerned the successive stages in the cognitive 
development of the child) in order to incorporate it, somehow, into his own work. 
problematic assumptions which I will show, in due course, are to be used by Ankersmit to effect 
both his separation from White and his departure. from Kantian philosophy. 
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He was simply using Piaget's striking conclusions along with the equally striking 
conclusions of other theorists working in different fields of study to demonstrate 
the general recurrence or reinvention of the structural form of the tropological 
model, and thus (this is the "key" to White's argument) reveal the archetypal 
nature of the fourfold pattern of tropes. 
However, Ankersmit took a very different view from this and concluded that 
White's theoretical position was actually informed by Piaget. Or, to rephrase, that 
White's adoption of Piaget's theoretical position can be cited as another proof of 
White's multiple ambivalences, and his scientism of metaphor and thus 
tropology. This is how Ankersmit explained his position on the matter: 
White is even quite specific about how the common ground between history 
and the sciences has to be defined. He thus hazards the suggestion that each 
of the four tropes corresponds to one of the four stages that Piaget 
discovered in the cognitive development of the child. And as this cognitive 
development is conditional for the possibility of doing scientific research, 
so the tropes are conditional for the possibility of historical meaning and 
insight. What is of special interest in this suggestion is the following. As is 
well known Piaget's description of the cognitive development of, the child is 
in many ways similar to and to some extent even inspired by. Kant's 
transcendental analysis of the human mind, as expounded in his first 
Critique. I am convinced that the link between tropology and Kantian 
transcendentalism that is thus hinted at should be taken quite seriously. 
Indeed, this seems to be in conformity with White's own explicit intentions: 
he incidentally compares his own tropology with the Kantian 
enterprise (t6)[1Wc«smic's ietermcel ...... we would 
be [thus] justified in attributing 
to White the wish to develop a quasi-Kantian critique of historical 
knowledge and to closely associate his own theory of history with that 
impressive culmination point of Western scientistic thought. Apart from the 
literalisation of historical writing Metahistory is no less an endeavour to 
provide us with a quasi-Kantian, epistemological investigation of the 
cognitive foundations that support historical representation and meaning. 
This then is the ambivalence in tropology that no reader of White's earlier 
work can afford to ignore. 36 
However, on my fundamentally different reading of White's Introduction to 
Tropics of Discourse, as already argued above, Piaget is incidental to White's 
theory in the sense that he could be replaced without compromise to it. 
36 Ankersmit. History and Tropology. pp 10-11 
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Nevertheless, Ankersmit (on the basis of his own radically different 
interpretation of that same text) contrived a link between Piaget's description of 
the cognitive development of the child and scientific research which he then 
further linked to historical meaning and insight only to then link the whole matter 
to Kant's transcendental analysis of the human mind, finally concluding that 
there is an implicit link between Kantian transcendentalism and tropology. 
Ankersmit went even further when he stated that White actually `compares his 
own tropology with the Kantian enterprise'- witness Ankersmit's own 
reference(' in the above extract which refers to the following extract from 
White's Tropics of Discourse: 
The essays in this book all, in one way or another, examine the problem of the 
relationships among description, analysis, and ethics in the human sciences. It 
will be immediately apparent that this division of the human faculties is 
Kantian. I will not apologize for this Kantian element in my thought, [for] I do 
not think that modem psychology, anthropology, or philosophy has improved 
upon it. Moreover, when it is a matter of speaking about human consciousness, 
we have no absolute theory to guide us; everything is under contention. It 
therefore becomes a matter of choice as to which model we should use to mark 
out, and constitute entries into, the problem of consciousness in general. Such 
choices should be self-conscious rather than unconscious ones, and they 
should be made with a full understanding of the kind of human nature to the 
constitution of which they will contribute if they are taken as valid. 37 
This statement by White seems absolutely clear. He was simply noting that the 
particular `division of the human faculties' adopted within his own theory is 
Kantian because, when `everything is under contention', the Kantian model is 
best for his purposes. This is a pragmatic choice of model and not, as Ankersmit 
insisted, an indication of a purposeful and total alignment with Kant: Thus, 
Ankersmit's claim that White was resolutely `developing a quasi-Kantian 
critique of historical knowledge' for the express purpose of `closely associating 
his own theory with that impressive culmination point of Western scientistic 
thought' is unfounded if this is all that there is to go on - and, as far as I can see 
from my readings of both Ankersmit and White, there is nothing else. It must 
then follow that Ankersmit's interpretation of Metahistory as `an endeavour to 
37 White. Tropics of Discourse. pp22-23 
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provide us with a quasi-Kantian, epistemological investigation of the cognitive 
foundations that support historical representation and meaning' (on which 
Ankersmit's ambivalence charge partly rests) is equally unfounded. I have, of 
course, already rejected the ambivalence argument on two previous counts and it 
now seems to have fallen to a third - it is thrice discredited. 
So what exactly was going on in all of this? Well, my suggestion is that 
Ankersmit, in the furtherance of his venture (his new "goal"), was working-up 
some foundation (flawed though it was) from which he could execute two tactical 
moves in the progress of his own thesis. First of all he wanted to rid himself of 
Kantianism (this move will be more fully investigated below) and in doing so he 
would effect his second move (also to be further investigated), namely, to 
achieve a clear separation between himself and White who (as Ankersmit saw it) 
would then remain trapped in `that well-ordered house of Kantian 
transcendentalism'. 38 
Accordingly, Ankersmit's overall "design" (if I dare look at it in this way), seen 
in the round, rests on the progress of two arguments; first, that of White's 
multiple ambivalences which putatively linked him closely with Kant (explored 
and dismissed above) and, second, as we shall now see, that of the so-called 
`disappearance of the tropes' from The Content of the Form (and all White's 
subsequent publications) and to which I turn now. 
Section Four: The Case of the Vanishing Tropes 
Ankersmit confronted his readers with a curious observation - or so it seems at 
first sight - when he drew attention to 
the profound difference between White's earlier work and the essays that 
have been collected in The Content of the Form (1987) ......... 
White does not 
explicate this difference himself, but his apparent change of mind is no less 
important for that. No reader of The Content of the Form can fail to be struck 
38Ankersmit. History and Tropology. p 17 
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by the fact that the tropes are all but absent from it. A clue to White's change 
of mind can be found in [etc. ] ...... 
3. (my emphasis). 
I will deal with the vanishing tropes in a moment but, before doing so, I am 
going to make an observation of my own. For throughout his works Ankersmit 
repeatedly uses a particular kind of argumentative strategy the effect of which is 
to seduce his readers into an unquestioned acceptance of a wholly unjustified 
assumption. The above extract contains a very good example of his technique and 
it will be seen that for clarity I have emphasised the operative words. 
This is the way it works. Ankersmit opens with a statement which, at least on the 
surface of things, might not seem unreasonable. The opening statement in this 
particular case refers to'an `apparent difference' to be found in White's ongoing 
use of the tropes (that is, unlike White's earlier work the tropes appear to be all 
but absent from The Content of the Form and White's subsequent publications). 
A few words later Ankersmit refers to White's `apparent change of mind' with 
regard to the tropes - thus Ankersmit, building on his first statement and without 
presenting any supporting evidence whatsoever, is now suggesting that White has 
apparently turned away from his central interest in tropology. And then, a 
sentence later, Ankersmit drops the word `apparent' and refers to `White's 
change of mind', thus elevating the status of a presumed apparent change to 
what is now (for Ankersmit) the unequivocal fact that White has changed. 
Accordingly, it is the certainty of White's "turn" from tropology that is now 
insinuated into Ankersmit's own discourse as a concrete matter of fact; a 
contentious fact which escapes scrutiny to become a foundational presupposition 
to Ankersmit's continuing argument - which I shall now outline very briefly. 
Convinced of White's turn from the tropes, and apparently in pursuit of his own 
design, Ankersmit proceeded to demonstrate the close relationship between 
`Kantian transcendentalism on the one hand and White's tropology on the 
other'40 and, rather than taking tropology in the whole, he decided that he would 
39 Ibid. p 13 
40 Ibid. p 11 
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`restrict [his] exposition to metaphor 41 which he said can adequately stand in for 
the whole. Ankersmit next observed that metaphor can be shown to be 
... 
in fundamental agreement with the main inspiration of Kantian 
transcendentalism - and this is why metaphor is a continuation of scientistic 
cognitive ideals, rather than being in opposition to them. 42 
This statement is supported by two observations. First, that Kantian 
transcendentalism and metaphor function in a similar way (in the sense that they 
both enable the organisation of knowledge) and second, that they both 
appropriate and then familiarise some previously strange or unfamiliar aspect of 
the world. By linking these two similarities of function together, Ankersmit (by 
his interpretation and not mine) demonstrated the `scientism of metaphor' and by 
extension `tropology' (for, as I have already pointed out, Ankersmit's argument 
is predicated on the assumption that metaphor can adequately stand in for 
tropology). Hence, for Ankersmit, metaphor and Kantian transcendentalism are 
necessarily inextricably linked and this enables him to read into White's 
presumed rejection of tropology a logically entailed (but in White's case 
unrealised) rejection of Kantian transcendentalism. This is evident in 
Ankersmit's assertion that 
... White favourably contrasts the historical sublime with the 
beautiful (and 
with tropology)... [and that] this is self evidently a move against 
tropology.... [but] within.... not against Kantian transcendentalism - .... for 
the sublime still has its logical place within the schematism of the Kantian 
system. 43 
Thus, Ankersmit is claiming here that White made his move against tropology 
but that he then failed to consolidate/endorse it because he failed to reject 
Kantian transcendentalism along with it. As far as I can make out this is, in 
skeletal form, Ankersmit's essential (for my particular purpose here) line of 
argument which putatively provided him with his confirmation of White's turn 
from tropology (linked by Ankersmit with a move to the sublime, discussed 
below on pagesl 15-118). But, and this is important to Ankersmit, this turn was 
seen to be accommodated within the "architecture" of Kantian transcendentalism 
41 Ibid. p11 
42 Ibid. p 11 
43 Ibid. p16 
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and therefore does not constitute White's escape from it. On the basis of this 
position Ankersmit can now declare his own new direction of enquiry as follows; 
I want to pursue the path suggested by White's transition from the kind of 
views that were presented in Metahistory to those we may find in his Content 
of the Form. That is to say, following White, I want to explore the 
possibilities and the nature of a form of historical writing that breaks with 
the Kantian, Enlightened tradition that always strove for a domestication or 
appropriation of the past. However, in contrast to White [my emphasis], I 
shall try to do so by attempting to effectively break the spell of Kantian, 
transcendentalist patterns of argument. My motivation for looking for an 
anti- or a-Kantian argumentation will be obvious: in the foregoing, we have 
seen that the intellectual function of both transcendentalism and of 
metaphor has always been to effect an appropriation of the relevant parts of 
reality. Hence, the avoidance of appropriation in our approach to reality can 
only have a chance of success to the extent that we know how to resist the 
temptations of transcendentalism and of metaphor. 
Now this time I am not going to dismember the finer points of Ankersmit's 
argument as laid out above (even though statements like `metaphor is a 
continuation of scientistic cognitive ideals' offer compelling reasons to do so). 
Instead I want to reveal the underlying persuasive drift within it. Ankersmit, in 
the first two sentences of this extract, indicates that up to this stage in his 
argument he had been `following' White. But - and this is the point that needs 
underlining -from this point on, by resisting the temptations of Kantian 
transcendentalism and of metaphor, Ankersmit believed that he could move 
ahead of White whose own progress was impeded by his continued entanglement 
with Kantian idealism. An argument like this makes good reading, but on brief 
reflection it immediately fails. For, broadly speaking, I take the view that very 
little common ground has existed between the theoretical positions of Ankersmit 
and White since Ankersmit's earlier development of his notion of the narrative 
substance; therefore the idea that Ankersmit was actually following White 
remains unconvincing. Furthermore, Ankersmit's earlier contention that White 
favoured the sublime over and above tropology, thus instigating his `move 
against tropology', lacks credibility. Add to this Ankersmit's conviction that 
White actually sought a non-Kantian form of historical writing and then, for me, 
Ibid. ppl7-18 
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Ankersmit's whole argument is reduced to an incoherent distraction. For this 
reason I think that it is the presupposition upon which Ankersmit's argument 
rests that now requires closer attention, and this observation brings me right 
back to the beginning of this section and the matter of the vanishing tropes. If 
this presupposition were to be "unseated" - if it can be shown that White never 
. abandoned 
tropes - then Ankersmit's subsequent argument would collapse. 
White's (alleged) change of mind with regard to the primacy of the tropes (his 
`turn from the tropes' which, we are informed by Ankersmit, is demonstrated by 
their virtual disappearance from The Content of the Form and White's 
subsequent writings) is also taken by Ankersmit, and this cannot be ignored, to 
be concurrent with `Whites turn to the sublime'45 (as noted on page 113). 
Ankersmit is even more precise than this when he refers to `..: the later Hayden 
White who shows us the past under the aegis of the sublime (as in The Content 
of the Form)i46. Thus, White's supposed `turn from the tropes' and his equally 
supposed `turn to the sublime' are for Ankersmit closely associated movements. 
Now, the `turn from' element of this so-called change of mind is easy to dismiss, 
particularly when understood in relation to a more recent publication of 
Ankersmit's in which he actually pointed out that 
.... 
in his later work, White more frequently relies on prefiguration (and 
. 
cognate concepts) than on the tropes. The title of his last collection of 
essays was Figural Realism, suggesting that the notion offigura may help 
us understand how we conceive of historical reality and in what way figura 
is conditional of our understanding of it. 47 
For it is evident from this extract that Ankersmit makes a category distinction 
between `prefiguration (the primary stage of figuration in White's tropological 
theory) and figura' on the one hand, and `the tropes' on the other. But (and how 
could Ankersmit possibly forget this? ), prefiguration is a tropological act - it is 
a conspicuous instance of tropology in motion. And to finally dispel any 
45 Domaüska. Encounters p83 
46 Ibid. p83 
47 Ankersmit, F. R., (2009). `White's `Neo-Kantianism': Aesthetics, Ethics and Politics' in Ankersmit, F., 
Domanska, E., Kellner, H., (eds. ) Re Figuring Hayden White. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p27 
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possible doubt about this, here is what White has to say in The Content of the 
Form (that same publication from which, ironically, Ankersmit found his 
contrary notion): 
If there is any logic presiding over the transition from the level of the fact 
or event in the discourse to that of the narrative, it is the logic of figuration 
itself, which is to say, tropology. 48 
The claimed non-tropological status of Figura, which arises out of another of 
Ankersmit's misunderstandings, can also be easily discarded. Figura is 
essentially a concept of fulfilment and it is erroneously described by Ankersmit 
as follows; 
.... fgura is meant to tie together two historical 
phenomena (separated from 
each other by sometimes thousands of years) on the basis of a certain 
structural similarity...... [where] the second can be seen as a fulfilment of 
the first..... this way of dealing with historical events and our understanding 
of them is riddled with nasty problems. First, what is to count as a pair of 
structurally similar events...... Second, the figuralist approach reduces the 
scope of historians to only those events that happen to have a believable 
twin in the past..... Lastly, the approach focuses on two events in the past 
itself, bypassing the dimension of language and historical meaning. 49 
One can immediately see here that, for Ankersmit's, the notion offigura has 
something to do with the past itself. That is to say that Ankersmit is looking for 
his `believable twins' in the past. However, White is quite clear thatfigura as a 
figure of fulfilment 
.... casts its light back - retrospectively and, in the narrative account 
retroactively - on the earlier figurations of the character of process being 
related.... It can only mean that the historian has treated his enfiguration of 
a given set of events as an "end-as-fulfilment" which permits him to 
"recognise" in earlier events in the sequence dim and imperfect 
anticipations of "what will have been the case" later on. The meaning- 
effect of the narrative account of the sequence is produced by the technique 
of relating events in order of their occurrence but construing them as 
"clues" of the plot-structure which will be revealed only at the end of the 
narrative in the enfiguration of events as fulfilment. 5° 
48 White. The Content of the Form. p47 49 Ankersmit. `White's Neo-Kantianism: Aesthetics, Ethics and Politics'. p39 
30 This extract is taken from White's, H., (1999). 'H'istory as Fulfilment: Keynote Address' (unpublished 
copy paper delivered at Tulane University on 12/11/99 and provided by Keith Jenkins). 
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Thus, for White, figura is a retrospective configuration of a sequence of actions 
and the outcome of those actions, such that the outcome can be seen as a 
fulfilment of the inaugural action. Figura, then, is a projection (of figuration) 
onto the past and not something that can-be found in the past itself. Moreover, as 
an act of figuration figura is fundamentally tropological. It is, therefore, 
difficult to understand how Ankersmit could fail to grasp (and thus misconstrue) 
White's clear explanation of the notion offigura, particularly since there are at 
least three consistent accounts of it (that I have come across) from threes' 
separate sources, one of which is in Figural Realism, cited above by Ankersmit. 
Moreover, White has himself rejected (in correspondence with me) the idea that 
sz he has moved away from his commitment to the tropes. 
This completes my investigation and dismissal-of Ankersmit's conviction that 
with the publication of The Content of the Form White actually turned from the 
tropes. With this dismissal Ankersmit's dependant argument, outlined at the 
beginning of this section, is thus "unseated". 
Next, I propose to tackle the related notion that White executed an associated 
turn to the sublime or, rather, a turn to Ankersmit's distinctly individual 
understanding of the sublime. The following excursion into this matter will also 
mark the end of my close reading of Ankersmit's texts. For it is now my 
intention to extricate myself from what has become a detailed (but nevertheless, 
indispensable) approach to Ankersmit's convoluted, developing argument. With 
this fresh approach Ankersmit's overall position might, I hope, be viewed from a 
more comfortable and perhaps more advantageous distance as I move towards 
my central argument. Here then, with a double sense of closure, I offer my own 
resolution to what can only really be described as the jumble and confusion 
31 My three sources are Hayden White's `History as Fulfilment: Keynote Address' cited above, White. H., 
(2005) `Cosmos, Chaos and Sequence in Historiological Representation'. Distinguished WEB Du Bois 
Lectures. 142: pp36-53 and White. H., (1999), Figural Realism: Studies in the Mimesis Effect. Baltimore. 
Johns Hopkins University Press. pp89-90 
52 See footnote 60 of this chapter. 
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surrounding Ankersmit's claim in relation to White's putative `turn to the 
sublime'. 
The concept of the sublime has been the subject of centuries of debate amongst 
philosophers, writers and artists. However, for my purpose, vis-4-vis 
Ankersmit's 'Journey' to sublime historical experience, I will concern myself 
only with Romantic and postmodern notions of it. Philip Shaw has usefully 
established a distinction between these two different notions of the sublime 
which he expressed thus: 
If the aim of Romanticism is somehow to incorporate the 'sense sublime', 
postmodernism, by way of contrast, seeks to retain a sense of the sublime 
as other, a 'something' that can never be 'interfused' through the use of 
metaphors, symbols or verbal connectives. 53 
The postmodern something or sublime thing to which Shaw refers is un- 
presentable to the mind and beyond apprehension in language (or ineffable). It 
thus resists all attempts at its appropriation and it is precisely this concept of the 
sublime which is evident in all of Hayden White's writings from the 1960's 
on. 54 It has always been his position that following the nineteenth century 
disciplinisation of history, the undesirable consequence of which was the 
suppression of this notion of the sublime, we now 
.... require a history that will educate us to 
discontinuity more than ever 
before; for discontinuity, disruption and chaos is our lot. 55 
Undoubtedly, White was contemplating a style of history which would explicitly 
recognise 'our lot' as a chaotic and disruptive discontinuity under the aegis of an 
incomprehensible sublime. Thus White ponders the possibility of 
.... a conception of history that would signal 
its resistance to the bourgeois 
ideology of realism by its refusal to attempt a narrativist mode for the 
representation of its truth .... [and the possibility that this 
refusal might 
53 Shaw, P., (2005). The Sublime. London: Routledge. p9 
54 Here I turn for support to Herman Paul who categorically states that, White's understanding of the 
world as a sublime (that is, chaotic and meaningless) reality already underlay his criticism of political 
ideologies in the 1960's' (Korhonen, K., (ed) (2006) Tropes for the Past: Hayden White and the 
History/Literature Debate. New York: Rodopi. p40). 
55 White, H., (1966). 'The Burden of History' in History and Theory 5 no. 2: p134 (Later to become 
Chapter One of White's Tropics of Discourse). 
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signal] a recovery of the historical sublime that bourgeois historiography 
repressed in the process of its disciplinisation. s6 
Now, there are two points which should be made here. In the first place White 
was just contemplating, as an imaginative exercise, the plausibility of a history 
which refused the narrative mode (refused the domestication of discontinuity and 
chaos) for the representation of its "truths". This, I think, can be read as a 
rhetorical proposition. And, in the second place, the historical sublime to which 
White referred is the postmodern notion of it (that is the incomprehensible, non- 
ontologizable, chaotic totality of the actuality of the past which escapes all 
attempts at its apprehension or appropriation). This second point is of crucial 
importance because, as I will now show, it can be seen to be at variance with 
what I believe to be Ankersmit's Romantic, `incorporated' (as construed by 
Shaw), concept of the sublime. 
Turning now to Ankersmit who, not exactly grasping White's position, 
maintained that the nineteenth century disciplinisation of historical writing (on 
White's view as Ankersmit interpreted it) involved the stripping of the past from 
everything that would not fit the `tropological explanatory patterns..... devised 
for making sense of sociohistorical reality'. 57 But, Ankersmit continues, there is 
no choice on that particular issue, for is it not the case that 
.... metaphor and figurative language are our ultima ratio 
in the task of 
transforming the unfamiliar into the familiar [? ]. However, it is precisely 
this category of the sublime that reminds us that the tropological 
appropriation of the past is not the only option that is open to the historian: 
representation - and even historical representation - leaves the historian the 
possibility of presenting the terrifying strangeness and sublimity of the past 
to his readers.... [however].... I will not enter into a discussion of the 
plausibility of White's view that the disciplinisation of historical writing 
mainly consisted in an exchange of the sublime for the beautiful in 
historical representation .... 
5. 
This extract is puzzling because the individual statements within it fail to cohere 
into any sort of comprehensible argument. For instance, the `tropological 
56 White. The Content of the Fam. p81 37 AnkerSmit. History and 71ropology p16 
38 Ibid. p16 
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appropriation of the past' and `historical representation' are construed by 
Ankersmit, on this occasion, to be of different kinds - his argument is thus in 
conspicuous contradiction to the central tenets of his own, earlier theorisations. 
Moreover, I cannot find anything in White's works which might confirm 
Ankersmit's contention that in White's view the disciplinisation of historical 
writing mainly consisted in `an exchange of the sublime for the beautiful in 
historical representation'. Ankersmit both declined to enter into discussion on the 
matter and he also failed to reference his statement. There is, however, a clue in 
his argument, for it is evident that Ankersmit sees the sublime as an entity already 
(in a sense) resident in historical writing prior to its disciplinisation - otherwise 
its exchange for the beautiful could not take place. Moreover, the notion of 
exchange presupposes or suggests a certain comparison of order between the 
sublime and the beautiful. Accordingly, these points taken together, I think that 
what Ankersmit's has in mind is a quasi-Romantic `incorporated' notion of the 
sublime -a sublime which submits to appropriation - which isn't ineffable! 59 
On this understanding some small sense can now be made of Ankersmit's 
mistaken conviction that White turned to and somehow grasped the sublime. 
Ankersmit's argument is grounded on what he sees as a distinction between the 
theoretical position adopted by White in both Metahistory and Tropics of 
Discourse, and that adopted in all of White's subsequent publications. Within 
these later publications, commencing with The Content of the Form, Ankersmit 
(who seemed to be unaware that White's sublime was and always had been an 
unfathomable sublime of Shaw's postmodern kind) imagined that he had found in 
White's writings a sublime of the accessible kind (his own Romantic kind) which 
embodied the facility to replace or exchange itself with tropology. Furthermore, 
Ankersmit interpreted White's supposed sublime "turn" (his disavowal of the 
tropes) as a remedy forced on him through the recognition of two insurmountable 
difficulties with tropology: (1) that the traces/archival evidence of any event in 
59 Further support for this argument might be found in consideration of the title of Ankersmit's recent 
publication Sublime Historical Experien e. For, in order to be experienced Ankersmit's sublime must. 
submit to a form of order such that it may be consciously apprehended as experience. By contrast, 
White's sublime is chaotic and meaningless and therefore defies any form of apprehension: is non- 
ontologizable 
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the past may be tropologically encoded into many different yet equally valid 
narrative versions of that event (Ankersmit construed this as a fault with 
tropology) and (2) that the theoretical optionality of the tropes appeared to be 
negated (or called into question) when representing extreme events, the holocaust 
for instance. In this convoluted and muddled fashion (a complex, arduous 
argument which, I hope, I have myself properly represented) Ankersmit found 
the cause for White's presumed "turn" in what he himself interpreted as an 
intractable problem with the tropes; a problem which, he then further presumed, 
forced White's rejection of them in favour of the sublime. 
Pulling all these above arguments together, one can perhaps now make out a 
certain direction or design60 in them. For Ankersmit appears to read into (or 
project onto) White's theoretical position a duplicate of his own evolving 
position (essentially a movement away from the dominance of linguistics 
realised through the rejection of tropology and the adoption of the sublime in its 
place). And on the basis of this (I have to say contrived) comparison of 
60 The preceding arguments comprising the current and the previous Section of this Chapter should be 
very briefly brought into focus here (at the risk of repetition), such that my use of the word `design' might 
not appear too extravagant. In the first place, and this is a sort of "base line", Ankersmit draws a parallel 
between metaphor and Kcnntian transcendentalism in that they both, in a sense, "strip" from the sublime, 
or the "whole", that which cannot be conceptually incorporated/grasped by them. It is for this reason that 
Ankersmit, driven by his need for the unmediated "whole", rejects them both together as a pre-condition 
to his argument for sublime historical experience (and I think that, for him, one entails the other so they 
both have to go anyway). Next, Ankersmit projects onto his reading of Hayden White a particular 
understanding of White's intentions. That is, he argues that White turns from the tropes and towards a 
sublime which, in this case, `still has its logical place within the schematism of the Kantian system' 
(History and Tropology. p11) and, thus, that this combined move does not constitute a turn against 
Kantian transcendentalism - which, for Ankersmit, is the mode of thought within which White 
remains trapped. Now, I have myself separately argued against each of these two implied and linked 
so-called Whitean "turns", and I believe that I have shown that each one of these arguments fails. To 
clarify this point, I see from my own exchange of emails with Hayden White that he specifically said 
to me (on 27th March 2009) `As for the disappearance of tropology from my later work, I would say that 
I continued to use it, I just did not wave it in the readers' face because I have to admit that I have not been 
able to convince very many people about its validity. I am going to come back to it again in some work I 
am planning now' (no turn from, hence no turn to). Since, to my satisfaction at least, each of these 
arguments has now been separately "dispatched", then of course the whole argument falls with it. 
However, even taking Ankersmit's argument in the whole as he presented it, there seems to be a problem. 
That is, Ankersmit's turn to the sublime frees him from Kantian transcendentalism but, as he himself 
insists, White's supposed turn to the sublime doesn't offer that same freedom and I cannot find anything 
in Ankersmit's philosophy to explain this "picky" behaviour of the sublime. However, having made these 
various arguments Ankersmit has, in effect, suggested a structural similarity between his and White's 
work up to this presumed joint turn to the sublime - and this is the essential point that I wanted to make 
and which now returns me to the argument above. 
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respective theoretical positions, he effects a kind of validation (a parallelism with 
White) of his own developing position up to this point. However, having 
arguably legitimated his work thus, it is also at this very same point that he 
disconnects from White who remains (as Ankersmit put it) `trapped' in a 
Kantian, transcendentalist mode of thought. Ankersmit, accordingly, appears to 
emerge from this agglomeration of what are really quite extraordinary arguments 
as the primary exponent of what he believes will be his definitive non-Kantian 
and non-metaphorical replacement theory of history. 
That completes my detailed analyses of Ankersmit's significant developmental 
arguments (principally arguments which carried him from the safe logic of the 
linguistic turn and thence, through various stages, to the threshold of experience), 
and I now propose to gather together and condense all of these various elements 
into a brief and (perhaps) more accessible general discursive account of 
Ankersmit's progress up to this particular juncture. This account, which 
comprises the next section of the current chapter, will provide the essential 
cohesive context within and from which I shall then propose an explanation for 
the Ankersmitean `Journey' of my thesis title. 
Section Five: Consolidation 
Ankersmit's writings prior to his publication of Sublime Historical Experience 
can be seen to fall into two broad categories (a) those which are informed by the 
linguistic turn and (b) those which seek to separate themselves from it. Now, the 
significance and meaning of the so-called linguistic turn is very well 
documented, yet as a name for a happening of a particular kind it was badly 
chosen and can lead to confusion. This is what Hayden White had to say on the 
matter: 
.... I don't think it is correctly called the 
linguistic turn, because a semiotic or a 
structuralist approach to the study of cultural and social phenomena is more 
interested in discourse than in linguistics. Linguistics studies language 
phenomena only at the level of the sentence, but discourse works at the level of 
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a number of sentences.... language and discourse are not the same thing. 
Discourse is a highly sophisticated, self-conscious use of language at a level 
more general than the sentence, and I think it had a very important impact 
upon the study of the human and social sciences. Because to consider these not 
as sciences, not even as disciplines, but as discourses allows you to understand 
why alternative interpretations of the same phenomena are possible. And this 
is what allows for one seeing that in the human and social sdiences, indeed 
even in the natural sciences in large part, what you study is a product of the 
way you describe reality in discourse. 61 
Put this way, White convincingly argued his preference for the evidently more 
satisfactory descriptive term `discursive turn' - nevertheless, a first naming often 
sticks and thus, confusion notwithstanding, the appellation `linguistic turn' seems to 
have found its place in common usage. 
Returning now to the two categories mentioned above, it should be understood that 
the favourable position that I have adopted regarding Ankersmit's conclusions in 
connection with category (a) is somewhat blighted by the incoherent and 
contradictory style of argument which he used in support of these conclusions. 
Furthermore, with regard to category (b), I find that both Ankersmit's theoretical 
position and his mode of argument are flawed. In addition to these observations 
there is one final general matter to be taken into account which is this: Ankersmit 
brought a kind of discursive "double plot" to these various texts under discussion 
here. Or, to be more precise, in History and 7ropology Ankersmit was principally 
engaged in the composition (the setting-up) of some validating structure of argument 
in support of his move towards a new experience-based style of historical theory. 
However, running concurrently with this enterprise, in the form of a subsidiary plot, 
he continuously (and with misplaced ingenuity) endeavoured - as we have seen - to 
separate himself from the philosophy of Hayden White. I will come to all these 
matters in due course, however, first of all I shall reconsider Ankersmit's earlier 
introduction of his linguistic instrument narrative substance into the discourse of 
historical theory. 
61 White, H., (2000). `The Ironic Poetics of Late Modernity' (an interview conducted in Athens by 
Angelica Koufou & Margarita Miliori, December 1999) in Historein: A Review of the Past and Other 
Stories 2: ppl83-184 
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So, to briefly recap. In his first book, Narrative Logic, Ankersmit focused on the 
often observed yet then scarcely worked distinction between historical research and 
historical writing. Historical research typically produces verifiable facts and singular 
statements referring to the past, but the writing up of that research into a narrative 
form (a history) was shown by Ankersmit to refer internally to its own narrative 
substance (governed by the point-of-view of its author) and not to the past itself. 
Historical writing, seen as a coherent whole, is therefore an internally referenced 
imaginative product of an aesthetic kind and, as such, cannot possibly be subject to 
validation on the basis of truth claims at the level of the singular statement. So clear 
does this point appear to be that it is interesting, even curious, to note here - bearing 
in mind that (a) histories are necessarily constituted (and thus carry their meanings) 
in culture dependant story forms and (b) that such story forms cannot be found in 
the past itself - that Ankersmit's enormously helpful proposition, which identified 
the narrative substance as the referent of its own manifest story form, received the 
negative reaction that it did. After all his proposition presented immediate solutions 
to a number of problems within historical theory; not least it offered a very plausible 
explanation for the apparently inexhaustible growth in the production of different, 
sometimes radically different but always different, historical accounts of a single 
vanished past -a past evidenced only through a finite common base of traces 
remaining from that single past. 
Now, the narrative substance (which Ankersmit defined as the primary logical 
entity within narrative accounts of the past) functions as a kind of "filter" which 
processes available facts or narrative statements according to their usefulness with 
respect to the particular narrative meaning intrinsic to the narrative substance in 
question. Or, to rephrase, it is from the point-of-view which governs the historians 
chosen narrative substance that a preference for a particular fact or statement is 
expressed. This preference will be for facts and statements which contribute to the 
individuation of that very same narrative substance or point-of-view62 which is, in 
62 It should be understood, as Ankersmit frequently points out, that a historian's governing point-of-view 
will rarely if ever be "on view" in his/her texts as a comprehensible and unambiguous figure. 
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turn, itself an expression of the historians predisposition to a story form of a 
particular kind. Hence, in this circular fashion, Ankersmit showed that the writing of 
history is always an autonomous activity in the extent to which narrative meaning 
(meaning carried by the narrative viewed as a whole) is referenced internally to its 
own. arbitrary point-of-view, rather than to the past itself. On this understanding it 
follows that the facts and singular statements arising out of historical research do 
not, and cannot, somehow figure forth the truth about the past. Rather, they 
constitute the reservoir of raw unprocessed (and therefore "historically" 
meaningless) materials from which the historian makes a preferred selection in order 
to individuate a prefigured notion about the causality/direction/ meaning and so on, 
of the past. Having imagined and individuated a history, coherently articulated about 
its own governing but arbitrary narrative substance, some might then see fit to 
defend that meaning as if it were part of the past itself and not a projection onto it of 
an imaginary narrative proposal about an ultimately unfathomable past which, of 
course, never possessed a narrative form in the first place. 
On this understanding, Ankersmit found in his narrative substance the "key" to the 
logical structure of narrative accounts of the past and he presented his case, for the 
most part, as an original thesis. Now, I am not going to suggest here that 
Ankersmit's was simply restating the work of others. For there is no doubt that his 
individual explanatory style, his focused insistence on the distinction between 
historical research and historical writing, his intuitive derivation and naming of the 
narrative substance and his thoroughly argued account of the fundamentally 
metaphorical nature of it, represented a truly significant contribution to historical 
theory as informed by the linguistic turn. But one cannot ignore the earlier work 
of his contemporaries, particularly that of Hayden White, whose writings (as I 
have already argued) have always both presumed the metaphorical nature of 
language and also taken into account the historical research/writing distinction. 
Furthermore, as the following extract suggests (and this can be taken as a 
supplement to my argument as laid out in Chapter Two, pages 81-83), White's 
essay `The Burden of History' (which pre-dates Narrative Logic by some 
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seventeen years) appears to similarly embody the essential elements that 
constitute Ankersmit's narrative substance. 
It now seems possible to hold that an explanation need not be assigned 
unilaterally to the category of the literally truthful on the one hand or the 
purely imaginary on the other, but can be judged solely in terms of the richness 
of the metaphors which govern its sequence of articulation. Thus envisaged, 
the governing metaphor of an historical account could be treated as a heuristic 
rule which self-consciously eliminates certain kinds of data from consideration 
as evidence. The historian operating under such a conception could thus be 
viewed as one who, like the modem artist and scientist, seeks to exploit a 
certain perspective on the world that does not pretend to exhaust description or 
analysis of all of the data in the entire phenomenal field but rather offers itself 
as one way among many of disclosing certain aspects of the field 63 
I believe that one can identify Ankersmit's notion of scope 64 in White's phrase 
`richness of the metaphors', and surely the `governing metaphor of an historical 
account' which behaves like `a heuristic rule' (essentially a data filter) can be 
likened to the narrative substance itself. Moreover, White's allusion to a 
comparison between the artist who `seeks to exploit a certain perspective on the 
world' and the historian who would appear to be similarly occupied, finds its 
parallel in Ankersmit's theorisations. One could therefore reasonably conclude that 
Ankersmit's central concerns, as articulated in Narrative Logic, are developments 
of, rather than additions to, historical theory. 
Returning to Ankersmit's own account of his narrative substance one might now, 
against this explanatory background, re-examine the status of narrative accounts of 
the past vis-a-vis the actuality of the past itself Ankersmit conclusively argues that 
narrative accounts of the past are the imaginative constructs of their authors, and that 
they refer internally to their own unique narrative points-of-view or narrative 
substances. The linguistic entities narrative substances, so described, can be seen to 
embody synthetic views of the past which are neither (logically) informed by, nor do 
they refer to, the past itself, although, as has been noted, within each singular 
individuating fact or statement contained therein such reference to the past is made. 
63 White. `The Burden of History'. p130 64 As laid out in Chapter One of this thesis. 
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However, with regard to meanings and values, it should be understood that the 
worked-up facts and statements which comprise a narrative proposal about the past, 
taken in isolation, are in a manner of speaking "vacant"; that is to say that as empty 
signifiers they are devoid of any narrative meaning and direction, or `compassless' 
(to quote Ankersmit). It follows that it is only relative to their appropriation and 
organisation into narrative form under the governing rationale of a narrative 
substance that facts and statements have their narrative dependant (and hence 
relative) meanings and values impressed onto them in accordance with the synthetic 
narrative point-of-view which they have been purposefully selected to individuate. 
Or, in short, the meanings and therefore the values attached to historical facts and 
statements are to be found only in relation to their uses when organised into 
narrative form. 
Understood thus, the writing of history and the shapes or structures of the meanings 
that it carries can be seen to arise out of an arbitrary, unsanctioned organisation of 
the past - an internally functioning organisation which draws both on its own 
narrative substance(s) and on language and linguistic devices in order to generate its 
manifest (and meaningful) story form. Accordingly, Ankersmit sees such 
organisation of the past as a violation of the past... 
[t]elling of the past...... is unavoidably a violation of that past in order to effect 
such a narrative organisation of the past - an organisation that is not intrinsic 
to the past itself.... ' 
The essential point that I thus wish to stress at this stage is that, on Ankersmit's 
view (and mine), the autonomous linguistic construct that we call history cannot 
provide access to any meaning, direction or purpose found/emanating from and 
thus located in the past itself, indeed, the discourse of history has little at all to 
do with the past in that sense. What emerges from Ankersmit's own arguments is 
the wholly defensible proposition that historians, for purposes of their own, 
linguistically generate and then project imagined meanings onto a past that 
neither notices nor cares about them. History is "one way" traffic - nothing flows 
back from the past but the echo of the imaginative figure of history itself. There 
es Domanska. F. ncaunters p78 
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is, in short, an immutable disconnect (a dissonance) between history and the past 
which history purports to represent. It therefore follows that the notion that 
history could constitutes some sort of "bridge" to the actuality of the past is 
fundamentally flawed and cannot be sustained. 
On my reading of Narrative Logic the foregoing paragraphs constitutes the 
important substance of, and the logical conclusions to, Ankersmit's position with 
regard to the narrative substance. Unfortunately however, notwithstanding that 
logic, Ankersmit was unable to completely "let go" of his lingering belief that the 
discipline of history, despite his devastating critique of it, might serve some 
useful purpose after all, a purpose which he was to express through his 
experimental garden of historiography. 
Now, if one were to take a general and uncluttered view of the meaningful 
content of Narrative Logic (and this would involve the stripping. away of 
Ankersmit's endless philosophical/algebraic proofs and also his controversial re- 
descriptions of the works of Hayden White), then two essential "movements" 
would become apparent: a positive step forward and a hesitant step back. 
Ankersmit's positive step forward is the development and evaluation of the 
relativistic/relativising narrative substance;, his hesitant step back the apparent 
negation of this original position brought about by both his `experimental garden 
of historiography' and his 'fact/value' arguments. These, it seems to me, are the 
two oppositional movements which Ankersmit attempted to pull together into 
(what is for me) the somewhat problematic whole of Narrative Logic. 
The first of these two negating movements, Ankersmit's experimental garden of 
historiography (evaluated in Chapter Two), centred on the notion that 
.... we can test moral and political values by establishing whether they inspire good or bad historical narratives. ` 
Ghosh, R., (2007). `Interdisciplinarity and the Doing of History: A Dialogue between F. R. Ankersmit 
and Rani ad Ghosh' in Rethinking History 11 no, 2: p244 
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Or, as Ankersmit insisted, if historical narratives inspired by one set of moral and 
political values can be systematically refuted by historical narratives inspired by 
a second different set of moral and political values, then the conclusion must be 
that the second set is that which is tobe preferred and therefore, by extension, 
.... we need no longer first put into practice moral and political 
values.... [rather], our compass here is historical writing; write histories 
inspired by these values, next see which of them are best - and then you 
will know what moral and political values you should adopt. 67 
For Ankersmit then, historiography taken in bulk form (metaphorically perceived 
as a garden in which the plant that best flourishes is the one to which the greatest 
merit is to be assigned) was to assume the function of arbiter on matters of moral 
and political values. Now, this argument is hopelessly inadequate for reasons 
already expressed, however that is not my immediate concern here. Rather, I 
want to turn to Ankersmit's fact/value argument (the second of his two negating 
arguments) on which his experimental garden of historiography is grounded. And 
my position here is that even if it were possible (and I do not believe that it is) to 
find the definitive history of some past event -a kind of transcendental history 
embodying the capacity to reject all competing accounts of that same event - there 
yet remains an insurmountable problem. That problem is that any happening or fact, 
either past or present, does not entail, intrinsically within itself, a fixed value which 
might lead to a, flared ethical imperative or response to that happening or fact. Values 
and meanings are not in happenings and facts, they are always projected onto them 
in relation to enculturation, ideology, context (and so on) which, taken together, 
constitute a point-of-view. Values and meanings are indisputably relative matters. It 
follows, therefore, that since values are neither in, nor entailed from, facts, that any 
perceived imperative or actual response to the facts of a situation or happening can 
be seen to be resting on a wholly-arbitrary rhetorical position. Thus, in any particular 
instance, one might ask `whose values are they that are in play, how and why are 
such particular values privileged above all others and in whose interests do they 
operate? ' 
67 ibid. p. 244 
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Ankersmit, however, takes a very different view. For him fact and value, the is and 
the ought, are merely the extremes on a continuous scale'` and this pivotal 
observation/belief of Ankersmit's endorses his unshakable conviction that from a set 
of true statements one can move `automatically and naturally toward an answer to 
the question of how to act in the future' 69 Now, the modus operandi of the 
experimental garden of historiography relies entirely on this (erroneous) assumed 
relationship (what Ankersmit calls the trait d'union) between fact and value and it 
can, accordingly, be seen as a kind of second-level 70 enabling device for his 
"gardening" metaphor. 
Referring back to the narrative substance and the logic from which it is derived, one 
can therefore see that a substantial incongruity ruins the coherence of Ankersmit's 
overall argument as expressed in Narrative Logic. For whilst articulating his 
gardening metaphor on the basis that values are entailed (fixed) in facts, he is 
assuming the position of a foundationalist. However, in order to validate his 
narrative substance argument it was necessary for Ankersmit to demonstrate (as he 
did very satisfactorily) that the meanings and therefore the values attached to facts 
and statements depend on the manner in which they are organised (emplotted, 
troped, etc. ) into narrative form. He thus concluded that `there are no facts devoid of 
narrative interpretation in narratios [narratives]' . 
71 This position is, of course, that of 
the relativist and it cannot coherently co-exist with a foundationalist point-of-view. 
These two oppositional/incommensurable positions, merged (apparently unnoticed 
by Ankersmit) into a single book, and the consequent textual incoherence/tension 
evident in it, no doubt contributed somewhat to its poor reception. 
But, taking my argument a little further, I think that Ankersmit's adoption of the 
notion of the experimental garden of historiography constitutes his first tentative 
turn away from the implicit, inescapable logic of his own narrative substance. And 
it was this turn which was more confidently developed in History and Tropology 
68 Ankersmit. Historical Representation. p94. This citation is consistent with, although more succinctly 
stated than, Ankersmit's views as expressed in Narrative Logic. p242 
69 Ibid. p94 
70 The first-level enabling device being the belief in the possibility of a single definitive history. 
71 Ankersmit. Narrative Logic. p219 
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where, as I have tried to show, Ankersmit argued for a rejection of tropology and 
Kantian transcendentalism in exchange for (what I have argued was) his own 
idiosyncratic quasi-Romantic perception of the sublime. Ankersmit wanted to avoid 
Kantian transcendentalism and metaphor because together they effected an 
appropriation and thus a domestication (a mediation of only that which could be 
apprehended within the tropes) of reality. Instead of which Ankersmit wanted to 
grasp the "whole", in . the raw, the past "plain", the pristine, the unprocessed and the 
unstructured, and he believed that his search for a non-Kantian, non-metaphorical 
form of historical knowledge was the way forward. For Ankersmit only this 
direction of enquiry would hold within it the potential to successfully avoid the 
hidden dangers of appropriation and thus truly (in his view) offer the possibility of a 
glimpse of the (Romantic) historical sublime. From this perspective Ankersmit, in a 
key. sentence or two, re-defined the direction and purpose of his theoretical enquiries 
as the development of 
.... an alternative to a Kantian theory of history [which] should begin with the 
recognition that Kantian transcendentalism is primarily a theory of experience 
and of how experience is transformed into knowledge. So historical 
experience, the experience of the past, will be our natural point of departure. 72 
Now, at this juncture in Ankersmit's argument there is an extremely important point 
which needs to be made. It is this. Having already established that language is 
fundamentally metaphorical (this being, to again recall, the third essential pillar of 
Ankersmit's argument as proposed in Narrative Logic), it follows that Ankersmit's 
move towards experience (which is conditional on the rejection of metaphor) also 
entails the rejection of language. But, the bizarre idea that language can be (totally) 
disregarded or replaced by experience (sensation, etc., ) entails the dismissal of the 
meaningful world as we (humans) know it. The absurdity of holding this position 
rests on the understanding that we humans live in a rhetorical world of human 
making which is constituted in the language we use to describe it. Any thing that lies 
outside our capacity for its linguistic description could not be linguistically related to 
72 Ankersmit. History and Tropology. p18 
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other things and thus could not (as Richard Rorty argues) be talked of or thought of. 
Or, as Rorty's Nietzsche points out: 
That things possess a-constitution in themselves quite apart from interpretation 
and subjectivity, is a quite idle hypothesis; it presupposes that interpretation 
and subjectivity are not essential, that a thing freed from all relationships 
would still be a thing. 73 [my emphasis] 
Glossing Nietzsche, Rorty comments that when Nietzsche says that a thing 
conceived apart from all relationships would not be a thing (for us), he is in effect 
saying that since all language seems to be a matter of relating some things to other 
things, then what is not so related cannot be talked of or thought of. Lack of 
linguistic describability means lack of relations and hence the only access to the 
indescribable must, on this account, be a sort of direct awareness (perhaps of the sort 
that the mystic has with God). Much of the history of Western Philosophy, continues 
Rorty, from Plotinus and Meister Eckhart down to Husserl and Russell is the quest 
for such direct experience (the pursuit of reality "plain"). But this is an impossible 
quest for, as Plato recognised, the only way to escape from linguistic re-description 
is to access a kind of absolute knowledge unmediated by linguistic formulations. 
Thus to conceive of a reality "plain" (direct access to the real truth of things as they 
are/were) is to conceive of that which cannot be described and thus (this is the 
crucial point) cannot submit to re-description or, as Rorty puts it, 
.... is to escape from the linguistically expressible to the ineffable. Only the ineffable - what is not describable at all - cannot be described dif erently. 74 
This contradictory desire to access the ineffable logocentrically constitutes the 
motivational basis of metaphysics and also (it should be added) it effects the source 
of a certain style of mysticism - exactly that sort of mysticism that "leaks" into and 
informs Ankersmit's position as expressed in Sublime Historical Experience (the 
substance of my next chapter). However, that aside for now, and by way of a 
concluding observation on this matter, it is of crucial importance to note that it is 
precisely such a Nietzschian position that lies beneath White's own extremely 
Nietzschian/existentialist readings of the inefiable/inaccessible sublime (a constant 
n Ibid. pill 
74 Ibid. p118 
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in White's thinking from his late teens/early twenties through to his eighties). 75 
Accordingly, the point to be made and underlined here is that I do not think that this 
vital NietzscheaNWhitean insight ever entered into Ankersmit's own theorisations 
at all or, if it did, then it seems to have been forgotten Ws-d-Ws the very idea of 
sublime historical experience. 
Returning now to my theme - my thesis on Ankersmit's developing position - one 
can see that his rejection of a metaphorical transcendentalist conception of history 
(in which `the experience of the objects studied.. . . counts for nothing'76) and his 
adoption of concepts of historical writing which take account of experience, can 
together be seen as the basis for, and indeed the substance of, his turn to experience. 
This turn will lead Ankersmit via the history of mentalities77 in History and 
Tropology towards his own development in Sublime Historical Experience of 
.... a new theory of historical experience..... [which recognises] the authenticity 
of historical experience as a token of its willingness to abandon the pretensions 
of the transcendental self to familiarise the (historical) world .... The notion of historical sensation as described by Goethe, Meinecke and Huizinga enables 
us to get a clearer view of what is involved in historical experience..... [and 
thus] the nostalgic experience of the past is proposed as the matrix for a 
satisfactory analysis of historical experience. 78 
This is the extract that both establishes a "bridge" to the next chapter and marks 
the completion of my account of Ankersmit's gradual shift in theoretical position 
from his early involvement with language up to the threshold of what eventually 
became an overwhelming engagement with (historical) experience. 
Accordingly, let me now, finally, bring this section to a close with a brief 
resume/account of Ankersmit's subplot which, as I have already pointed out, runs 
concurrently with (and interconnects with) his central arguments. This subplot is, 
75 This is unquestionably the position that White has always taken concerning the sublime. See Jenkins, 
K., (1998). `A Conversation with Hayden White' in Literature and History 7 no. 1: pp72-73 76 Ankersmit. History and Tropology. p28 
"For Ankersmit, the history of mentalities implements the movement against appropriation (and hence, 
by implication, the movement against Kantianism) and, furthermore (he says), it should be seen as a 
break with most historical writings of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But, his argument is not 
convincing since metaphorical appropriation is fundamental to the use of all language, and that includes 
the language of the history of mentalities. 
7s Ankersmit. History and Tropology. pp30-31 
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of course, largely evidenced through Ankersmit's various significant 
misrepresentations of White's work, misrepresentations which have perhaps been 
covered in enough detail already (in this and the previous chapter) such that it 
would be sufficient for me now to merely list below the most important of them, 
and then to suggest a plausible explanation for them. 
The principal misrepresentations that I have in mind are those concerning the 
translation rule argument, the ambivalence charge upon which Ankersmit's 
controversial interpretation of Metahistoy depends, White's alleged rejection of 
the tropes and Ankersmit's more recent misconstrual of White's actual account(s) 
offigura. In the closing paragraphs of Section Two of this chapter I offered a 
partial explanation for these matters, and I now offer for consideration an 
addition to that explanation which, in summary, comes down to this. Long before 
Ankersmit's intervention in the historical theory, White's new language- 
informed style of historical theory was largely completed and comprehensively 
"wrapped up" to the extent that there was little space left for any improvements 
on it. That is, there was no obvious room left for any fundamental additions or 
changes to what had already been said by White and, hence, Ankersmit found 
himself unable to make any significant and original contributions to narrativist 
historical theory during a crucial stage in its development. All he. could do was 
add to, develop and promote what was already there and that, it would seem, was 
not enough for him. 
With all of this in mind I can now put forward an overarching speculative 
explanatory proposal which actually comes in the form of a spectre, or more 
precisely in the already hinted at form of "a spectre of White". This proposal 
rests on the observation that Hayden White is (as I have, I think, already shown) 
omnipresent in Ankersmit's earlier theorisations to the extent that, at bottom, he 
might be shown to be articulating Ankersmit (Ankersmit speaks but we are 
listening to White).. Perhaps, from this viewpoint, it is possible to see White (and 
his theoretical position) as the spectral embodiment of everything that Ankersmit 
found himself compelled (psychologically) to leave behind. Only a resolute 
dismissal of White (or rather, of that which he metonymically represented) 
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offered Ankersmit release from this spectre. Accordingly, perhaps 
subconsciously, this resolute dismissal of White affected/effected Ankersmit's 
description/redescription of White's position such that it might fall to his own 
arguments. On this reading White becomes Ankersmit's bite noire or haunting 
which he is driven to exorcise by whatever means he can find. However, whilst this 
is an interesting secondary thought, I now want to address my primary explanatory 
account of Ankersmit's turn from language to experience, again in a sometime 
r6sume/sun mary fashion. 
Section Six: An Explanation 
At the outset it must be understood that the following argument/proposal is based 
on the assumption that Ankersmit has always harboured a deep seated need to 
retrieve the past in some real/authentic form. In order to adequately explain this 
need I must, with a momentary glance towards the substance of my next chapter, 
draw on the endnotes to page 281 of Sublime Historical Experience. Page 281 
itself refers to Ankersmit's `fascination since early adolescence.... [with]..... a 
world we have lost'. 79 The world referred to here is that which preceded and was 
traumatically terminated by the French revolution of 1789. Without wanting to 
"trespass" on the content of my next chapter, it should be sufficient for my 
purpose to simply draw attention to Ankersmit's following very personal 
recollections of his early years: 
The transition from childhood to early adolescence on the one hand and [my] 
nostalgia for the eighteenth century on the other are, for me, most intimately 
linked. I must have transferred my feelings about the loss of my happy 
childhood days to 1789 -, and I am well aware of what things made me do 
this at that time in my life. Undoubtedly this is why I can now still feel the 
awareness of what we lost in 1789 with the intensity with which one 
experiences the great losses in one's personal life and why, for me, 1789 is still 
the historical event par excellence. This also moulded my relationship to the 
past, and this book is, in fact, an attempt to come to terms with the pain I can 
still feel about 1789. Needless to say, I fully recognize that all this is peculiar 
to me and that I will not share my attitude toward the past with many others. 
On the other hand, was History, as we presently know it, not bom from the 
rupture of the great revolution from the West's childhood days of the Ancien 
79 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. p281 
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Regime? Is History - again, as we presently know it - not the offspring of the 
unhappy marriage of past and present that was celebrated in 1789? 80 
Ankersmit makes other similar references to his childhood, but I think that one 
can already see here the origin of his passion to seek out and "know" the past. 
But, as we have seen, with the publication of Narrative Logic (which turned out 
to be so good in terms of its general conclusions) no empirical epistemologically- 
striving history could ever again be taken as the narrative embodiment of any 
kind of truth, knowledge, essence, meaning, purpose and so on, of the past. 
Ankersmit (following, for sure, in the theoretical "wake" of Hayden White) had in 
the course of writing Narrative Logic systematically and brilliantly deconstructed 
history. He had indeed opened up and laid bare the essential nature of the narrative 
form, described its cognitive core and irrevocably severed all epistemological ties 
between the form of the historical narrative and the past which it was supposed to 
adequately represent. Thus history, which had once appeared to embrace the 
possibility of the discovery of truth and knowledge about the. past, was at once 
revealed as an empty vessel available for requisition by anyone for any purpose - an 
autonomous internally referenced'imaginative construct, underdetermined by and 
categorically different from the past itself Ankersmit had, in effect, reduced 
academic modernist histories to ruins and, in so doing, he had demonstrated that 
there was no possible access to the past by this particular route. 
As a direct consequence of the efficacy of his own demolition job, Ankersmit then 
found himself confronted with an impasse for, as I have shown, he desperately 
wanted and needed some form of authentic access to the past, but there was now no 
such path to the past through history - he had thoroughly and quite literally critiqued 
that idea to death. Ankersmit, therefore, needed to find his way to the past by some 
other route, a route which would not succumb to the same devastating critique with 
which he had so effectively demolished history. This is the "pivotal" point of my 
explanatory argument and all matters concerning Ankersmit's new theoretical 
position, his misrepresentations and his often impenetrable logic, etc., can arguably 
80 Ibid. p442 (endrote 25) 
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be taken to link directly back to this overriding single consideration. Accordingly, 
Ankersmit's continuing search for a solution to what had become his own dilemma 
was essentially governed by the fine belief that only a non-Kantian, non- 
metaphorical link with the past of the direct experiential kind (experiences of the 
past received directly from it in the form of sensations, feelings, etc. ), could 
eventually lead to a meaningful engagement with the past unmediated (and this is 
the crucial point) by language. 
Now, reflecting on the plausibility of this explanation, all I can say is that for me 
there really seems to be no other available. In its favour it takes into account 
Ankersmit's initial need to really know the past, his (somewhat ironic) demolition of 
the only (once seen as possible) path to it and the consequent search for another 
way, his endless theoretical posturing in support of (what I am arguing is) a `lost' 
cause and his extraordinary interpretations of the works of others - interpretations 
which he put to work in the furtherance of his own idiosyncratic cause However, in 
order to balance the account, I have to say that there is no doubt at all in my own 
mind that Ankersmit's early contributions to historical theory (albeit developments 
of original ideas) were inspirational and significant. Furthermore, I can and I do 
appreciate exactly what it was that Ankersmit was trying to achieve in the writing of 
History and Tropology and in his subsequent publications. But, and this is a big but, 
there are arguably major problems with the fundamental presuppositions which 
Ankersmit brought to his argument for historical experience and, as I shall argue in 
the following chapter, his overall position on historical experience collapses under 
the combined weight of these and yet more unworkable arguments to come. This 
collapse, in a sense, reflects back onto my explanatory proposal as laid out here. 
That proposal being, in essence, that Ankersmit's insatiable need for the authentic 
past, both against his own logic of Narrative Logic (which he should have observed) 
and because of it (since it blocked his access to the past through mainstream 
history), drove him towards and up an experiential cul-de-sac for, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, experience could never have given him the "real" history that he 
sought. And it is this argument which in my view, of course, represent the key to 
Ankersmit's controversial departure from the mainstream of historical theory. 
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Before bringing this chapter to a close it is worth noting that there are arguably two 
essential (central) problems that Ankersmit carried with him from History and 
Tropology into his argument for sublime historical experience. In the first place he 
failed to recognise that the past as an object of study is constituted only in its 
language of description (as convincingly argued by Hayden White and others). Thus 
it could not be assumed to continue to exist outside, language as would be necessary 
if it were to function in Ankersmit's new theory which rejected language in 
exchange for experience. And the second problem, which in a sense parallels the 
first, is that Ankersmit also neglected to question the idea that meaningful 
experiences themselves could actually exist outside language. Of course, 
sensations/feelings/moods in isolation can so exist, but without concepts of 
understanding (which are language dependant) they cannot constitute experiences81. 
Ankersmit's new theoretical argument, as he crossed the threshold of experience, 
was thus to be considerably weakened by the omission of these two important 
considerations - it was off to a very bad start. However, for the moment, further 
investigation of these two problems can rest pending their more detailed 
consideration in the following chapter. 
So, having made all these points, and also taking into account my views as 
expressed in this and the preceding chapter, it will by now have become apparent 
that it is my position that the writing of Sublime Historical Experience could never 
have been anything but a "doomed" project. Nevertheless, an analysis of the book is 
essential to my thesis since it represents the completion of Ankersmit's venture 
his `Journey from Language to Experience' - and it is, therefore, to Sublime 
Historical Experience that I must now turn in order to complete my story, or perhaps 
I should say my proposal on how best to read Ankersmit. However, before doing so 
there is to be one fmal concluding paragraph. 
This very final conclusion comes in the form of a kind of global contextualisation to 
date; a "birds-eye" view of the plot so far. In the first three chapters of my thesis I 
have tried to trace a line of development from an Ankersmit at his very best to an 
This, Kant's point, will be explored in the following chapter. 
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Ankersmit moving towards his very worst and, it is to be hoped, that following my 
analysis of his writings one can now see how and why my portrayal of Ankersmit 
has been formulated in this particular way. In sum, these three chapters can be seen 
to describe and critique the combination of unusual, generally controversial, 
arguments which carried Ankersmit towards the threshold of a new land wherein the 
solution to his dilemma (his impasse) might be found - the land of sublime historical 
experience. The next chapter examines exactly what he does when he gets there. 
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Chapter Four 
Sublime Hi ncal Fxpaieace 
In September 1994 Frank Ankersmit presented a remarkable paper at an 
International Conference in Uppsala, Sweden. This Conference had been organised 
by the Commission of Historiography under the title `The Past of History', and one 
of its primary functions was to analyse philosophically the intellectual basis for the 
study of history. `Can We Experience the Past? ' was Ankersmit's choice of title for 
his unique contribution to this analysis and it is the substance of his paper, or more 
precisely the suppositions on which this substance rests, that I want to initially 
consider before setting out the broad structure of the final chapter of my thesis. 
First of all, however, I should point out that I have described Ankersmit's paper as 
remarkable because, as touched upon in the previous chapter, the new style of 
historical theory proposed in it was distinctly different from the also new (but 
nevertheless always language governed) exploratory proposals advanced in and 
especially towards the'end of History and Tropology. I am thinking here in 
particular of Ankersmit's excursions into the history of mentalities and micro- 
stories' and in general his search for a non-Kantian, non-metaphorical form of 
historical writing; such endeavours can only be language bound. By contrast, 
Ankersmit's new theoretical style was predicated on the notion that it was only 
through the rejection of all forms of mediation - language, textualism, context, etc. 
- that the past might be accessed plain in the form of direct, and therefore unsullied, 
authentic historical experiences. Furthermore - and this is the main point that I wish 
to stress at this juncture - Ankersmit's Uppsala paper constituted 
his first 
comprehensive account of unmediated direct historical experience; in fact, 
' Later Ankersmit expressed his reservations in relation to this particular line of enquiry, for in 2003 he 
said: `I now feel that I may have been too generous in my interpretation of the micro-stories, that the 
intellectual import of the micro-stories is negligible and that the fashion was little more than a temporary 
eccentricity' (see Ankersmit, F. R. (2003). `Invitation to H'istorian' in Rethinking History 7 no. 3: p428). 
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Ankersmit's account was so comprehensive that his later publication, Sublime 
Historical Experience, 2 can be taken as a 480 page expansion and development of it. 
In Section Two of his paper (subtitled The Nature of Historical Experience'), 
Ankersmit argued that whilst historical experience had rarely been the subject of 
discussion or debate amongst historical theorists, it was nevertheless possible to find 
an adequate account of it (in fact, he says, the most complete account of it) in the 
works of the Dutch cultural historian Johan Huizinga. Although Ankersmit found 
Huizinga's account of the phenomenology of historical experience to be `regrettably 
sketchy', 3 he nevertheless believed it to be `fundamentally correct.... [and 
thereforej. 
.. . the obvious point of departure .... for his thesis'. 
° But, and this 
diminishes Ankersmit's argument somewhat, Huizinga himself did not speak of 
historical experience at all but rather, drawing on the works of the novelist and 
literary theorist Lodewijk van Deijssel, he spoke of historical sensation. However, 
wishing to avoid terminological confusion, Ankersmit preferred to discuss his 
variant of Huizinga's historical sensation under what he considered to be `the more 
neutral term "historical experience"'. ' It thus seems, from the very outset, that 
Ankersinit was - through his change of terminology - performing a crucial but 
unexplored, and apparently unnoticed, conceptual leap from the notion of sensation 
to the quite different notion of experience whilst continuing to use Huizinga's 
sensation based theory as exemplar for his own theory of experience. Experience, as 
Kant long ago pointed out, is `the unification of a sensible object with a concept of 
understanding', 6 and intuitions (or sensations) without concepts of understanding are 
"blind". Accordingly, it follows that sensations alone cannot constitute experiences, 
rather they can be seen as providing, as it were, the occasion for possible 
experiences. Seen this way, Ankersmit's apparently innocuous shift from the term 
sensation to his preferred term experience is anything but neutral. Nevertheless, 
2 The distinction that Ankersmit's makes between `historical experience' and what he calls its variant 
`sublime historical experience' will be fully explained later in this chapter. 3 Ankersmit, F. R, (1996). `Can We Experience the Past' in History. -Making. - The Intellectual and Social Formation of a Discipline (Proceedings of an International Conference, Uppsala, September 1994). 
Torstendahl, 11, Veit-Brause, I., (Eds. ) Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International. p50 
4 Ibid. p50 
s Ibid. p50 
6 Curtis, N., (2001). Against Autonomy: Lyotard Judgement and Action Aldershot: Ashgate Pub. p35 
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drawing on Huizinga's description of historical sensation, Ankersmit proposed his 
own theory of historical experience which he summarised in four points as laid out 
below: 
1) It is effected through quite insignificant cultural objects. 
2) It is of short duration (a matter of seconds or at most of a few minutes), and it 
resists contextualisation. In fact, Ankersmit went further and described it as a 
completely de-contextualised experience with a high and impenetrable fence 
around it, and this de-contextualisation on the side of the subject is returned 
by a de-contextualisation of the object. 
3) It comes unannounced and unexpectedly and cannot be repeated at will. It is 
thus a gift of the moment which the historian undergoes rather than provokes. 
4) It has to be distinguished from historical insight. For in the case of historical 
experience the historian's mind is formed by the past itself whereas historical 
insight is a formation of the past by the historian. However, Ankersmit 
explains, historical experience can be the source of historical insight and in 
so doing he provides a link, it seems to me, between historical experience 
' and the practice of history. 
These points, listed on page 50 of his paper and derived from Huizinga's discourse 
on historical sensation, together constitute what Ankersmit claimed in his paper to 
be a definition of his concept of historical experience. There is nothing more in the 
paper to support this claim except for brief anecdotal remarks elicited from the 
writings of Herder, Meinecke, Goethe, Byron, Ruskin, Proust, Burckhardt and 
others, who are said to have described events which could be construed, and are 
construed by Ankersmit, in such a way as to fall within his own so-called definition 
7 This is a point that is well worth a comment, for Ankersmit insists in his preface to Sublime Historical 
Experience that his thesis '.... has no bearing on what historians do and on the question of why they do 
what they do... [and the kinds of issues discussed in his book].... are as useless as 
they are meaningless 
from the perspective of the practice of historical writing' (pp xv-xvi). Yet, 
in his Uppsala paper he states, 
contrary-wise, that 'self-evidently .... 
historical experience can be a source of historical insight' (p52) and 
he defines historical insight as '.... intuitions of how knowledge of the past can be organized and 
presented in a historical study' (p5 1). Now, the organization and presentation of the past in the form of 
history is precisely what historians try to do - this is their primary sphere of activity - so 
it would appear 
that on this matter Ankersmit is (without apparently noticing it) setting up two contradictory arguments 
/positions. 
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of historical experience -a definition which turns out to be just a brief 
summarisation of effects and therefore not a substantive definition at all. It thus 
seems to me that everything8 that has grown out of Ankersmit's embryonic, putative 
notion of the existence of historical experience, including his position with regard to 
sublime historical experience which he claimed is a variant of it, 9 refers back to this 
terminological muddle which, in its turn, rests on what is (by Ankersmit's own 
admission) a summarisation of a `regrettably sketchy account' of Huizinga's own 
very personal and imaginative belief that he could receive authentic sensations (not 
experiences) directly from the past. 
Anticipating objections to his claim that the vanished past can be experienced in the 
present, Ankersmit added to his descriptive account of it the explanatory observation 
that, since historical experience is ordinarily occasioned by some object from the 
past that is given to us here and now, then, 
.... 
it seems a perfectly reasonable assumption that in these objects an aura of 
the past has been preserved all through the centuries and that the subject of 
historical experience suddenly becomes aware of [this preserved aura]. Hence, 
the notion of historical experience does not necessarily require a sudden 
disappearance of the dimension of time or some mystical union with the past. 10 
Although Ankersmit failed to reference this statement to the works of Walter 
Benjamin in this particular paper, it is undoubtedly (and is so footnoted in his book 
Sublime Historical Experience) a reference to Benjamin's essay `The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction'" and the notion of aura contained in it. 
Now, to draw these various points together, Ankersmit claimed in his paper that a 
historical experience is a rare, short durational `gift of the moment' to the historian. 
It comes unannounced and ordinarily relies for its reception on the historian's 
particular sensitivity to an aura which, Ankersmit affirms, can reasonably be 
8 The word `everything' can arguably be extended to include amongst other things presence and parallel 
processing (both to be discussed later in this chapter) and indeed the establishment of `The 
Centre for 
Metahistory', Groningen, set up for the purpose of investigating all these putative phenomena. 
Ankersmit, F. R, (2005). Sublime Historical Experience. California: Stanford University Press. p 127 
10 Ankersmit. `Can We Experience the Past'. p55 
ii Benjamin, W., (1969). `The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' in Illuminations. 
Arendt, K, (Ed. ) Zohn, H., (Trans. ). New York: Schocken Books. pp217-252 
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assumed to be attached to whatever cultural object from the past it is that effects 
such experiential transmissions. And finally, that historical experience is necessarily 
a de-contextuaiised experience, that is, an experience outside the contexts of both 
subject and object. 
This argument of Ankersmit's underlies and informs his, theoretical position as 
articulated in Sublime Historical Experience and thus constitutes the footing upon 
which he proposed his notion of sublime historical experience. However, as the 
basis for an argument in support of the existence of historical experience it already 
appears to be slender indeed. For there seems to be nothing in it, or its anecdotal 
corroborative evidence, that can possibly lend support to the idea that a small 
number of appropriately gifted historians can step outside their own contexts and 
then receive de-contextualised experiences directly from the past by way of auras 
(in the case of cultural objects from the past given to us in the present) or by way of 
metonymy12 (in the case of monuments, texts or whatever). To me it has the 
appearance of a flawed argument which rests on the unlikely supposition that the 
subject of historical experience (that is the historian) can, by some means or other 
not explained, achieve his/her own de-contextualisation (de-subjectification) at the 
moment of experiential reception. For, to be de-contextualised is quite literally to be 
outside context, to be outside what we are or outside that which inscribes us and 
without which we are pre nascent again. Much more plausible is the argument that 
every individual embodies and is articulated by a context-bound condition , which is 
not of his/her choosing. As Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth explains: 
.... individuals do not produce ideas or cultural systems; ideas and systems 
are there already and individuals .... get 
born into them just as they are born 
into a language and into an entire set of assumptions about identity, conduct 
and How Things Work. 13 
Surely, there can be no experience of the sort that Ankersmit describes outside or 
prior to this defining/governing context, for it is only within such a context that the 
12 The transmission process involved in historical experience was eventually developed to include a form 
of non-aura dependant metonymic transfer of feelings, intuitions etc. from past to present. This matter 
will also be investigated later in this chapter. l3 Ennarth, E. D., (2001). `Beyond History' in Rethinking History 5 no. 2: p196 
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conditions for the possibility of categories of understanding can be said to reside. 
This and other related considerations will be addressed in more detail in the last 
section of this chapter. 
However, I want to leave this for the moment and turn to address another matter; 
namely, that were Ankersmit's phenomenon of historical experience to be accepted, 
then certain questions would seem to arise in relation to it. For instance, what 
contributions to history and historical insight can be attributed to historical 
experience? What is to be the role of historical experience in the future doing of 
history? And, above all, how exactly is a very personal and idiosyncratic experience, 
based on sensations and feelings, to find its validation in a discipline which trades in 
consensually agreed empirical data and representational proposals? These are 
reasonable and legitimate questions to raise, not least because it was Ankersmit 
himself who chose to prefix and thereby describe the experiences in question with 
the adjective `historical' yet who then, somewhat perversely I think, closed down 
all debate on this matter by arguing that the investigation of historical experience 
could not be `an appropriate task for a historical theorist". 14 
On reflection, it therefore seems to me that Ankersmit's notion of historical 
experience (as he himself describes'it here) might almost be seen as a form of 
religion established on the basis of the four primary points listed above which, 
understood thus, would then be seen to constitute its foundational beliefs or its 
absolute presuppositions. There is nothing in Ankersmit's position which might be 
seen to lie beneath these presuppositions: no validating theory, nothing that can be 
measured or fixed, albeit even temporarily, such that it might become part of the 
broader theoretical discourse about the past. Ankersmit is simply asking us to 
believe absolutely in his four descriptive points. Or, to rephrase from a slightly 
different perspective, one could only be a "true" follower of Ankersmit (on this 
matter) on the basis of the total acceptance of each of these arguably quasi-mystical 
propositions which, in order to support any favourable reading of Sublime Historical 
14 Ankersmit. `Can We Experience The Past'. p55 
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Experience, must necessarily operate as the book's unquestioned, foundational 
presuppositions. 
In this short preamble I have only referred to the underlying descriptive premises 
governing Ankersmit's theory of historical experience as expressed in his Uppsala 
paper. The rest of that paper contained other dependant components of Ankersmit's 
argument which, along with his founding premises, he eventually expanded/ 
developed into book form as Sublime Historical Experience. All of the principal 
elements of these various arguments will be critiqued in the following four sections 
of this chapter under the subtitles: `Section One: Cultural Trauma and the Historian', 
`Section Two: Obsession or Theory? ', `Section Three: Presence: A New Paradigm' 
and `Section Four: A Misleading Title'. But, before proceeding, I must take a 
moment to first clarify a terminological matter and then, second, explain my 
approach to my own reading of Ankersmit's text in this specific instance in a little 
more detail. 
With regard to terminology, then, it will be evident that Ankersmit's thesis can only 
be properly (and fairly) assessed on the basis of his own definitions of the terms that 
he uses, and it is for this reason that I must clarify, with reference to Ankersmit's 
developed thesis as laid out in Sublime Historical Experience, the distinction that he 
experience', himself makes between the three key terms `objective historical 
`subjective historical experience' and `sublime historical experience'. Dealing with 
these three in order, Ankersmit said that he used the term `objective historical 
experience' for `referring to how people in the past itself, ... experienced their world 
themselves' `S and, furthermore, that this form of historical experience, already well 
documented, would not be part of his exposition. However, `subjective historical 
experience' (also shortened to `historical experience' both by Ankersmit in his book 
and by me in this thesis) would be subject to examination and it should, Ankersmit 
argues 
.... primarily be situated in a context in which the past has already acquired 
its 
independence from the present: There is a past that is investigated by the 
13 Ankersmit. Subfinne Historical Experience. p264 
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historian and, then, suddenly, seemingly out of nowhere, may arise this sudden 
fusion of past and present .... 
it is an experience of the past by the his- 
torian..... [and] is a direct encounter not only with the past in its quasi- 
noumenal attire but also with the aura of a world we have lost. 16 
However, `sublime historical experience' is the historian's own experience 
.... of a past breaking away from the present. The past is then born . 
from the 
historian's traumatic experience of having entered a new world and from the 
awareness of irreparably having lost a previous world forever. In such cases 
the historian's mind is, so to say, the scene on which-the drama of world 
history is enacted. The fate of a civilization will then have its resonance in the 
historian's mind..... instances of sublime historical experience have been 
decisive in the evolution of the West's historical consciousness (and hence in 
the writing of history itself). "The wisdom of the world" is then primarily 
expressed by historians.... [consequently] the historian then is a civilization's 
Delphic oracle through whose mouth the gods announce their will and speak to 
all who try to recover their way in the present. These are the most tragic 
moments for historians, but also the moments of their greatest triumphs. 
Historians will then feel themselves part of what they are describing - viz. this 
divergence of present and past - and their desperation about the loss of a familiar world will then motivate their writing and inspire in them their 
profoundest thoughts. What they then write about their civilization's fate, about 
its having been thrown into a vortex of unfathomable powers, is then, in the 
last analysis, an expression of the historian's own experience of the past: '? 
Thus described it appears - and this is a key distinction to keep in mind - that, 
unlike `historical experience' (which arises out of a sudden and momentary fusion of 
past and present -a transient closure of the "gap" between past and present), 
`sublime historical experience' actually takes place and unfolds on the `scene' of the 
historians own mind (a style of re-enactment) and therefore manifests itself as an 
expression of the historian's own experience of the past; in this sense there is no 
temporal "gap" to close. Now, this distinction between the two phenomena is surely 
one of kind rather than degree, and it is partly18 for this reason that I would question 
Ankersmit's assumption that the latter phenomenon is a variant of the former. 
However, my purpose here is to clarify Ankersmit's own distinction between these 
two phenomena ahead of Section One in which the detailed nature of sublime 
16 Ibid. pp264-265 
17 Ibid. p265 
is There are other differences (to be discussed later in this Chapter) which can only enforce this argument 
for a category distinction between these two variants of historical experience. Nevertheless, Ankersmit 
argues throughout Sublime Historical Experience that the latter is a variant of the former. 
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historical experience will be explained (revealing yet another distinction between 
these two types of historical experience). 
The second introductory point that I want to make is that when reading any text 
there is always a temptation to start at the beginning, end at the end and take one's 
compass, for the purpose of analysis and critique, from any identifiable introduction 
to that text. I used this approach in my Chapter Three analysis of History and 
7ropology precisely because it was in Ankersmit's Introduction to the book that he 
sought to coherently pull together his chosen, disparate collection of essays. But in 
Sublime Historical Experience Ankersmit's Introduction fails to serve this purpose, 
for in it he confronts the reader with too many false starts, too many different 
definitions of his project (all of which sit uneasily together), thus precluding any 
clear idea of precisely what it is that he is going to be doing and saying. ' 9 By way of 
illustrating this point here is just a short selection of statements drawn from the 
book's Introduction: 
.... the crucial question is whether it is (historical) experience that may enable 
us to break through the walls of "the prison house of language" - and this is 
the main question to be addressed in this book........ the main topic of this 
book is to contribute to the resuscitation of the notion of experience from its 
apparent death, to explore and to explain the parallelism of the relevant 
developments in historical writing and philosophy, and, more specifically, to 
show what lessons historical writing can teach the philosopher........ the claim 
that there is a variant of experience preceding and transcending questions of 
truth and falsity is precisely the main thesis of this book........ this book is 
mainly an attempt to do away with all the (quasi-)transcendentalist conceptions 
we may find not only in tropology but also in hermeneutics, deconstruction, 
(post-)structuralism, or semiotics...... more specifically this book is a 
rehabilitation of the romanticist's world of moods and feelings as constitutive 
of how we relate to the past........ [and finally]What is the experience of the 
past underlying the language used by the historian? That is the question asked 
in this book. " 
In addition to this (what one might call) uncertainty in relation to narrative direction, 
it soon becomes apparent that a straightforward reading of the book from beginning 
19 This point was also raised in Chorea, T. G., (2006). `F. R Ankersmit and the Historical Sublime' in 
History of Human Sciences 19 no. 4: p92 20 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience, pp4-14. 
148 
to end presents even firher difficulties since Ankersmit does not enter into a 
substantial discussion of its ostensible subject matter, sublime historical experience 
(as indicated by its title), until reaching his very last chapter (that is Chapter Eight) 
some 317 pages into the text. It would seem to me, therefore, that any analysis of the 
book might sensibly first address the content of its last chapter. Accordingly, in 
Section One of this chapter I initially examine the meaning of collective sublime 
historical experience as described by Ankersmit in his Chapter Eight. I then look at 
its implications and impact, as construed by Ankersmit, at the level of the individual 
historian (in this instance necessarily drawing on further references scattered 
throughout the book) and I also reflect on the confusion that arises out of 
Ankersmit's conflation of what are arguably different considerations. 
I should point out here that Ankersmit's conflation of these two phenomena - the 
collective and the individual - has already been noted by Keith Jenkins who, fording 
himself initially dissatisfied with his own critique of Sublime Historical Experience, 
finally managed to put his finger on the problem as he saw it. This is how he 
described his thoughts on the matter: 
.... slowly, I began to get it. For whilst I 
had initially thought that I was 
dissatisfied because I hadn't managed to adequately connect two things that 
inform Ankersmit's text - sublime experience (as the historians existential 
experience of the sublime) and collective S. H. E. - as I reflected on this I began 
to realise, too late in the day, that these two elements did not actually (and 
certainly did not necessarily) connect up any way: that the historian's 
experience of the sublime and S. H. E. are totally different, separate things. In 
fact, what we have here are two books in one. For although on the surface and 
from the title - Sublime Historical Experience - it looks as if that's what the 
book is about - namely the collective feeling that a civilisation experiences 
when it undergoes a rupture so profound that in its semantic free-fall everything 
collapses irretrievably - in fact the bulk of the work is actually on the 
experiences historians (apparently) feel when `the past' they thought they knew 
becomes strange as all that was solid indeed `melts into air'. And it is this 
phenomenon that the book is primarily about; it is this which constitutes the vast 
bulk of the first seven chapters of this eight-chaptered text........ so, once I had 
realized Ankersmit's two-in-one, then my unease about being able to convey 
the joined-up nature of the book or capture its coherence vanished as I 
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recognised that the book was never coherent in the first place; that it is about two 
very different phenomena which just cannot be elided. 21 
Taken together, both of the above mentioned unwarranted elisions of ideas (first the 
conflation of the notion of experience with that of sensation and second the 
conflation of the idea of a collective historical experience with that of an individual, 
existential historical experience) arguably effected a distortion in, and substantially 
diminished the force of, Ankersmit's thesis. I will return to these matters in more 
detail later. However, to conclude my account of the layout of this current chapter, 
having established in Section One the nature of and the, for me, irreducible 
distinction between collective and individual historical experience, I then consider 
its significance for the historian. In Section Two I evaluate Ankersmit's very 
personal and idiosyncratic obsession with a particularly negative and traumatic 
notion of sublime historical experience, whilst Section Three deals with the closely 
related phenomena presence and parallel processing. In Section Four I then attempt 
to dismantle the whole idea of sublime historical experience which, I argue, is not 
and cannot be historical at all. Rather, it would appear to be a phenomenon of an 
existential kind and is I think more suited to - if it suits anything at all - the field of 
memory studies. 
21 Jenkins, K., (2009). `Cohen contra Ankersmit' in At the Limits of History: Essays on Theory and 
Practice. London: Routledge. pp311-312. In the some essay Jenkins suggested (and I am noting this as a 
point of interest which might add something to the more general understanding of Ankeramit's 
motivational drive towards the sublime) that one might take as Ankersmit's governing thematic 
.... something like Nietzsche's dictum that we need 
lies in order to live, and that these'lies' can be seen 
as the various ways in which social formations have constituted 'reality' - and especially the way they 
have expressed this through language. And I think Ankersmit shares Nietzsche's view that if we 
stripped away these carapaces of the real (`reality effects') to reveal 'bare life' then without our usual 
fictive, Tabular shelters, we would be quite literally exposed to the nature of actuality plain before 
human beings got at it and (contingently) real-iced it. 
But Ankersmit's sublime thus realised, Jenkins continued, was and is an angst-ridden and terrifying 
sublime which failed to register the positive, expectant dimension of Nietzsche's own thinking. 
Nevertheless, Ankersmit would have us follow his argument (this being his contribution of a form of 
authenticity to the discipline of history) in order that we might also experience and benefit from a 
sublime (albeit of his own idiosyncratic kind) which would otherwise be denied us by Nietzsche's 
'.... soothing tissue of lies (linguistic/textual) which allow us to pass through life as if sleepwalking', as 
Jenkins put it. My point here being that from this perspective Ankersmit's self appointed task would have 
become clear to him, he would tear away from the past all those carapaces of textualisation in order to 
reveal it "plain" or, as Ankersmit himself expressed it, he would 'break through the thick crusts of 
effective history and meet history in its quasi-noumenal nakedness'(Ankersmit. Sublime Historical 
Experience. p277). 
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A very final point; a reminder. On page seven of my Introduction I said that in 
Chapter Four I would try to adopt a more discursive/impressionistic style of writing 
(whilst not entirely losing an analytical "edge") rather than the expository and 
analytical style of the preceding chapters, and I now need to remind the reader of the 
consequences of this change. In order to do so I refer to my structuring of Chapter 
One where I tried to outline the whole of Ankersmit's narrative substance argument 
(the logic of Narrative Logic) before later, especially in Chapter Two, concentrating 
in detail on its parts. However, by contrast, in this current chapter I deal with 
Ankersmit's Sublime Historical Experience not chapter by chapter outlining the 
whole, but by concentrating on those aspects or parts of it - and only on those 
aspects or parts of it - which serve the purpose of my thesis; that is, to show that 
Ankersmit's journey from language to experience is a lost historical cause (a cause 
that loses history along the way, displacing it into memory studies). My treatment of 
Ankersmit's text in this chapter is therefore deliberately impressionistic in the sense 
that these parts are pulled together to give weight to my thesis, not to give a general 
reading of Sublime Historical Exxperience..., though I think that such a general 
reading would not subvert my thesis. 
an Section One: Cultural Trauma and the Histori 
In the introduction to this chapter which you have just read, I focused my attention 
on three of Ankersmit's unsatisfactory (in my view) theoretical assumptions. These 
are (1) that the notions of sensation and experience may be unproblematically 
conflated, (2) that a description, in this case of historical experience, can be taken as 
an explanation of it and (3) that collective sublime historical experience, as he 
himself describes it, can properly be seen as a variant of his concept of individual 
historical experience. The first two of these essentially unexamined presuppositions 
were brought by Ankersmit directly into his expanded thesis (as laid out in Sublime 
Historical Experience) and, as a consequence, they can be seen to have informed 
and to some extent governed his argument therein. The third matter mentioned 
above, which disturbs the coherence of Ankersmit's general position in relation to 
historical experience of both kinds, will be further scrutinized below. However, first 
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I am going to turn to yet another of Ankersmit's unexamined presupposition 
(touched upon towards the end of the previous chapter) which, arguably, can also be 
seen to lie beneath and govern the style of argument which he presents in support of 
his proposal on sublime historical experience. I am here referring to Ankersmit's 
evident belief that (human) reality (not actuality but reality) is prior to language (or 
does not presuppose it) and that, in consequence, the real and language can be 
treated as discrete entities. He plainly stated his position thus: 
It certainly needs the philosopher's propensity to dogma and to 
intellectualisation to sincerely believe that a pre- or non-linguistic experience 
of reality would be impossible. As Schusteruran most perceptively comments: 
We philosophers fail to see this because, disembodied talking-heads that 
we are, the only form of experience we recognize and legitimate is 
linguistic: thinking, talking, writing. But neither we nor the language 
which admittedly helps shape us could survive without the unarticulated 
background of pre-reflective, non-linguistic experience and 
understanding. 
I could not agree more.... u 
Ankersmit then moved on to conclude that `the ultimate truth we can have of the 
world is a truth in which the world "exposes" itself to us free from all context'. 23 
And in so doing he is undoubtedly proposing that the world of human reality (the 
"real" of our species which is the only world that we humans can possibly know) 
can be revealed to us in the form of a context free, authentic experience. 24 That is to 
say, authenticity unmediated by language and thus free from, or prior to, language. 
But, of course, this language/reality position assumed by Ankersmit is not (I think) 
generally accepted and should, for clarification, be set against the positions adopted 
by other philosophers/theorist in the same general discursive field. For this purpose I 
have selected four such individuals (Hayden White, Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty 
and Paul Ricoeur) not least because they all make frequent appearances in 
Ankersmit's various theoretical arguments and one can, therefore, reasonably 
22 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. p254 (and Ankersmit's inset quote, Schusterman, R., 
(1992). Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. p128 
Ibid. p257 
24 The reader will have noticed at this point in Ankersmit's argument that his notion of `truth' appears to 
have been elided with his notion of `authentic experience' which, as he elsewhere claims, is not in itself 
truth generating. This problem will be further discussed and referenced on page 205 (footnote 1). 
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presume that Ankersmit is au fait with their various positions on this particular 
matter; positions which I now briefly summarise. 
As already noted, White - in his Introduction to Tropics of Discourse (and one 
should bear in mind here that this publication of 1985 was informed by White's 
Metahistory of 1973 which was, in its turn, an expansion of ideas expressed in `The 
Burden of History' right back in 1966) figuratively represented the tropological 
use of language as `the shadow from which all realistic discourse tries to flee'. 25 
This flight was seen by White as futile because realism in discourse arises out of 
tropological language use, and he went on to explain (also noted) that `tropic is the 
process by which all discourse constitutes the objects which it pretends only to 
describe realistically and analyse objectively'. 26 On this view it would appear that 
reality, as the subject of discourse, is inextricably imbedded in tropological language 
use and, as such, can be taken as a performative product of that tropology. 
Derrida's position as succinctly expressed by one of his former students, the French 
philosopher Jean-Luc Marion, is that we simply do not have and cannot have 
.... access to reality apart from our engagement in language. There are not first things presented to consciousness, that are then matched up with signs to 
represent them, but always and only signs that refer to other signs or resonate 
as symbols in a web of meaning. Reality is not what is present in or behind the 
signs, but effectively remains constructed by them as text. In other words, 
reality is always and already mediated: we inhabit a symbolic order. 27 
On this understanding it is not possible for human beings to stand outside the human 
system of meaning (which Derrida refers to as `the text'), for we are always and 
already implicated in that system (we are `always in a text already'). 
Rorty's position (also already noted in previous discussions in this thesis) is one 
which takes the view that, following Nietzsche, one must break absolutely with the 
notion that things have a constitution in themselves outside of all relationships, such 
relationships being expressed in systems of meaning (or language). Thus, for Rorty 
as well, the "real" is constituted in language and language `goes all the way down'. 
25 White, H., (1978). Tropics ojDiscourse. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. p2 26 Ibid. P2 
Z' Horner, H., (2005). Jecni-Luc MariarA Theological Introduction. Burlington VT: Ashgate Pub. p43 
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And finally Ricoeur, whose three volumes under the title Time and Narrative28 
(described by Ankersmit as a magisterial `landmark in the philosophy of history'), 29 
and his Rule of Metaphor30 which preceded this triple volume work, recognise the 
`power of the metaphorical utterance to redescribe a reality inaccessible. to direct 
description'. 31 
Now, the crucial point here is that Ankersmit has taken a position on the nature of 
reality which can be seen to radically contradict these four alternative theoretical 
positions, such positions being drawn from philosophers/theorists who Ankersmit 
himself introduced into his own theoretical arguments for various purposes, whilst 
ignoring the supremely important point on which they all appear to agree. Namely, 
that what constitutes the real world for us humans is a real (a reality effect) made 
meaningful by language. Ankersmit's apparent disregard for this if not identical at 
least collective position is further compounded when one takes into account a wider 
perspective, for it is surely the case that the complicity of language in what we think 
we know as the real is accepted amongst a much broader group of prominent 
philosophers. It was, for instance, accepted by Jean-Francois Lyotard who, as 
Geoffrey Bennington pointed out, took the position that 
.... [r]eality is neither simply given and awaiting more-or-less adequate transcription, nor is it magically produced by a demiurgic act of creation on the 
part of a speaker, but is an unstable state attributed to referents on the basis of 
operations of nomination, ostension and description..... Reality is established 
as the result of playing a language-game with specifiable component parts. 32 
And by Roland Barthes too, who writes that there is no `other side'33 to language; 
there is no autonomous reality which is merely relayed by language. These same 
general assumptions were also made by the later Ludwig Wittgenstein (whose latter 
works influenced Lyotard's position), Elizabeth Ermarth, Judith Butler, Emesto 
28 Ricoeur, P., (1983 vol. 1,1990 vol. 2/3). Time and Narrative. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 29 Ankersmit. History and Ti ©pology. p68 
3° Ricoeur, P., (1986). Rule ofMetaphor. London: Rutledge & Kogan Paul. 31 Ricoeur, P., Time and Narrative vol. 1, p. xi. 37 Bennington, G., (1988). Lyotard. " Writing the Event. New York: Columbia University Press. p121 33 Barthel, R., (1977). Imagie, Music, Text. New York: Hill and Wang. P30 
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Laclau, much of the work of Jean Baudrillard and many others. In fact, such anti- 
foundational/post-structuralist positions are now common in our intellectual culture. 
In short, there is a substantial authoritative weight behind this specific proposition 
concerning the relationship between language and reality. Surely (as a sometime 
postmodern thinker) Ankersmit should have addressed this matter in detail in 
Sublime Historical Experience precisely because it is this argument/position that, if 
accepted, can be seen to fatally undermine his central thesis which manifestly 
operates on the understanding that an autonomous past reality - not actuality but 
reality - (the authentic reality of the past that Ankersmit thinks he can grasp direct) 
does precede its constitutive language of description. But nowhere in Ankersmit's 
theorizations is this matter substantially confronted - at best it is dismissed in his 
writing on Rorty; it is simply peremptorily excluded because 
.... 
it leaves no room for the possibility of an experience of the world that is not 
predicated on language...... [and moreover] the more language and reality are 
integrated 
.... the more experience will 
be squeezed out of existence by it. 34 
Or, in other words, his thesis cannot both tolerate it and remain intact, so he rejects 
it. Thus, what is at stake here right at the outset is the viability of Ankersmit's 
overall thesis when seen against the background of these alternative presuppositions, 
presuppositions which can be seen to significantly undermine or negate his project. 
Accordingly, it is with these crucial prefacing points made and in mind that I can 
now turn directly to Chapter Eight of Sublime Historical Experience. 
Chapter Eight opens with a short treatise on the nature of forgetting, a particular 
type of which takes precedence in Ankersmit's unfolding argument. The exact 
nature of this specific type of forgetting is explained by Ankersmit in relation to 
traumaticldisruptive past events of a particular kind and the irreversible identity loss 
associated with these specific events. The dislocation of this no longer accessible 
past identity, effected by its repudiation (understood here as an endeavour to forget) 
as a necessary condition for the acquisition of a new identity, is (in brief) what lies 
at the heart of the phenomenon of sublime historical experience and will be 
explained more fully in a moment. But first it should be stressed again, in view of its 
34 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. p74 
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central importance to my argument, that the identity to which Ankersmit refers in 
this instance is not that possessed by an individual being but, rather, that possessed 
by a civilisation, a culture or a past epoch. It is therefore of a collective sublime kind 
and, as such, it would be my argument that it is categorically different from 
historical experience which is of an individual existential kind (as already explained 
in the early remarks to this Chapter). Having again highlighted this distinction 
between historical experience and sublime historical experience, Ankersmit's later 
questionable conflation of these two categories will become all the more 
conspicuous. 
But to continue. Ankersmit found his paradigmatic explanatory model for loss of 
collective identity in the events, and the consequent rupture with a former way of 
life, which together constituted (for him) the substance of the French Revolution of 
1789. For, as Ankersmit said, it is undoubtedly the case that the dramatic 
transformations which issued from the French Revolution `changed the lives of 
Western Europeans in every conceivable aspect...... [and that they were] the most 
decisive and profound changes that Western man had undergone in the course of 
history' 
. 
35 Furthermore, that these changes brought to the level of collective 
consciousness the realisation that a former way of life had been lost forever. Or, to 
rephrase, Ankersmit is arguing here that, as a direct consequence of the French 
Revolution, Western Europeans quite suddenly became aware of an un-reflected 
previous world (their own previous world or former collective identity) which, at the 
precise moment of its recognition, they were forced to irrevocably surrender in 
favour of a new identity. This lost identity, which had to be surrendered orforgotten 
at the very moment of its realisation, and the trauma surrounding this loss 
constituted (for Ankersmit) both the necessary conditions for the occurrence of 
sublime historical experience and also the basis upon which a new Western 
European identity had to be established. Furthermore, Ankersmit argued that 
Western historical consciousness itself can be seen to come into being36 out of this 
3s Ibid. p323 
36 Ankersmit also argues that `modern Western historical consciousness came into being in sixteenth 
century Italy' (Sublime Historical F. xperience. p356) and, accordingly, he finds (in this instance) its origin 
in the period which he refers to as the Italian Renaissance. But, he also states that the 'formation of 
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same pivotal and profoundly traumatic transformation from a former pre- 
revolutionary identity to a new post-revolutionary identity. And he went even further 
when he suggested that `the fact that the Anglo-Saxon world has had the fortune of 
never having to undergo such a traumatic experience may help us to explain why 
historical consciousness is so much an invention of the European continent'. 37 
For Ankersmit, then, this kind of transformation from a former to a new identity is 
...... always accompanied by feelings of a profound and irreparable loss, of 
cultural despair, and of hopeless disorientation. In this sense such historical 
experiences are undoubtedly traumatic too. But the stake of the traumatic 
experience is far more dramatic in such cases-for here one really loses 
oneself, here a former identity is irrevocably lost forever and superseded by a 
new historical or cultural identity. Hence, in cases like these any reconciliation 
of a former and a new identity is categorically out of the question. -and this 
also means that no room is left for a mechanism that might give us the 
redemption from trauma. This, then, is the kind of trauma that we will always 
carry with us after History has forced us to confront it; it is a trauma for which 
no cure is to be found. The new identity is mainly constituted by the trauma of 
the loss of a former identity- precisely this is its main content, and that this 
is the ineluctable truth announces itself in the realization (agonizing, resigned, 
or otherwise) that this loss is permanent and can never be undone. And then 
trauma is just as permanent as the loss of the former identity is. In this way we 
can say that our collective identity largely is the sum of all the scars on our 
collective soul, scars that were occasioned by our forced abandonment of 
former identities, scars that will never wholly fade and that will cause in us a 
continuous and enduring pain. 38 
Consequently, sublime historical experience (which is understood by Ankersmit to 
arise out of the said traumatic39 loss and consequent repudiation and forgetting of a 
former identity) is, particularly when taken in relation to the description immediately 
above, bound to be for him of a negative, pessimistic and melancholic kind. 
However, before pursuing this significant point, I should highlight a distinction that 
modern Western historical consciousness .... came 
into being in the decade between 1790 and 1800' 
(Sublime Historical Fxperience. p443 fa, 25). There are, throughout the book, many references to these 
two, ado periods but it is not clear to which one he definitively and finally attributes `the coming 
into being of modern Western historical consciousness'. There is thus a two to three hundred year gap to 
explain here. 
37 Ankersmit, F. R., (2002). `Trauma and Suffering: a Forgotten Source of Western Historical 
Consciousness' in Western Historical Thinkaing. " An Intercultural Debate, Rosen J., (ed. ). New York: 
Berghakim. p75 
ss Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Faperience. p324 39 For Ankersmit `the trauma is the sublime and vice versa'(Ankersmit. `Trauma and Suffering'. pp75-76) 
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Ankersmit makes between this type of forgetting, which is associated with the 
trauma of identity loss, and a superficially related yet different kind of forgetting 
which leaves identity intact. 
This other variant of forgetting, where a memory is too painful to be admitted to 
collective consciousness, is explained by Ankersmit in relation to the trauma of the 
Holocaust. The memory of this terrible event was, he argued, for the two decades 
following World War II, forgotten or withheld from conscious memory. It was, at 
least during that period, literally unspeakable; it defied adequate narrativisation and 
could not therefore be de-traumatised and thereby be subsumed into the collective 
Jewish consciousness. However (Ankersmit continued), profoundly traumatic as it 
undoubtedly was, the Holocaust left the collective Jewish identity intact. That is to 
say that there was no rupture in the Jewish identity, it survived, and there was 
therefore no necessity for the Jewish race to repudiate it in order to build a new 
identity. One could say that forgetting in this instance (the closure of its associated 
trauma) assumed the psychological aspect of a repression and that there was no loss, 
and therefore no imperative to forget, at the level of identity. Understood in this way 
it is immediately obvious that the Holocaust could never function as one of 
Ankersmit's sublime sources of historical experience because his defining element, 
`traumatic loss of a former identity', was never a component of it. This illustration 
serves to again highlight the centrality of Ankersmit's traumatic identity loss theme 
within his concept of sublime historical experience and it can be taken as its decisive 
causal element. 
I return now to a previously mentioned point and the question that arises out of it; 
namely, `why is it that sublime historical experience is exclusively for Ankersmit of 
a negative, pessimistic and melancholic kind? ' Well, an attempt at a more 
comprehensive answer will be the subject of the next section of this chapter, but for 
now the short answer is that it is so because that is how he repeatedly 
describes/defines it. For example he says 
.... history as a reality of its own can only come 
into being as a result of 
traumatic collective experience. -the past 
is primarily a painful past ; and 
histories rejoicing in the triumphs of monarchs, soldiers and heroes will never 
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be able to give us that essence.... shared traumatic pain provides the 
collectivity with a common basis in a far deeper layer of reality than happiness 
and joy could ever be capable of.... historical experience is always an 
experience of loss...... [experience of a prehistorical past] can only come into 
being as a figure of loss.... and, finally, historical experience is fundamentally 
tragic. 40 
These observations are predictable, of course, since Ankersmit's notion of sublime 
historical experience is (as explained) worked-up from and predicated on his own 
founding condition for it (this condition being that of its grounding in trauma and 
loss). There is, I recognise, an inevitable and unsatisfactory circularity in this 
explanation, but the matter will have to rest here for the moment pending Section 
Two. 
However, (and this is, I suppose, another matter - an aside) perhaps Ankersmit's 
notion of sublime historical experience should be re-examined with reference to his 
paradigmatic account of it in relation to the French Revolution. The point that needs 
to be made here is that in Ankersmit's explanatory example, the idea of `traumatic 
loss of a former identity', can only function or have any meaning at all when applied 
to the French elite, the minority. For, seen from the point of view of the majority 
(say, the French peasants) the French Revolution engendered a positive and radical 
identity where before there had been scarcely any positive/progressive identity to 
lose. Or, to rephrase, the French Revolution arguably effected a transformation in 
the standing of its peasants which lifted them out of their collective quasi-medieval 
mode of existence towards the status of modem citizens. From the standpoint of the 
peasant this transformation can be reasoned as having the appearance of a 
progressive romantic gain41 rather than a sudden traumatic loss. It might thus be 
40 These citations are, in the order quoted, drawn from Ankersmit. `Trauma and Suffering'. p76 (first 
three quotes) and Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Fgaerience p 128 & p234 (for the final two quotes). 
41 On this longer perspective the French Revolution, notwithstanding the violence and atrocities 
occasioned by it, can be read not as Ankersmit's sombre and pessimistic ending but, rather, as a 
progressive and optimistic beginning. This is also, of course, Kant's position. For him 1789 was a sign of 
progress as indexed by its favourable reception by the senses comnrunis. This is interesting because whilst 
Ankersmit draws heavily on Kant's notions of the sublime, he never mentions the fact that although for 
Kant 1789 occasioned sublime feelings it did not occasion negative ones. The sublime - as ascribed to an 
event - is therefore not determined by it. Moreover, Cohen, Bennington and Lyotard all make this same 
point (see Cohen, S., (2006). History Out Of Joint. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press pp182-282 
and Bennington, G., (1988). Lyotard: Writing the Event. Manchester: Manchester University Press., in 
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concluded that Ankersmit's new historical theory which appears to be figured out on 
the basis of the losses occasioned by privileged minorities, is for those 
disadvantaged minorities/elites only. And he appears to confirm this observation 
when he states that 
..... elites vanquished by the inexorable course of history will be most open to and 
most fascinated by historical fate as manifesting itself in the guise of long-term developments. Only these can make these former elites realize why all their 
wisdom and insight could be so sadly helpless and ineffective against the inexorable course of History. Even more so, one may well surmise that an 
unusually acute awareness of long-term developments is the indelible sign of the 
historical cohsciousness of superseded elites, for they are in the best social position 
to identify them... 42 
Bearing in mind that sublime historical experiences are, as Ankersmit has always 
insisted, only encountered by a small number of appropriately gifted historians 
(connoisseurs), then it could be argued that such experiences, if taken seriously, are also 
exclusively confined to current elites who receive messages from former elites. And 
since these messages are connected with the traumatic loss of the former identities of 
such elites then they can only be both non-representational (in a general sense) and 
deeply pessimistic. 
Now, so far this discussion concerning the content of Chapter Eight of Sublime 
Historical Experience has only revealed a very general idea of what sublime 
historical experience is and where it comes from, and this isn't really satisfactory. In 
order to get a more precise idea of what Ankersmit thinks that it actually is and, 
more to the point, how he thinks that it actually connects up and manifests itself at a 
conscious level within the subject of that experience (or, in short, how the historian 
actually "gets it") it will now be necessary to turn back for a moment to the 
beginning of Chapter Five of Sublime Historical Experience where Ankersmit lays out 
what I want to call his `fabulous explanatory story' in precisely the detail sought. For 
Ankersmit's extraordinary illustrative vindication of his thesis, which he claims is 
elicited from (or described with the help of) Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
which Bennington expresses this view in his Chapter Five'Le Difförend'. ppI06-I78 and within that 
Chapter under the subtitle 'The Sign of History'. ppI62-165, Bennington relates Lyotard's similar view). 42 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. p 142 
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Investigations, 43 is presented here in Chapter Five as, perhaps, an early introduction to 
Chapter Eight. Anyway, whatever the source or inspiration for this story (which I quote 
here at some length in order to allow Ankersmit to explain himself fully) he asks his 
readers to 
...... think now of a civilization, a culture, or a historical epoch as if it were 
some strange and hybrid creature.... Such a creature would be "strange and hybrid" in the sense of being, on the one hand, far more than what we are and, 
on the other, far less - "more" in the sense of comprising, in some way or 
other, all the individuals that are part of this civilization, and so on but "less" 
so in the sense that its level of self-awareness is far less developed and far les 
articulate than usually is the case with us as normal, waking human 
individuals. Moreover, think of this strange creature to consist of nothing but 
these vague and inarticulate sensations, moods, and feelings. It lacks a "self' 
tying them together; these creatures are only these fleeting sets of sensations, 
moods, and feelings. In this way these creatures are sets of experiences without 
there being a subject of experience. Suppose, furthermore, that, for all their so 
very weak or, rather, nonexistent capacity of self-awareness, these strange 
creatures may nevertheless sometimes become conscious of themselves, of 
their pains and sensations, although even then there is no 'r' to which (the 
awareness of) these pains and sensations could meaningfully be attributed. 
What could this entity possibly be? The paradox of a self-awareness without 
self-awareness could then be solved by saying that the presence of these pains 
and sensations articulates itself only in the minds of some of the great poets, 
novelists, or historians living and writing in a certain civilization or culture. 
The job of self-awareness has been delegated, so to say, by these creatures to 
certain "subsystems" of theirs...... such as poets, novelists, and historians (and 
we may envy them for their capacity for doing this, for how more pleasant 
would human life be if we could do the same! ). These poets, novelists, and 
historians are the creature's "nerves", so to say (although in order to make the 
metaphor work, we should attribute to these nerves also the capacity for 
translating the firings of these nerve cells to the level of consciousness). In that 
case the disjunction of experience from truth and language would hold also for 
what these "enthusiastic" (to use the most appropriate adjective here) poets, 
novelists, and historians say about their civilization, and so on. And the 
implication would be that we should not try to fit their writings into the 
discourse of truth (as exemplified by statements such as "This cat is black"); 
instead we should see them as the groanings [my emphasis] of this 
civilization. That does not imply, however, that they should be meaningless to 
us. Once again: Far from it! These groanings may overwhelm us with an 
unequalled force and intensity, and they may be perceived in the basso 
continuo accompanying all that a civilization thinks and does. It means, rather, 
that we should not interpret them as being about something else in the way that 
the true statement is about some state of affairs in the world. We should take 
them for what they are, that is, as the groanings of a civilization, as the texts in 
43 Wittgenstein, L., (1963). Anscombe, G. E. M. (trans. ) PhilosvphicalImaestigations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
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which the pains, the moods, and feelings of a civilization articulate themselves.. 
In this way these groanings are essentially poetic; just like a poem they do not 
aim at truth but at making experience speak. And this is how we should read 
them 44 
On my reading, what I believe Ankersmit is claiming here is that fleeting sets of 
sensations, moods and feelings, all of them bereft of a subject of experience, or a 
self, can nevertheless collectively constitute the painful experiences of past 
civilisations, cultures or epochs. These so called `hybrid creatures', made up of 
those painful experiences, drift about in a timeless limbo awaiting realisation - that 
is to say, awaiting a self onto which each might register its as yet un-manifest self- 
awareness through the temporary possession of a `subject of experience' - the 
subject of experience being an unsuspecting and suitably gifted surrogate historian, 
poet etc. Such fleeting sets of sensations, moods and feelings (the actual stuff of 
sublime historical experience) have, according to Ankersmit, the capacity first to 
enter the central nervous system of that subject of experience and then to manifest 
themselves at the level of the subject's consciousness as authentic historical 
experiences. These "epiphanies", Ankersmit maintains, are not presented in the form 
of true statements about the past but rather as the authentic recovery, through the re- 
living at the level of the historian's, poet's, etc., individual existential self, of the 
collective pains, moods and feelings which civilisations (cultures or epochs) have 
experienced. And, furthermore, Ankersmit expects that we should take them for 
what he says they each are - the groanings of a civilisation in the case of his 
example. This, as far as I can see, is the process by which Ankersmit's privileged 
historian is supposed to be able to effectively tap directly into the past (granted here 
as a gift of the moment which cannot be repeated at will) through the agency of 
sublime historical experience (the `hybrid creature') and render the collective 
experience of that past into an individual, existential experience in the historian's 
present. In this way Ankersmit offers a putative link between collective `sublime 
historical experiencei45 and individual (existential) `historical experience'. Or to put 
44 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. pp 196.197 
43 It is curious to note that, at this earlier stage in his argument, Ankersmit's fleeting sets of collective 
sensations, moods and feelings (which I take to be sublime historical experiences "in the raw" and 
available for processing through the central nervous system on receipt) are not anywhere in this particular 
explanation linked directly to the idea of irretrievable loss of a former identity which is fundamental to 
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it another way, this is how a historian, through the agency of sublime historical 
experience, is presumed by Anlcersmit to be able to experience an authentic past 
that actually predates his or her own life. Now, before moving on to Section Two of 
this chapter, a very brief summary of the current section and then one final 
observation concerning Ankersmit's sequencing of Chapters in Sublime Historical 
Experience. 
In summary, then, I am arguing thus far that Ankersmit's own argument in support 
of sublime historical experience rests on four contentious presuppositions which, 
had they been properly investigated, would have effectively negated his thesis. And, 
furthermore, that having initially set up his argument on the basis of these suspect 
presuppositions, Ankersmit stretched credibility even further with his fabulous story 
about a `hybrid creature' which his readers are presumably expected to swallow 
whole. I do not doubt that in his book Ankersmit described what sublime historical 
experience is to him, but I think he failed to present to his readers a comprehensible 
account of it at a theoretical level. His proposal that the traumatic `groanings of a 
past civilisation' could, in the guise of a hybrid creature deprived of its own self- 
awareness, alight on the central nervous system of a gifted historian in order to 
release its own self-awareness into that surrogate's mind in the form of an 
unmediated authentic experience of those same groanings, isn't really a philosophy 
at all - arguably it's a fantasy. Nevertheless, it seems that Ankersmit pressed on with 
this idiosyncratic description of a profoundly traumatic and melancholic kind of 
sublime historical experience only to then mistake that imaginative description for 
an explanatory account of it. 
And my final observation for the moment, which takes me back to the introductory 
remarks to this chapter, concerns Ankersmit's choice of title for his book (Sublime 
Historical Experience) which, of course, suggests that `sublime historical 
experience' is its central topic. Yet, as noted, this subject is not addressed in any 
substantial way until the book's very last chapter: how has this come about? Well, 
Ankersmit's concept of sublime historical experience as later described in Chapter Eight of Sublime 
Historical Experience (as explained at the beginning of this Section). 
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an explanatory clue could lie in the book's recurrent Romeo and Juliet theme 
which constitutes a coherent narrative thread that runs right through its first six 
chapters. For this is consistent with the idea suggested by the title of Ankersmit's 
book whilst in manuscript form, Historical Experience: the Embrace of Romeo and 
Juliet, which was changed (for no clarified reason) to the current title shortly before 
the book's publication. " Just a few examples of this Romeo and Juliet theme are the 
kiss, " the embrace and the metaphor for de-contextualisation 49 The point here is 
that the original title suggested a book about historical experience of the individual 
kind and not the collective, sublime kind (the wider significance of this argument 
will be expanded in a moment). On this basis Ankersmit's description of collective 
sublime historical experience, his variant of historical experience, would then be 
expected to follow and not precede the main argument. One can perhaps now see 
some rationale for Ankersmit's particular sequence of chapters and hence 
arguments -a rationale that was, however, effectively lost with the book's change of 
title. 
Section Two: Obsession or Theory? 
I now turn to address Chapter Seven of Sublime Historical Experience where a more 
adequate explanation might be sought for Ankersmit's particular preference for a 
profoundly melancholic and pessimistic style of historical experience. However, for 
reasons which will become immediately apparent, I first want to return to 
Ankersmit's Introduction to the book where he contemplates the origin of the 
sublimity of historical experience; 
...... [it] involves, in the first place, a 
Gestalt-switch from a timeless present 
into a world consisting of things past and present. This gives us the discovery 
of the past as a reality that has somehow "broken off' from a timeless present. 
This is "the moment of loss". But at the same time historical experience aims 
at a recovery of the past by transcending again the barriers between past and 
present. And this could be characterized as "the moment of desire or of love". 
All of historical writing is to be situated in the space enclosed by these 
46 See `footnote 148' in jay, M., (20(4). Songs of Experience. California: University of California Press. 
p216 
7 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. p121 
48 Ibid. pp130 & 135 
49 Ibid. p125 
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complementary movements of the discovery (loss) and the recovery of the past 
(love) that constitute together the realm of historical experience...... The 
sublimity of historical experience originates from this paradoxical union of the 
feelings of loss and love, that is, of the combination of pain and pleasure in 
how we relate to the past. 50 
It appears, then, that the sublimity of historical experience is, at this introductory 
stage, in Ankersmit argument, situated in a space enclosed by `loss and love' or 
`pain and pleasure' which, together, constitute the realm of historical experience. 
However, the pleasurellove element of this equation is lost without trace by the time 
that Ankersmit gets round to "nailing down", in the last two chapters of his book, his 
final definitions of both histörical experience and his variant of it, sublime historical 
experience. Exactly why and where pleasure and love disappear from historical 
experience is hard to see, but by the time Ankersmit gets to his seventh chapter it 
seems that they have already departed, thereby effecting a destabilisation of the 
harmony of the loss/love and pain/pleasure dichotomies established at the beginning 
of his book. 
It is with this observation made that I might now myself plunge into the arguably 
oppressively melancholic curiosities of Ankersmit's Chapter Seven (appropriately 
titled `Subjective Historical Experience: The Past as Elegy') which are collected 
together here and presented in the form of an explanation for subjective historical 
experiences' Broadly speaking Chapter Seven breaks down into two parts, the 
`Pulcinella' and the `Rococo' arguments, the first an illustrative example of 
subjective histori cal experience through the analysis of a painting and the second, 
the more convoluted of the two, being concerned with the establishment of a link 
between rococo ornament, or rather the mode of artistic expression embodied in it, 
and subjective historical experience. Both of these examples are, in their own 
individual ways, of a negative kind and it is important to try to see how they work 
for Ankersmit if his text is to be understood. 
30 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Eq enema. p9 
51 To recap, subjective historical experience is of the Huizinga kind (the second of Ankeramit's three 
kinds of historical experience as explained in this Chapter's preface). 
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The Pulcinella (taken by Ankersmit to have been of the unpleasant, malicious, 
vulgar and egoistic type)52 was a traditional and very distinctive character from the 
commedia dell'arte, 53 and groups of these bizarre hunchback masked figures were 
often depicted in Eighteenth-Century Venetian paintings. Ankersmit selected a 
Particular example of this genre of painting, the capriccioS4 `Arcade with a Lantern' 
by Francesco Guardi, as the definitive source of historical experience in the sense 
that this painting, which pre-dated the French Revolution, could (he supposed) in 
itself afford access to `the "mood" of the ancient regime' 55 through its oppressive 
symbolic Pulcinella theme of ennui, incarceration and hopelessness (the painting 
appears on the cover of his book). But, and this is crucial, Ankersmit failed to 
observe that this access came courtesy of his own interpretation of the meaning of 
the painting and what he himself saw in the loathsome Pulcinelli depicted in it. In 
total Ankersmit wrote twelve pages of detailed perspectival, tonal and comparative 
analyses of Guardi's painting in which, he believed, he had adequately demonstrated 
the case that his own experience of the painting had indeed 'obliterate[d] .... the 
barriers separating [him] from the end of the eighteenth century', 57 thus revealing 
the authentic moods and feelings of that time. I have carefully studied Ankersmit's 
interpretation of the Guardi painting but I will not enter into any discussion of it here 
simply because it constituted (as would be the case with any such interpretation) a 
personal projection onto the object of its investigation; in this case the projection of 
Ankersmit's own thoughts and feelings onto the Guardi painting. My argument here 
52 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. pp266-267. 53 This ('the comedy of art') is a form of improvised theatre that began in Italy in the 15th century. 
Unscripted performances, involving troupes of up to ten costumed and masked performers, were held in 
the open air using few props. They were funded by donations and anyone could view the performances 
free of charge. It is interesting to note that in his ballet "Pulcinella", Igor Stravinsky (on the basis of an 
eighteenth-century play) cast his Pulcinella as a `traditional hero of Neapolitan media dell arse' who, 
in this particular instance, negotiated a happy ending to the ballet and was thus of a markedly different 
type from that described by Ankersmit (see Kuenning, G., (1995), `Stravinsky: "Pulcinella" Suite 
Programme notes' at http: //fmg-www. es. ucla. edu/geofVprognotes/stravinsky/puleinella. htnif). 
In Italian capriccio means that which is capricious, whimsical or fantastic. In relation to paintings of 
this period the term was used to describe imaginary topographical scenes comprising extant architectural 
elements which were recombined in inventive relationships for decorative effect. Their capricious nature 
suggests a certain lightness of being - an engaging whimsy - and accordingly, for me, there is nothing in 
this particular painting (as I argue below), and certainly nothing in Guardi's paintings in general (not, 
perhaps, even in the genre itself), that suggests Ankersmit's doom and gloom analysis. s Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Earperience. p273 56 Ibid. P272 (see here for a more complete description of the dark and oppressive "Pulcinella" effect). 37 Ibid. p276 
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is that Ankersmit, assuming a morbid negative point-of-view (governed by a 
portentous, retrospectively imposed master-trope of tragedy/trauma; an 
apprehension of the Revolution to come), placed the various elements of Guardi's 
painting under a particular style of description. He then found meaningful 
relationships amongst these elements such that the painting itself appeared to 
transmit, of its own volition, precisely the moods and feelings required of it by the 
point-of-view originally taken. And, indeed, this process was helped considerably by 
Ankersmit's choice of painting, for whilst I have looked at many other examples of 
Guardi's work I have yet to come across another of his pictures which could have 
been so advantageously appropriated for this precise use. There is arguably 
something of the notion of figura (as described by Hayden White)58 in all of this. 
That is to say that Ankersmit, without realising it, appears to have retrospectively (in 
the light of privileged hindsight) applied an imaginative figure onto Guardi's 
painting such that the imminent French Revolution, retrospectively figured by 
Ankersmit on the basis of traumatic, irrevocable loss, became its fulfilment. 
Now to consider Ankersmit's Rococo argument, which he prefaced with an 
autobiographical confessional that occupied two pages of text and, in addition, a 
lengthy endnote (already mentioned in Section Five of the previous Chapter), all of 
which referred to his unhappy childhood. Ankersmit, in essence, explained that as a 
sickly child - confined to his bed and cut off from the outside world - 
he was 
inevitably overtaken by an overpowering sense of boredom. However, he discovered 
that boredom possessed a special intrinsic quality because 
in boredom the interactions between ourselves and the world are temporarily 
suspended; and this suspension invites reality to manifest its true nature, 
untainted and undistorted by our interests and preoccupations. 59 
It was this `true' nature of the world which was thus revealed to Ankersmit during 
his sickness through his boredom induced fascination with the repetitive flower 
patterns on his parents bedroom curtains. These patterns seen in the whole and thus 
drained of their representational content at the level of the individual component 
S8 Already explored in some detail in Section Three of the preceding Chapter. 
59 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. p286 
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flower, appeared to embody an autonomous freedom of interaction (an interaction 
which also encompassed various random stains and tears in the wallpaper) within 
which new shapes and new meanings emerged. Drawing (he claims) on Kant, 
Ankersmit argued that this free play of imagery could be understood as the product 
of originary de-contextualired experience and that this form of expression is 
therefore 
.... the closest we can come to pure experience, to complete openness to what the senses present to us, for now neither the real world nor our perceptions of it 
is forced any longer within pre-existing Patterns-60 
Ankersmit is therefore arguing that, liberated from all the influences which might 
require reality to be seen in one particular way rather than another, `pure experience' 
is attained (since there is no mediating determinant to fix or regulate the free play of 
the imagination) and, through this pure experience, `reality may manifest to us its 
quasi-noumenal qualities'. 61 This explanation, as Ankersmit admitted, presupposed 
the complete subjectivity of perception and thus the obscuration of the object of 
perception. Yet, he insisted that we can still 
..... agree with Kant that the workings of such cognitive structures do not in the least exclude the possibility of knowledge of objective reality. 62 
Now, very briefly, two things. First, this last statement - which, incidentally, 
Ankersmit failed to reference to Kant's writings - arguably does not fit in with my 
own reading of Kant and, second, Ankersmit's argument taken in the whole seems 
to internally negate itself. However, discounting these two problems for a moment, 
there yet remains another more fundamental problem with Ankersmit's argument for 
(as mentioned in the preface to this Section), in Kant's theorisations experience is 
the unification of a sensible object with a concept of understanding. On this basis 
Ankersmit's idea of `pure experience', and his argument for it, can be seen to be 
meaningless since experience already embodies categories of understanding and 
therefore cannot be `pure' in the sense that he means. This unexamined conflation of 
60 Ibid. p281 
61 Ibid. p289 
62 Ibid. p289 
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experience with sensations as evidenced in the former of these two quotes is, as I 
have already stressed, a serious flaw in Ankersmit's theoretical position. 
However (rejoining the Rococo argument), Ankersmit next turned his attention to 
the "secrets" of ornament and decoration, initially with reference to a late 
seventeenth-century engraving by Jean Bdrain depicting an `elegant arrangement of 
grotesques'. This arrangement, to Ankersmit, exemplified Kantian free play and, 
furthermore, the engraving's three-dimensional central tempietto (motif) set within a 
two-dimensional ornamental depiction of the surrounding framework, suggested to 
Ankersmit that the engraving was in essence a representation of dimensional 
transition. For whereas normally a picture is detached from three-dimensional 
reality (its real surroundings) by a separate purpose made two-dimensional picture 
frame, in this particular case the ornamental frame was subsumed into the picture 
itself. Thus dimensional change became the subject of the picture, and Bbrain's 
engraving was accordingly deciphered by Ankersmit as a depiction of the transition 
between picture and ornamental frame. This unexpected line of argument was 
expanded as Ankersmit took-off on something of a journey through the world of 
rococo representational art, during which he particularly noted the merging of 
ornament with representational reality and the rococo artist's play with space and 
time which found its expression in the symmetry of the ornamental C-curve 
63 Seen 
altogether, the purpose of Ankersmit's argument, which I have only very briefly 
sketched here, was (on my reading of it) to show how rococo (or, rather, its 
expression of moods and feelings) moved from its early form as ornamental 
framework into the representation of reality itself - the picture - which its original 
purpose was to frame only (thus invading reality with ornament). The next stage of 
the development of ornament was to truly supersede itself by becoming 
(transforming itself into) part of reality itself. In this manner ornament, Ankersmit 
explained, `paradoxically disappeared at the very moment fit] became everything 
'u The C-curve is primary in rococo. It is suggestive of depth, movement and mobility and 
it can be said 
to represent the four dimensional world (time being the fourth dimension). It 
is, Ankersmit argues, an 
affirmative expression of the artistic confidence of the rococo period which has its parallel 
in the 
Enlightenment's confidence in Newtonian science. The C-curve curls up the infinite 
in itself - it reduces 
infinity into a form which can be surveyed in a single glance. (see Sublime Historical Experience. pp 
299- 
306) 
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.... it died in its highest state' 6a Now, this argument with all its ramifications 
constituted what Ankersmit called `the secret of the ornamental picture frame'. 65 
For Ankersmit then, as he explains himself in his Chapter Seven, rococo represents 
and expresses a world of moods and feelings which resonate deeply within himself, 
and it is in these moods and feelings that he finds that the past object and the present 
subject merge in pure experience without a subject of experience to experience it. 
Moods and feelings are, on this view, both subjectless and objectless and they 
precede the differentiation between self and the world (or subject and object). They 
are, for Ankersmit, embedded in an indivisible totality of experience where moods 
and feelings are expressions of both the self and of the world. Extending and 
stretching this argument, Ankersmit then claimed - in what is surely a non-sequitur 
- that `because of this moods and feelings have .a 
natural affinity with historical 
experience...... and one might well say that sublime historical experience preferably 
makes itself felt in these moods and feelings. ` 
This is the substance of Ankersmit's Rococo argument on my reading of it and, as 
such, it can be seen as an attempt by Ankersmit to raise rococo ornament to a new 
status; that of a form of expression (articulated through ornament) which shared an 
equivalence or correspondence with sublime historical experience. To me the 
argument is convoluted, complex, confusing and fragile at best. 
Nevertheless, the structure and content of the Pulcinella and the Rococo arguments - 
the two principal elements of Ankersmit's Chapter Seven, as noted above - may 
afford further insights into the nature of Ankersmit's position in relation to historical 
experience (of both kinds). But (referring back to this Chapter's opening paragraph), 
there is nothing at all in these arguments that might, as was hoped, help explain 
Ankersmit's particular preference for a negative and pessimistic style of historical 
64 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. p306 
6s Ibid. p297 
Ibid. p308 
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experience. However, an explanation might be found through further examination of 
Ankersmit's reference, again previously mentioned, to 
the complementary movements of the discovery (loss) and the recovery of the 
past (love) that constitute together the realm of historical 
experience.... [followed by his italicised statement that] The sublimity of 
historical experience originates from this paradoxical union of the feelings of 
loss and love, that is, of the combination ofpain and pleasure in how we relate 
to the past. 67 
This quotation might at first sight leave the impression(as it did for me) that the 
historical experience itself inhabits a space between loss/pain at one extreme and 
love/pleasure at the other, and that within this space one could then reasonably 
expect to find historical experiences of the non-negative pleasurable kind. But, in the 
italicised part of the quotation Ankersmit is actually associating the loss/love and 
pain/pleasure combinations with `how we relate to the past' and not with the 
experience of the past itself So-these combinations are, in a sense, to do with the 
state of mind that the historian brings to the experience (or needs to possess in order 
to have such an experience) rather than the mode in which that historical experience 
is registered. Thus it is `these most personal feelings.... [that] are absolutely 
indispensable for.... being open to the experience of the past'. ` Or, again, 
`... [historical experience] must be situated.. . on the 
surface, where subject and 
object meet, where they lightly touch each other in a most tactful gesture... . of the 
subtlest and most delicate love' 69 All of this is to do with the manner in which the 
historian makes contact and not about what comes through having made that 
contact. 
But even this does not properly answer the question of Ankersmit's pessimism, for 
there must have been many past events which could have intrinsically satisfied 
Ankersmit's conditions for the occurrence of sublime historical experience (an 
irreparable break with the past, the necessary rebuilding of identity, etc. ) that are not 
of a profoundly pessimistic kind. For instance (and in addition to the "happy 
peasants" of 1789), following the 13th Amendment of 1865 which abolished slavery 
in America, the community of recently freed slaves would have experienced a 
67 bid, p9 
'8 Ibid. p191 
69 Ibid. p152 
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radical break with their collective past which required the building of a new 
collective identity out of that break. It could well have been traumatic for some of 
them at the time, but it seems unlikely that the majority of ex-slaves would have 
wanted to reverse events and regain their pre-emancipation slave lives and slave 
identities. Surely one can presume that their change in status would generally have 
been seen by them themselves as a positive, perhaps even a romantic move towards, 
at the least, a better post-emancipation human condition. A similar argument, no 
doubt, could be applied to the beneficiaries of post-World War II decolonisation and 
countless other instances of advantageous (to the benefit of one group or another) 
breaks with the past. Why Ankersmit should have excluded, without explanation, 
these happier sorts of collective transitions between old and radically new modes of 
existence remains unclear to me. So perhaps all that can be said is that sublime 
historical experience is, after all, Ankersmit's concept and that, as I have already 
pointed out, he defined it in a particular way and worked his thesis around that 
definition. 70 And in so doing I think that he also demonstrated (whether he noticed it 
or not) that sublime historical experience is of an elitist kind. For it can by definition 
only come into being as a figure of loss'71 and that loss can only apply to the 
traumatic and irretrievable losses of the minority groups it favours - his vanquished 
elites72- or, as he elsewhere describes them, `the most responsible among [those 
constituting a civilisation] .... the 
Socrateses, so to speak'. 73 
Whatever the reasons for it, however, Ankersmit's pre-occupation with a deeply 
pessimistic notion of the sublime (a kind of dark obsession which excludes any other 
possible reading of it) certainly colours his ominous reading of the past and the 
mechanism which (he says) afford conscious awareness of it. Buried in his own 
terrifying historical sublime he has little at all to say about positive emancipatory 
possibilities for the future. For (arguably) we should never 
70 On reflection, Chapter Seven of Sublime Historical Experience could never, of course, have offered the 
explanation sought, for Ankersmit chose as his secondary title to it `The Past as Elegy' and seen as a 
nairatiw substance, which is exactly what it is, this colligating device would filter out all statements of 
the non-elegiac kind, the happy and positive kind, and admit only those of the elegiac or mournfully 
reflective and melancholic kind. 71 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. p128 
72 Ibid. p 142 73 Ibid. p367 
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.... fail to give up (as Derrida urged us never to give up) on that great 'fable' of 
emancipation .... and [we should] place the past where it categorically belongs - behind us.... the past isn't something we should nostalgically dwell in or on, but 
something we should get out of, not least by stressing the positive aspects of 
`sublime' experience .... 
74 
Moreover, although the arguments Ankersmit used in support of sublime historical 
experience can (as he himself accepted) be seen to reflect his own very personal 
"spin" on it, there seems little doubt that, nevertheless, he wished to carry his 
readers with him such that they could also, like him, believe in and benefit from 
those fleeting unmediated experiential moments through which the sublime would 
(Ankersmit supposed) reveal the past in all its authentic nakedness. I shall return to 
this `authentic nakedness' later in Section Four, however, one final observation to 
conclude this Section. Ankersmit presented his argument for the existence of 
sublime, historical experience in a writing style which was suggestive of its own 
collective acceptance. I am referring here to his ubiquitous use of the word `we'; an 
umbrella term under which Ankersmit included himself and all his readers who, 
figured in the form of a like-minded community, were assumed by Ankersmit to be 
picked up and swept along by the affirmative logic of his argument. My point is 
that Ankersmit, in effect, left no space for dissent in his text because it presupposed 
and manufactured its own singular, collectively understood thrust towards its one 
and only conclusion. 
Section Three: Presence: A New Paradigm. 
This critique of (sublime) historical experience cannot be complete without a brief 
contextualising account of its offspring, presence, and the related phenomenon of 
parallel processing, not least because Ankersmit himself, along with the 
psychologist and historian Eelco Runia, established a department at the University 
of Groningen (the `Centre for Metahistory') for the study of these phenomena. 
Accordingly, my short description of presence is articulated in relation to the output 
of what (as previously noted) I shall be referring to here as the "Groningen School". 
74 Jenkins, K. `Cohen cme a Ankersmit'. p311 
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It seems that the word presence was first coined in this connection at an 
International Conference at Groningen University, entitled `Presence: A viable 
alternative to representation? '. Its central theme, which (it is interesting to note) 
sought to diminish the representationalism expounded by Hayden White in his book 
Metahistory, was that such a notion had lost its vigour, rigour, and explanatory 
Power when faced with the more recent phenomena of memory, remembrance and 
trauma studies. Collectively, the development of these new studies (according to the 
Conference program notes) constituted the emergence of a new paradigm for which 
the Centre for Metahistory `boldly gave the name "Presence"'. ' 
A second International Conference at Groningen in 2007, entitled `Moved by the 
Past', again focused on (or, perhaps one could say, was again obsessed with) 
Hayden White, and chose as its point of departure an analysis of his expression 
`what is fictive in all putatively realistic representations of the world, and what is 
realistic in all manifestly fictive ones'. 76 Taking the second part of this quotation, 
what is realistic in the manifestly fictive, and misunderstanding White's purpose in 
writing it, the declared objective of the conference became the search for 
.... how reality can be said to be `present' in fictive representations of the 
world ... 
[and to] explore the way the past may engulf the here and 
now... [having been].... transported through time, as a kind of stowaway, in 
the .... novels, laws, histories, myths, traditions, monuments etc. we consider it 
our duty to make and transmit. " 
Furthermore, it was proposed that the conference would investigate how the 
transported past could be said to exert an influence on the present. 78 
In this context I now turn to Eelco Runia who, in his essay `Presence', refers to 
presence not as a manifestation of meaning79 but as a condition of "`being in touch" 
75 See the promotional literature for `Presence: A Viable Alternative to Representation', An International 
Conference held at Groningen university, 1" & 2°d December 2005 or (http: //www. rug. nl). 76 From the preface to a conference pamphlet distributed at a colloquium entitled 'Moved by the Past' 
ýningen University 27h & 28m September 2007) p6. Also available at (http: //www. rug. ni). 
Ibid. p17 
78 Altogether these objectives constituted a radical conceptual departure from the substance of White's 
original argument which, in point of fact, analysed the functional distinction between the sign, symbol 
and icon in language use and neither mentioned nor implied any passage of agencies, stowaways or 
anything else directly from the past into the present. (See White, H. Tropics of Discourse. p88). 
79 For Runia '.... all strategies of emplotment, including the strategy White calls metonymy, belong to the 
sphere of "Metaphor". They are metaphorical because they are in the business of 'transfer of meaning", 
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- either literally or figuratively - with people, things, events, and feelings that 
ma[k]e you into the person you are'. $0 In this sense for him presence is `the 
unrepresented way the past is present in the present', " and he further explains that 
this transfer from past to present is effected by the rhetorical figure of metonymy. 
Runia goes on to say that: 
[a] metonymy is a "presence in absence" not just in the sense that it presents 
something that isn't there, but also in the sense that in the absence (or radical 
inconspicuousness) that is there, the thing that isn't there is still present. The 
presence of the past thus does not reside primarily in the intended story or the 
manifest metaphorical content of the text, but in what story and text contain in 
spite of the intentions of the historian. One might say that historical reality 
travels with historiography not as a paying passenger but as a 
stowaway...... the wonder of the historical text is.... that it, despite its 
textuality, somehow, sometimes, does bring us into contact with historical 
reality .... [for) the past is present in the present.... 
[and moreover] historical 
reality is, so to speak, very able to get into contact with us, 112 
However, Ankersmit in his essay `Presence and Myth', explains that `Presence is a 
new word in theoretical reflections on the humanities' and that 
.... there are no dictionary meanings or authoritative 
discussions of "presence" 
that fix the significance of this word in a way that ought to be accepted by 
everybody using it. So we are in the welcome possession of great freedom to 
manoeuvre when using the term. In fact, the only feasible requirement for its 
use is that it should maximally contribute to our understanding of the 
humanities.... [and] I am convinced that this really is the kind of notion we 
now need more than anything else. For the lingualism of the philosophy of 
language 
.... his become a serious threat to the 
intellectual health of our 
discipline. The notion of "presence" may help us to enter a new phase in 
theoretical reflection about the humanities and to address a set of wholly new 
and fascinating questions. 
Notwithstanding this apparent confusion (which is particularly evident in 
Ankersmit's claim that a word of no fixed meaning or significance can, nonetheless, 
signify a notion which can be of use to the humanities), all these various accounts of 
whereas metonymy, by presenting an absence, is a "transfer of presence,.. (Runic, E., (2006). `Presence' 
in History and Theory 45 no. 1: p29). 
80 Runia. `Presence'. p5 
81 Ibid. p1 87 Ibid. p1 
83 Ankersmit, F. It, (2006). `Presence and Myth' in History and Theory 45 no. 3: p328 
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presence do, in fact, ' share a common characteristic. That is, they are all to do with 
immediate, untarnished, abrupt, intuitive and unmediated modes of access to the past 
- the past "plain". The pure essence of the back there suddenly flooding directly into 
the here and now in all its authenticity. Or, in short, the "stuff' of historical 
experience on which the concept of presence is manifestly based and then further 
developed (as I shall now show) into an agencjP, that of parallel processing. 
Runia's9' concept of parallel processing essentially rests on Freud's observation 
that an experience which is not adequately remembered may be repeated by a 
patient under (psycho)analysis in the form of an unconscious re-enactment of that 
experience. Runia then further observed, drawing also on the works of the American 
psychoanalyst Harold Searles, that inadequately remembered experiences (those that 
are not adequately historicised) may not only shape re-enactments through 
patient/psychoanalyst interaction but may also shape the interactions between 
psychoanalysts and their supervisors (as Runia calls them). Runia then takes this 
Freud/Searles combination of ideas into the field of historical theory and calls it 
parallel processing in order to distinguish it from Collingwood's theory of re- 
enactment. 87 It should be noted here that Runia's parallel process, as he described 
it, can only operate on the basis of both of these propositions; first, the idea that an 
inadequately remembered past experience can interact with and shape the mind of 
the subject of that experience and, second, that this kind of re-experiencing process 
can, in effect, be displaced such that it can perform its interactions in another 
location. Armed with this theoretical tool Runia found in his description of a 
particular event, the Srebrenica Massacre which took place during the Bosnian War 
of 1992/5, his postulated parallel process which he then championed as the (his) 
definitive proof of the existence of parrallel processing. 
84 Even in `Presence and Myth', for instance, Ankersmit goes on to illustrates his argument with an 
example of parallel processing which, as I will explain in a moment, relies on a form of unmediated 
contact with the past (see `Presence and Myth'. pp333-335), 
. 95 Because it is assumed to be able to exert an influence on the present. 
a; Although Ankersmit argues enthusiastically for parallel processing, it was Runia who first imported 
the idea into historical theory from the sphere of psychoanalytic research (see Runia, E., (2004). `Forget 
About It: Parallel Processing in the Srebrenica Report' in History and Theory 43 no. 3: p293-320 
r' The essential difference here being that Collingwood's theory refers to the consequences of intended 
(conscious) action in an artificially reconstructed environment whilst Runia's concept refers to an 
unconscious process in a putatively real environment - the presence of the past. 
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The event is explained (storied) by Runia as follows. In July 1995 a large number 
(latterly reported as 8373) of Bosnian Muslims, under the protection of a Dutch UN 
peace keeping force, were slaughtered by Bosnian Serb forces in and around 
Srebrenica. This event, the greatest European mass murder since World War II, 
reflected badly on the peace keeping operations of a nation which believed in its 
own decency and moral propriety. The Dutch government's slow and confused 
reaction to the event -a replication of its own military authority's reaction - was 
interpreted by Runia as a failure to adequately historicise (or remember) the 
catastrophe, this being the Freudian key to the theory of parallel processing. The 
matter was then turned over to the historians of the MOD (Netherlands Institute for 
War Documentation) who were asked to do what the Dutch military and Dutch 
politicians had failed to do - to account for (or historicise) the catastrophe. But, and 
this was Runia's point, the MOD merely replicated the previous actions of the 
Dutch authorities in that they wrote 7000 pages (2.45 million words) of literary 
obfuscation which - this being the point -failed to properly account for the tragedy. 
Runia (and Ankersmit) seized on this description of the sequence of events as both 
the definitive example of, and the proof of, the existence of parallel processing 
which was presumed to have been demonstrated through the MOD researchers' re- 
enactment of their principals' behaviour in a parallel process, as evidenced by their 
very lengthy, indecisive and obscure report on it. And, what according to Ankersmit 
that report unintentionally did, was to 
`.... try to perpetuate the myth of the Dutch people as a sensible, decent and 
fundamentally well intentioned nation... [for] myth manifests itself when 
historicisation has reached its limits and. then begins to leak into 
representation, and the continuum between nature and history emerges in 
which representation turns into a copying of the past.... [whence] the 
representation of action becomes the action of representation.... [and] precisely 
this transformation make us aware of the blind spot of the MOD report: its 
authors started to behave in the same way as their principals but without being 
aware of it, and of what makes them copy their principals. We had best 
characterise this blind spot as the report's myth: for we have to do with myth 
when the past determines our actions' 89 
ss Another of Runia's examples of the past determining actions in the present relied on the idea that 'In 
the cells and corridors of Abu Ghraib, Saddam Hussain's torture practices were so overwhelmingly 
Present, and the sheer possibility of using them - though horrifying - loomed so 
large, that sooner or later 
the Americans had to repeat them' (Runia, E., (2006). `Spots of Time' in History and Theory 45 no. 3: p- 
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Seen in relation to the description of presence at the beginning of this Section and 
this very complex90 developed version of it (or parallel process), presence can now 
be seen to operate at two distinctly different levels. That is to say that the past is 
presumed to momentarily flood into the present where, at the first level, it is simply 
registered as an individual's existential experience of it but, at the second level, the 
presence of the past (personified as `the stowaway') itself takes action and imposes 
its own autonomous designs on the present. Or, as Runia himself prefers to put it, 
.... we as subjects are overwhelmed by the presence of the past - as in 
sehnsucht and nostalgia, in Johan Huizinga's "historical sensation", in what 
Frank Ankersmit calls "sublime historical experience", and finally in the mind- 
boggling cases where our object controls and prefigures the histories we, 
historians, write. 91 
Now, for me, the essentially passive notion ofpresence and, by contrast, the active 
`mind-boggling' notion of parallel processing, consign these phenomena to different 
categories. Nevertheless, Runia's statement (immediately above) appears to tie 
together, for him and the "Groningen School" at least, the notions of presence and 
parallel processing. And furthermore, it relates them to sublime historical 
experience and historical sensation; the latter of which, as I have already argued, is 
the underlying founding concept upon which this whole branch of experience 
studies is based. Just for the moment this completes my excursion into the alluring 
sphere of presence. 
308). These and many related phenomena involving the intervention of the past in the present were the 
central concern of the previously noted conference `Moved by the Past' (which I attended). However, no 
one present thought to question its underlying presupposition that the present can be influenced in the 
above way; this central idea was simply taken, as a conference defining given. 
89 Ankersmit. `Presence and Myth'. pp334-335 
90 A simple explanation might be that the Dutch politicians and the NIOD historians, being profoundly 
disturbed when they became aware of the effective (through neglect) complicity of their own Dutch UN 
peace keeping battalion in the massacre of these Bosnian Muslims, tried to concealed or disguise matters 
as best they could through obfuscation in order to mitigate National embarrassment. That is what others 
nations might well have done in similar circumstances and such a response could be easily explained in 
terms of human nature or political expediency, so why should Ankersmit and Runia need to explain this 
affair through the mysticism and the arguable incredulity of a notion like parallel processing? 
91 Runia. `Spots of Time'. p7 
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Section Four: A Misl Title 
In this final Section of Chapter Four I am first going to very briefly gather together 
all the essential points that I have tried to make in the previous three Sections such 
that my critique of historical experience might be more effectively presented. I then 
question more closely Ankersmit's notion of de-contextualisation and the 
significance of his assumption that all considerations relating to language can be 
unproblematically ejected from his theorisations. Having dismissed Ankersmit's 
thesis on these and other grounds, I then hope to show that historical experience as 
construed by Ankersmit is not historical (nor for that matter, experiential) at all and, 
therefore, it could never have given Ankersmit the style of history he seemed to be 
after. Rather, if it can give or do anything at all (and I argue here that this is 
questionable) it does so only at an individual existential level and, therefore, it 
would have been more appropriate for Ankersmit to have located his phenomenon in 
the rapidly expanding field of memory studies - to which its timely appearance 
could also almost certainly betaken as indexical. 
So, first the general points in connection with the arguments raised in this Chapter. 
Ankersmit's undertaking in the writing of Sublime Historical Experience can now 
be seen as an attempt to develop an alternative theory of history capable of 
providing an unmediated and thus direct entry into a real, authentic experiential 
relationship to the past. In addition, his argument was to account for the nature and 
occasion of the emergence of a modern Western historical consciousness which he 
inextricably tied-in to his notion of sublime historical experience. And, furthermore, 
sublime historical experience itself was understood by Ankersmit to be a variant of 
historical experience which, as i have argued, rested not only on a problematic 
interpretation of Huizinga's thesis on historical sensation, but also on a series of pre- 
suppositions that were never properly investigated by Ankersmit. Now, with these 
general points made, a brief summary of the nature of sublime historical experience 
can follow. 
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For Ankersmit the French Revolution of 1789, which gave rise to `the most decisive 
and profound changes that western man has undergone', 92 is the paradigm case for 
his theory of sublime historical experience. The irreversible rupture with a previous 
way of life occasioned by the French Revolution and the necessary abandonment of 
its traditions, familiarity and so on - the shedding of a previous identity in order to 
enter into a radically new way of life with a new identity - was a painful experience. 
And this pain (the pain of profound loss and cultural despair) which lingered on after 
the event as a constant presence (seen by Ankersmit as a component of his 
`groanings of civilisations') is the essence of the "stuff ' that historians are presumed 
to connect with when experiencing the historical sublime - an experience which, 
Ankersmit insists, can only come into being out of the trauma of loss. Now, 
concurrently with this proposition Ankersmit's ran the closely related argument that 
in order to get a historical consciousness in the first place, a civilisation or culture 
has to go through a traumatic cultural experience of this sort. For it is only when a 
civilisation's or a culture's past has been ripped away from its present, causing that 
civilisation or culture to lose all "bearings" as it faces the uncertainty. of its 
collective future, that the process of historical change - the past breaking away from 
the present - becomes suddenly very apparent. Accordingly, for Ankersmit, it is 
precisely out of this sudden recognition of a previous identity which (because it has 
"broken away" and become irretrievably lost) has to be consciously shed in favour 
of a new identity, that the conditions for the acquisition of historical consciousness 
arises. 
Now, at this stage in his argument Ankersmit (it appears) assumed that he had 
identified a collective sublime experience, his `groanings of a civilisation' which, as 
he himself explained, had no subject of experience, no self. However, through the 
inventive introduction of the `hybrid creature' metaphor, Ankersmit endeavoured to 
name, give shape to and articulate this collective notion such that it could be linked 
to the individual being of the subject of historical experience. Ankersmit, in effect 
called on his readers to accept that this hybrid creature, adrift in the ether and bereft 
of self-awareness, possessed a facility which endowed it with the capacity to make 
92 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. p323 
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contact with (or intersect and enter in some way or other) a historian's central 
nervous system, thereby to register in that historian's mind (as a surrogate se#) the 
authentic, unmediated feelings and sensations transmitted by the experience in 
question. Such an argument, if one were to suppose that it could be seriously 
entertained, would provide Ankersmit with his required link between collective 
sublime historical experience and individual (existential) historical experience. But, 
even so, there are yet further problems because historical experience itself rests, as I 
have argued, on a flawed set of pre-suppositions which are (1) that the notions of 
sensation and experience are identical (2) that description can constitute explanation 
(3) that sublime historical experience can be unproblematically taken as a variant of 
historical experience and (4) that human reality (not actuality but reality) is prior to 
language (or does not presuppose it) and that, in consequence, the real and language 
can be treated as discrete entities. 
That completes my brief summary, but there is another assumption that should be 
revisited here, for it lies beneath and shapes Ankersmit's explanation of historical 
experience under the overarching rhetorical figure of his Romeo and Juliet 
metaphor. 93 I am referring to Ankersmit's conviction that the subject of historical 
" Ankersmit's Romeo and Juliet metaphor, as I have already explained, figures his argument in support 
of historical experience (as the original title to Ankersmit's book suggests - see page 164 above). This 
metaphor functioned for Ankersmit on the basis of what he called 'a double movement of do- 
contextualisation', in the sense that both Romeo and Juliet had to free themselves from the influences of 
their respective mutually belligerent families in order that they could eventually come together in the 
embrace, or kiss, which effected a transfer of true feelings and sensations. Projecting this idea onto his 
theory of historical experience, Ankersmit illustrated his conviction that both the historian and the past 
have to, in like manner, rupture their contextual ties in order to hurry together to the locus of contact 
where similar authentic exchanges would then take place. Now this metaphor of Ankersmit's has, I think, 
not been properly thought through, for Romeo's and Juliet's withdrawals from their respective families 
cannot be seen as acts of de-contextualisation at all. Rather, I would argue that they both added to, or 
modified, their contexts in the sense that their identities became more complex with the repudiation of 
their families. Accordingly, it is my argument that neither Romeo nor Juliet moved outside their 
respective contexts and that therefore Ankersmit's omnipresent metaphor fails to 'work its passage'. 
Furthermore, I should point out that Ankersmit's particular use of the Romeo and Juliet metaphor appears 
to conflict with his own contextual notion of self identity as he explained it in Narrative Logic. For (as I 
have already explained in Chapter One) he takes self identity to be a logical entity which refers to a 
narrrattve substance (per)formed on the self and which is comprised of statements which express all the 
experiences and perceptions of that self to date (which would, of course, in the fullness of time, include 
those. to come). On this (Ankersmit's own) understanding of the structure of self identity - that is, as an 
always on-going performative product of contextualisation - his introduction of the idea that one can 
somehow "shed" context/identity is absurd/unworkable. Thus, Ankersmit's underlying articulatory use of 
his Romeo and Juliet metaphor in the first six chapters of Sublime Historical Experience arguably 
represents yet another contradictory tension within the rhetorical style of his thesis. 
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experience, the historian, can indeed become de-contextualised, as required by 
Ankersmit's theory, and thus meet the necessary condition for the receipt of (de- 
contextualised) historical experiences. I will now more thoroughly explore this 
assumption on which, by his own definition, Ankersmit's theory of historical 
experience actually depends and therefore without which it basically collapses. For 
the oppositional point that needs to be made is that arguably we are, all of us, born 
into ongoing social formations which constitute a context, or a life-giving, life-long 
process of socialisation and enculturation, which 
.... performatively produces/reproduces personal/interpersonal identities, etc., 
relative to hegemonic (and hence contingent/unstable) `conditions'.... we just 
are, as Derrida has expressed it many times, `our inheritances' (know it or not, 
like it or not); we are `always in a text already' without any originary moment, 
without any chance of any metaphysical/ontological .... actual `full 
presence'.... 
On this understanding the Ankersmitean shedding of context/identity (literally the 
emptying out of the experiencing subject) reduces that subject to neutral blankness; 
an unformed pre-natal being without the wherewithal, the self identity, which is 
required by Ankersmit's theory in order to register the historical sublime or 
remember a previous identity or, for that matter, anything at all. It is interesting to 
note in this connection that the historical theorist Torbjäm G. Chorell, in his review 
article T. R Ankersmit and the Historical Sublime'95 (already referred to in `footnote 
19' above), produced an argument from a slightly different perspective which 
supports my sceptical position with regard to de-contextualisation. 
Chorell argued that the notion of de-contextualisation as construed by Ankersmit 
was internally incoherent, in that Ankersmit claimed that historical experience 
referred to an experience 
.... in which the history of the experiencing subject (and the memory thereof) has 
no role to play-it is an experience without a subject. The subject has to divest 
itself from its own history which ordinarily contextualizes and historicizes his or 
" Jenkins, K., `Referee's Report' concerning the publication of Runia, E., `Inventing the New from the 
Old: From White's `Tropics' to Vico's `Topics" (Both to be published, along with Runia's reply to the 
Jenkins report, in a forthcoming edition of RethrmtingHistory in 2010). Thanks to Keith Jenkins for early 
sight of these papers. 
9 Chorell. `F. R. Ankersmit and the Historical Sublime'. pp9l-102 
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her experience - and in this way there is no preceding subject of experience. The 
subject ofexperience comes into being only with and thanks to the experience in 
question. It is only thanks to this emptying of the subject of any prior structure, 
content, memory, and so on that we can move on from dialectical Erfahrung 
(and thus from Gadamer and Adorno) to the sublimity of historical 
experience. % 
Yet, this explicit understanding of the de-contextualisation process seems to defeat 
itself, for the subject of experience, stripped of any prior structure, content, memory, 
etc., lacks the cognitive framework within which anything at all could be 
recognised. So how, one might ask, could that subject, whilst suspended in a de- 
contextualised "nothingness" state of being, somehow recognise a previous self 
irretrievable broken away from the present? As Chorell pointed out, what the subject 
of experience must, actually, be recognising is 
.... the change that experience 
has brought about, not that they met a lost part 
of themselves in the moment of experience.... [and, furthermore, he asks] in 
what way does this differ from the dialectical experience that Ricoeur and 
Gadamer and others speak about, where the experience changes and influences 
the subject? 9' 
Moreover - and crucially - since Ankersmit had claimed that it was through the 
phenomenon of historical experience that we can recognise a lost part of ourselves, 
surely the new identity formed out of that experience cannot be seen as a complete 
break with that previous identity.. For we must be retaining some sort of memory of 
what has been in order to be aware of what we have lost and what is new; therefore 
we cannot have de-contextualised ourselves after all. Rather, this whole process 
must logically entail some form of continuity with the former self and, accordingly, 
Chorell has suggested that `the loss [that] we think we have had has.... been 
dialectically incorporated into the new memory'. " Chorell's critical evaluation of 
Ankersmit's position compliments my own critique of de-contextualisation and also 
accords with Ankersmit's earlier and much better characterisation of identity as a 
narrative substance written or inscribed on the self (as discussed in Chapter One, 
pages 29 and 30) and which he now seems to have forgotten. 
% Ankersmit, F. R., (2005). Sublime Historical xperience. California: Stanford University Press. p146 
97 Chorell. T. R. Ankersmit and the Historical Sublime'. P98 
'8 Ibid. p99 
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I would now like to tie this observation into another important matter, namely the 
performative function of language which constitutes the human reality (built out of 
`our inheritances') in which we are all immersed. I will be, in part, drawing for this 
purpose on an argument laid out by Martin Davis in the last Section of Variation 
Four (`History as Symbolic Re-enactment') of his recent publication Historics. 
Davies argues here that within our (human) historicised world there is nothing which 
cannot become or has not already become a historical symbol - the past is all around 
us in our "historic" environment which is `a collective memory containing stories 
written in. stone, brick, wood, glass, steel; stories inscribed in field patterns, 
hedgerows, designed landscapes and so on .... 
'. 9 Accordingly, the past which no 
longer exists can only (putatively) make itself known through some kind of existing 
historical text within the historicised semiotic system. There is, therefore, no extra- 
textual referent for the historical text, no knowable objective reality, nothing beyond 
the semiotic-system which describes it. 
Thus humans, as symbol using language animals, consciously operate reflexively 
through systems of representations - sign-systems (notations) of human making - 
without which human objective reality would be unthinkable and thus unknowable. 
This world of words creates the world of things or, to restate again one of my 
previous Hayden White quotes, `.... tropics [meaning tropological language use] is 
the process by which all. discourse constitutes the objects which it pretends only to 
describe realistically and analyse objectively'. 
Returning to Historics, Davies, drawing support from George Steiner, 100 is in 
agreement with the latter's notion that; 
[tihe past is thinkable and knowable only through the current semiotic or 
symbolic system. `Our sense of the past, not as immediately, innately acquired 
" Davies, M. L., (2006). Histories. Why History Dominates Contemporary Society. Abingdon: 
Routledge. p233 
100 Steiner, G., (1975). &lraterritoriai. " Papers on Literature and the Language Revolution, 
Harmondsworth: Peregrine Books. (Davies quotes from p70). 
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reflexes, but as a shaped selection of remembrance, is... . radically linguistic. History, in the human sense, is a language-net cast backwards.... ' 101 
Davis's argument, then, is articulated around the understanding that we humans live 
in a rhetorical world of human making which is constituted in the language we use 
to describe it. Any thing that lies outside our capacity for its linguistic description 
could not be linguistically related to other things and thus could not (as we have 
seen Richard Rorty argue) be talked of or thought of. For, to step outside a language 
of description is to step into an ineffable void. A void which, in a converse sense, 
finds itself in serious want of a language of description (and any familiarising 
language would do, providing that it has sufficient utility value to allow us humans 
to get around in it). There is, then, no escape from language, and (incidentally) I 
therefore cannot agree with one aspect of Michael Roth's argument in his recent 
review bf Sublime Historical Experience in which he maintained that, following the 
`demise' of the linguistic turn, 
... the massive tide of language... . 
has receded... [and] we are now able to look 
across the sand to see what might be worth salvaging before the next wave of 
theory .... begins to pound the shore. As 
language recedes .... etc%tc. 
102 
For here the point is that arguably the medium of language does not, nor cannot, 
itself recede it is not, in Roth's sense, 'tidal': language cannot succumb (to use his 
metaphor) to the moon's gravity and thereby leave us beached outside its reach in an 
ineffable void. As symbol using language animals we are always continuously and 
totally submerged in language - like it or not, that is how it is. 
Now, I have argued these two connected points (the inextricably context bound 
condition of human existence and the language dependant nature of that context) in 
order to demonstrate the questionable nature of the idea that these arguments can be 
ignored or that they can, without explanation, be assumed to have been 
circumvented. There is nothing in Ankersmit's writings that indicates to me that he 
has grasped the implications that these considerations have for his thesis on 
historical experience, and certainly nothing that effectively negates these two 
10' Davies. Hisiorics. p235 102 Roth, M. S., (2007). `Ebb Tide'in History and Theory 46 no. 1: p66 
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arguments such that his move beyond them might be seen to be adequately justified. 
Nevertheless, Ankersmit does move on, apparently secure in the knowledge that de- 
contextualisation holds no problems for him, and it appears that the "Groningen 
School" itself reflects this position. 103 However, the last and essential point that I 
wish to stress here is that Ankersmit's assumption (in the furtherance of his thesis), 
that one can unproblematically "step out" of both context and language, is not 
supported anywhere in his writings by any form of argument whatsoever. But, as I 
have shown, there is a coherent and powerful counter-argument to Ankersmit's 
position which (in my view) fatally undermines his overall thesis and which he 
continues to ignore, even though it can be seen to be leaking into and destabilising 
his and the "Groningen School's" position on the matter. 
4 So, to make it quite clear, my argument is that these two interconnected" 
propositions which, it can be convincingly argued, undermine the validity of 
Ankersmit's case for the existence of the phenomenon of sublime historical 
experience, were either unnoticed, ignored or dismissed by him whilst arguing his 
thesis. This oversight of Ankersmit's is compounded when taking into consideration 
a further two matters as follows: 
103 For instance, responding to Jenkins' `Referee's Report' on his essay submitted for publication in 
Rethinking History (referred to above, footnote 94), Runia very positively confirmed that 'yes, I am 
saying that we are not `always in a text already', yes, I do maintain that there are `originary moments', 
yes, I do believe that things may start ex nihilo, yes, etc.... ' This constitutes a clear statement of position 
which, effectively, emanates from the "Groningen School", yet it is not entirely coherent for in Runia's 
essay he makes many references to his central subject presence as context bound. For instance our 
culture is made up of `presences'.... institutions not only determine the way we live but also constitute 
the sphere in which we communicate about the way we live.... presence succeeds in getting 'on board' 
unnoticed in as far as texts tap living culture .... and 
(in Runia. 'Spots of Time'. p315) presence.. 
.... coincides with our culture. In a sense 
it is our culture. ' On my reading of these two texts, and despite 
Runia's protestation to the contrary, it appears tome that he locates presence (and thus historical 
experience) precisely in that same cultural context discussed a few pages back, the context of our 
inheritances. This apparent contradiction of his own argument undermines Runia's theoretical position 
and by inference undermines the collective position of the "Groningen School". 
104 Ankersmit's presupposition that the human "real" precedes and is thus disconnected from its language 
of description, such that language and reality can each be taken as discrete entities (argued at the 
beginning of this section), can be taken as implicit to and thus included in the second of these 
interconnected arguments. 
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(1) Ankersmit's whole argument and its derivatives (presence, parallel 
processing and other products of the "Groningen School"), '°5 rest on 
Huizinga's theory of historical sensation. Moreover, when Ankersmit took 
Huizinga's description of historical sensation and adopted it as the basis for 
his own phenomenon of historical experience, he apparently failed to notice 
the categorical distinction between these two terms. For a descriptive 
example of what I mean, let's say that walking down the high street I 
suddenly receive a sharp blow between the shoulder blades. At the instant of 
the occurrence my awareness is one of sensation and only that (shock, pain, 
fear for instance). However, a moment later, having turned and observed the 
piece of masonry fallen from above or my assailant still grasping a club (or 
whatever), I can then fit my received sensation of being struck into the 
human "real" - that is, into the context in which I function - and thereby 
transform my sensation, through categories of understanding (as Kant 
explained), into an experience. Now, categories of understanding are context 
bound and context, our human context, is (as I have already argued in various 
places) constituted in its linguistic (symbolic) description. On this view it 
follows that experience already and always embodies a language dimension 
within it which, ironically, is precisely what Ankersmit wanted to circumvent 
(and he believed that he had done so) through his use of the notion of 
experience. To sum-up on this point, it seems to me that Ankersmit's shift in 
descriptive terminology from historical sensation to what (for the avoidance 
of terminological confusion) he called the more neutral term, historical 
experience, effected a fundamental disjunction from, and therefore broke all 
ties with, Huizinga's phenomenon. Yet, Ankersmit continued to use 
Huizinga's now "disconnected"-thesis as a kind of validating authority and 
exemplar (even explanation) for his own thesis. Moreover, Ankersmit failed 
to see that having made this questionable shift, he was, in effect, also moving 
back into the medium of language - the place he wanted to avoid. 
ios For instance, Rick Peters on `Fascism as a Presence Based Culture', Michael Bently and his notion of 
`chronism' - bringing presence (authenticity) back into historical studies and Hans U. Gumbrecht on the 
"transportation" of presence through language. These and other presence related essays can be found in 
(2006). History and Theory 45 no. 3 (a themed edition). 
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(2) My second point is in connection with Ankersmit's apparent assumption that, 
once described, a phenomenon is somehow explained and "up and running". 
For example, Ankersmit's `hybrid creature' metaphor with which he linked 
the collective (sublime) and individual forms of historical experience, is a 
description presented as an explanation. Here Ankersmit presumes to be 
actually explaining how a historian can genuinely and authentically re- 
experience something predating his/her birth date - something he/she never 
witnessed - that is to say, something which resides outside the identity of its 
subject of experience. Now, Ankersmit's hybrid curiosity has already 
featured twice in my thesis and there is no need to run through its mode of 
operation again, but there are several observations that I would like to add to 
it. For instance, this metaphorical device of Ankersmit's is buried in his 
Chapter Five on Gadamer (page 196, right in the middle of the book), and is 
not in plain view in Chapter Eight where it belongs. For it is, after all, 
absolutely fundamental to the supposed functioning of the operating 
mechanism of Chapter Eight's subject matter, sublime historical experience. 
Indeed, Ankersmit's curious idea could easily be and indeed has been 
missed, ` for nowhere else in his book does he again refer directly to this 
transference apparatus which purports to render a wandering, ethereal, 
experiential collectivity at an existential, individual level '07 - it is simply 
taken for granted that this can happen. So how might this "disappearance" 
have come about? Well, perhaps there is something else of significance going 
on in Ankersmit's text, for having completed his hybrid creature argument he 
effectively displaced both it and its explanatory mechanism by renaming it 
and thereby masking (in a way) its imaginative descriptive origin. That is, he 
told his readers to take the hybrid creature not metaphorically but for what it 
really/actually was, the groanings of a civilisation', and, accordingly, the 
creature vanished from Ankersmit's text at this point whilst the replacement 
`groanings' (just another metaphor) got four mentions in ten lines to 
106 And it is missed to the extent that (to my knowledge) none of Ankersmit's commentators/reviewets 
have ever mentioned it. 
107 Hence, this is the only link between what appears to be two books rolled up into one. 
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reinforce its new status. No doubt the `groanings of a civilisation', as a 
metaphor, better fits (or finds its natural home) in memory/experience 
discourse and, following the demise of the hybrid creature, it readily 
superseded108 its predecessor and hence (this being the point of my 
observation) it effectively obscured its origins. However, the main point that 
I want to make is that behind what is intended to be a familiarising metaphor 
lies a bizarre old metaphor, and beneath that lies an astonishing description 
of a phenomenon. A description which Ankersmit must have taken as some 
sort of explanation109 for that phenomenon because his subsequent argument 
is unquestionably based on the assumption that such experiential clusters of 
past moods and feelings really do exist and do exactly what he says that they 
do. 110 
To recap for a moment. Over the previous few pages I have laid out four arguments 
in opposition to Ankersmit's four positions regarding, respectively, (1) the notion of 
de-contextualisation (my point being that one cannot step out of context), (2) the 
language dependant nature of that context, (3) the conflation of experiences with 
sensations and (4) the very idea of the hybrid creature which provides the connective 
link between collective (sublime) and individual experience. 
Now, items (2) and (3), as I have already intimated (in the opening comments to this 
chapter and the beginning of its Section One), can be taken as unexamined 
presupposition imported by Ankersmit into his argument as articulated in Sublime 
Historical Experience, whereas items (1) and (4) are worked-up within that 
argument itself. And I think that one could further argue that Sublime Historical 
Experience - internally at the level of its own text and ignoring all philosophical 
presuppositions brought to it - could be reduced to items (1) and (4) as its two 
108 Albeit with the word gracam'ngs, on some occasions, becoming moods, feelings or experiences. 
109 An explanation, both necessary and sufficient, cannot be generated within a description. However, 
there is a distinction between a description that only attempts to be a description and an attempt at an 
explanation of what is being described. I do not think that Ankersmit makes that explanatory attempt. 
11 I could equally have used for my example here Ankersmit's four point description of historical 
experience which, as evidenced in his following arguments, was taken by him to constitute a satisfactory 
explanation of it. 
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essential, central issues (i. e. his claims regarding first de-contextualisat ion and, 
second, the conflation of collective sublime historical experience and individual 
historical experience) for, in a manner of speaking, these are the sequenced enabling 
strategies which, were they to be accepted, would make his argument work. I have 
used the word sequenced in the sense that de-contextualisation, as expressed through 
Ankersmit's omnipresent Romeo and Juliet metaphor, is the necessary enabling 
device for historical experience itself and its variant as Ankersmit put it (although 
seen in my argument as of a different kind), sublime historical experience. Then, 
having argued this much, Ankersmit's subsequent conflation of these two different 
terms under the validating authority of the hybrid creature rendered collective 
(sublime) experience at an individual experiential level and got him, he thought, 
precisely the all embracing direct experience theory that he wanted. This appears to 
be the underlying thematic "story" of Sublime Historical Experience, a story which 
Ankersmit tried to hold together with his imported, unworkable philosophies. 
However, to continue, it seems to me to be the case that any one of the points/ 
arguments mentioned above poses, at the very least, a serious threat to the validity of 
Ankersmit's argument for sublime . 
historical experience. But, I am convinced that all 
four together demolish it and, accordingly, from my point-of-view the concept of 
sublime historical experience is now effectively dead. For this reason the completion 
of this Section (and Chapter) will have the appearance of a post-mortem on sublime 
historical experience which will initially focus on Ankersmit's choice of title for his 
book. Accordingly, I first of all want to consider Ankersmit's use (in his title) of the 
word `Historical' which, and one must assume its purposeful use here, describes a 
phenomenon of a historical kind. So, what is it about sublime historical experience 
that is historical? . 
Well, I think that historical means pertaining to histories or stories about the past 
(`the-past-as-history'"' being the only form in which the past can be thought of and 
11 In various places Alun Munslow has stressed the point that we can only "know" the past through 
various constructed historical accounts of it - or as 'the-past-as-history' which 
he suggests could usefully 
replace the word 'history' to remind us that '.... the past exists now only as a form of created (written, 
physically built, filmed or whatever) phenomenon' (Munslow. Narrative and History p8). 
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debated in the here and now) and there is no history, as far as I can see, which does 
not have all of those characteristics which Hayden White attributed to it in his book 
Metahistory, my reading of which can be briefly summarised as follows. For White 
the past is sublime, it can never be known in itself and for itself, but it leaves traces 
and when seen in a certain light (from a particular point-of-view) a preferred 
selection of these traces can become both the sources for, and the evidence in 
relation to, the case to be supported from that point-of-view. This data, written-up in 
culturally meaningful story forms within the formalist literary structure identified by 
White 112 (its architecture being that of emplotment, argument and ideological 
positioning coherently integrated within tropological modes of meaning making) 
constitutes a history. In this sense history can be seen as the performative product of 
an on-going point-of-view which both launches the process of its own production 
and carries that process to its conclusion in the form of a narrative representation of, 
or proposition about, the past - and nothing more. Moreover, these components and 
processes are, in effect, White's conditions of possibility for any sort of history at 
all, be it of an empiricist, feminist, Marxist, reflexive postmodern (or whatever) 
style: (no White - no history ... one might say). But, and this 
is my point, sublime 
historical experience does not have any of these characteristics in it, indeed it 
specifically rejects them all. And Ankersmit himself confirmed this point when he 
stated that Sublime Historical Experience is not about `historical explanation, 
causality, narrative or representation'. "' So, whatever it is about, one can very 
reasonably presume that it has nothing to do with history and it is therefore not 
historical. 
112 However, one should note that as a formal structure within which multiplicities of conceptual and 
explanatory choices exist, it clearly does not nor cannot determine the style or content of histories 
organised within its structure (it is not a form of linguistic determinism). It is a structure without a 
substance of its own but within which the substance ot; for example, Nazism, Marxism, Imperialism (or 
whatever) can be imported and articulated - it is, in short, an empty yet necessary mechanism 
(a 
necessary condition) for the production of all stories including histories. White then, on my reading of 
him, is not saying that these component formalist elements determine what is to be said but he is saying 
that nothing can be said without them, that they are the narrative's enabling devices. Accordingly, White 
is describing/explaining a metaphysical concept/structure of a literary fictive kind within which all 
(hi)stories are necessarily told. Moreover, the fictive element in historical writing is irreducible, that is to 
say that one cannot get rid of it precisely because it is the structure within which traces of the past are 
worked-up into the coherent texts we call histories. 
13 Ankersmit. Sublime histwrcalErperienee. p14 
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Next the word `Experience' which is equally inappropriately used in Ankersmit's 
title. For, as I have been arguing throughout this chapter, his book is not about 
experience. Rather, it is about sensations which do not in themselves constitute 
experiences per se but do, as I have previously argued, refer back to Huizinga's 
account of historical sensations upon which Ankersmit (without, as far as I can 
determine, noticing his conflation of categories) constructed his theoretical argument 
for historical experience. 
And finally, as I have argued in Chapter Three, when Ankersmit talks of the sublime 
he has in mind a quasi-Romantic notion of it. For the aim of Romanticism was to 
somehow appropriate and subsume. a `sense sublime' 14 into itself and Ankersmit 
talks of his sublime in rather the same way. That is, as something imaginable 
with a theoretically discoverable shape and discoverable boundaries to the extent 
that its apparent indeterminacy might even be solved mathematically. "' By 
'14 'A presence that disturbs me with the / Of elevated thoughts; joy a sense sublime', Wordsworth, W., 
(1798). 'Lines Written a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey' in Lyrical Ballads, London: J. & A. Arch. 
15 This, another of Ankersmit's complex and convoluted arguments, involves the sublime, mathematics 
and Burckhardt's synchronic approach to the past (his attempt to liberate past events from their 
historiographical ties to the events - the context - which surrounds them). These synchronic cross 
sections (Querschnitte) of the past are each presumed to constitute an instantaneous de-contextualised 
image of the past. Burckhardt's past is thus denuded of its protective shell of narrative and revealed not as 
a set of dramas unfolding with time but as a set of isolated pictorial compositions - works of art - and the 
past, encountered thus, retains the character of a work of an. That is to say that the. apprehension of any 
moment in the past (a snapshot), on this view, can be likened to an encounter with a work of art - an 
experience - where all that truly matters happens precisely on the trajectory between the work of art and 
the observing subject and nowhere else. Such isolated snapshots of the past deny the narrative 
organisation of any before or after and thus deny the discovery of any mediating temporal order in the 
past which would, were it to be established, devalue the notion of direct experience as referred to here. 
Ankersmit then argues that this `doing away with narrative', which is central to Burckhardt's thesis, is in 
a sense initially parasitic because the act of doing away with narrative' presupposes the existence of 
narrative in the first place. Or, to rephrase, Burckhardt's argument operates on the basis of the prior 
existence of narrative which it then strives to dismiss - his argument thus feeds on narrativist historism. 
Ankersmit accordingly concludes that this act of de-historieising (de-eontextualising) can only take place 
if everything is first historicised (contextualised). In this manner he finds a link between his so called 'de- 
contextualised historical experience' and the 'contextualised narrative'; that is to say that the former both 
presupposes and depends on the latter. Consequently, what is to be learned from Burckhardt, Ankersmit 
explains, is that professionalised (historist) historical writing should not be sacrificed in favour of 
historical experience because, although narrative and experience are incommensurable, 'historical 
experience makes sense only and exclusively against the background of professionalised historical 
writing .... [for] before and without professionalised historical writing, 
historical experience 
is... 
. meaningl ess' (Sublime Historical Experience, p. 173). 
Accordingly, Ankersmit proposed that 
historians should recognise the creative interaction of the interdependence, yet incommensurability, of 
'historical experience' and of'professionalised historical writing'. However, says Ankersmit, there are no 
rules for fixing the juste milieu (his words) between the two of them. Moreover, if there werefxing rules 
then these two elements would no longer be incommensurable. And this is where the argument drifts into 
differential calculus for Ankersmit argues that.... 
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contrast the post-modern sublime is an ineffable sublime which resists all 
attempts at its appropriation precisely because it is unfathomable, un- 
ontologizable and therefore beyond grasp. To somehow penetrate the ineffable 
(a logical contradiction) and apprehend its sublimity (place it under description) 
would be to negate its sublimity, yet this is effectively what Ankersmit seems to 
be doing when he engages with this post-modern sublime (of White, Derrida, 
Rorty et al) from the standpoint of a dated Romantic sublime. Moreover, 
Ankersmit's understanding of the notion of the sublime is, as Ewa Domal ska 
has also pointed out (in a recent paper in which she focused on the concept of 
Sublime Historical Experience), inadequate to the needs of his argument, and 
she suggested that it would have been useful to her to have had from Ankersmit 
... 
it follows that ifwe accept the category ofthe sublime as a meaningful category, a creative interaction of 
narrative and experience must exist, although we will never be able to figure out a priori where to find 
it. It is the kind of thing that we just hit upon - and more cannot be said about it. We can only 
just 
observe or establish that some t piimum or creative interaction has been achieved in the relationship 
between narrative and experie ces without our being able to deduce this. observation from the application 
of some set of ruffs for how to negotiate between the two (Sublime Historical Experience, p. 175). 
Ankersmit then likens this indeterminacy with that of the differential equation in mathematics (an equation 
which contains both an unknown function and its derivatives) wherein optimum values of the fimction, prior 
to Newton's/L. eibniz's differential calculus, could only be established by trial and error commencing with an 
initial intuitive (logically inexplicable) guess or, in Ankersinit's words, `something we just hit upon'. Thus, 
Ankersmit continues, 
.... differential calculus can be said to perform what, analogously, could not possibly 
be performed 
for the relationship between narrative and experience. So one might say that historical writing is 
in much the same situation as mathematics was before the discovery of differential calculus by 
Newton and Leibniz. Before this discovery there was something "sublime" about the question of 
where the equation f(x) - %x$+ 54x2-12. x would attain its local optimum and minimum: One 
could only hit on it experimentally (that is, by simply trying out different values for x), but no 
adequate explanation could be given for this. It has been Newton's and Leibniz's feat of genius to 
reduce what was "sublime" to what could be figured out, or to reduce what was 
incommensurable to what could be made commensurable thanks to the magic of differential 
calculus, whereas this is not (yet) possible in the domain of historical writing. I would like to 
add here that Leibniz's theory of the substance (which is in many respects the ontological 
counterpart of his mathematics) may also show us what such a "differential calculus" for the 
humanities would probably have to look like and how we could thus eliminate sublimity from the 
humanities - although this will remain in all likelihood a merely theoretical rather than actual 
possibility (Sublime Historical Experience, p. 175-6). 
This claim of Ankersmit's - that the sublime can, in theory, 
be eliminated from the humanities - appears 
to me to be based on the belief that it is theoretically possible to transcend the sublime, appropriate it and 
then reduce it to the equivalence of a component of a mathematical equation. I have followed this 
argument through in detail because within it one can, in fact, discern the origins of three of Ankersmit's 
underlying ideas. First the notion of de-contextualisation in general and, in particular, the 'doing away 
with narrative'. Then the notion of linkage between 'de-contextualised historical experience' and the 
'contextualised narrative'. And finally (supporting the current argument) an extension of Ankersmit's 
concept of the sublime which, for him, also includes the possibility of its theoretical reduction through a 
proposed "'differential calculus" for the humanities'. 
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some explanation of his `.... theory of the sublime, the instruments for its 
analysis, and understanding of its aesthetics. "6 Thus, also for Domabska, 
nowhere in his argument does Ankersmit clearly state his own position on the 
status of the sublime -- a position which, were it to be revealed, would (I 
believe) locate him outside current philosophical discourse on the matter. 
Accordingly, taking each of these three arguments in order, it would appear that 
one can immediately and reasonably strike the word `Historical' from the book's 
title because the book has nothing to do with history. Along with it goes the 
word `Experience', because the book is about sensations and not about 
experiences and, furthermore, the word `Sublime' can also be struck out 
because, as Domaliska argued (and I agree), Ankersmit's particular 
understanding and use of this word is inadequate to his argument. This apposite 
exercise, of course, leaves the book without a title. However, turning to the very 
last page of Sublime Historical Experience, one can see that the book is part of a 
series of books published under the collective title Cultural Memory in the 
Present. And this is very interesting, for (on my reading of it) this is precisely 
the subject of Ankersmit's book. What he is talking about in Sublime Historical 
Experience, but he scarcely seems to notice it, is the subject of enculturation. 
The transmission of cultural identity (or human context) from the past into the 
present in the form of a kind of latent memory; memory which is already and 
always in the present as embedded in our laws, our institutions, our religions, 
practices, norms, every-day `isms' and so on, which are collectively referred to 
by Derrida as `our inheritances' or, by Davies, as the `collective memory of our 
already historicised world'. On this understanding, Ankersmit's excursions into 
the sublime can be re-situated where they really belong: in the field of sociology 
and memory studies from whence they appear to have escaped in the guise of the 
historical. Ankersmit's writings on sublime historical experience can, on this 
view, be explained in terms of the ancient sociological concept of habitus, more 
116 Domaäska, E., (2009). `Frank Ankersmit: From Narrative to Experience' in Rethinking History 13 no. 
2: p187 
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recently re-elaborated by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu who argues that 
what is taken-for-granted in the world flows from 
." . practical sense.... instilled by the childhood learning that treats the body as 
a living memory pad [a receptacle for enculturation], an automaton that `leads 
the mind unconsciously along with it'.... [in a] form of blind or symbolic 
thought 
.... 
[a] social necessity turned into nature, converted into motor 
schemes and body automatisms... [thus] agents never know completely what 
they are doing [but] what they do has more sense than they know.... [and] 
every social order systematically takes advantage of the disposition of the body and language to function as depositories of deferred thoughts that can be 
triggered off at a distance in space and time by the simple effect of replacing 
the body in an overall posture which recalls the associated thoughts and 
feelings, in one of the inductive states of the body which, as actors know, give 
rise to states of mind. ' 17 
This line of argument can be applied equally successfully to the phenomenon of 
presence which, in the light of the foregoing explanation, can also plausibly be seen 
as the natural, explicable consequence of enculturation and hence need not be 
explained in terms of myth, stowaways, de-contextualisation, pre-lingual states of 
mind or anything else. Moreover, there is a rich, compelling and brilliantly argued 
contemporary source of literature to support this general view on the nature and 
effect of enculturation, yet it lies "untapped" by Ankersmit (and also by Runia/ 
Ankersmit in relation to presence) and which, were it to have been explicitly taken 
into account in their experiencelpresence discourse, could have enhanced the 
standing of the "Groningen school" and the literature produced by it. But Ankersmit 
does not appear to have attached any value to these explanatory politico-sociological 
sources (included in the works of, for instance, Badiou, Deleuze, Derrida, Lyotard et 
al) for, despite this vibrant and significant body of analysis, he preferred to find his 
definitive references in Huizinga, Burckhardt, Schiller, Goethe etc. Ewa Domal ska 
has more to add to this critique, for in her essay for Rethinking History (mentioned a 
moment ago) she notes that 
.... in his discussion of historical experience Ankersmit not only 
ignores those 
trends in historiography which emerged in the 1990s, when he was formulating 
his theory of experience, but also fails to acknowledge those works which first 
drew historians' attention to the category of experience, such as `history from 
below' with E. P. Thompson's classic The making of the English working class 
Bourdieu, P., (1990). The Logic ofPractice. Chicago: Stanford University Press, pp68-69 
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and the journal History Workshop, focusing on the experience of real life. 
Further, Ankersmit does not acknowledge the long tradition of women's history, which concentrates on the everyday experience of women, or the history of gender. In Sublime Historical Experience he never mentions Joan 
W. Scott's classic and influential 1991 article `The evidence of 
experience'.... [in which] she expresses an ambivalent attitude towards 
experience .... [and] cautions against the notion of experience because it can 
essentialize both the experiencing subject and experience itself [whilst] Frank 
Ankersmit addresses experience within the aesthetic framework of the sublime 
[and thus] his view of experience is radically opposed to that of Scott. 
Adopting the concept of the sublime based on the classic theories of Burke and 
Kant, Ankersmit seems to invite the kind of criticism that is generally aimed at 
the project of modernity... .a 
discussion of the historical sublime should take 
into account the critical views of it.... 118 
And these critical views, to follow Domaliska's developing argument, further 
undermine the integrity of Ankersmit's Burke/Kantian sublime because they oppose 
a sublime of this sort which is founded on a gender-specific tradition. Or, to restate, 
the sublime described by the classics is - as Domalska stresses - associated with a 
masculine perception of the world whereas the beautiful is associated with a 
feminine one, and this division of the world into the masculine sublime and the 
feminine beautiful (which is implicit in Ankersmit's Burke/Kantian sublime) has 
become, in the work of Scott et al, the focus of feminist criticism. "9 It is curious to 
1'a Domafiska. 'Frank Ankersmit: From Narrative to Experience'. pp186-187 
J19 Domafiska is the fourth (of the very small number that my research has revealed ) critic of Ankersmit's 
Sublime Historical Experience mentioned so far in this thesis, the former three being Jenkins ('Cohen 
contra Ankersmit'), Chorell ('F. R. Ankersmit and the Historical Sublime') and Roth ('Ebb Tide', a 
distinctly negative review, but a review which arguably failed to grasp the underlying substance/style of 
Ankersmit's argument). Another however (a fifth), is that of the historian John H. Zammito (Zammito, J. 
H., (2007). 'Frank Ankersmit: Sublime Historical Experience' in 27m Journal of modern History 79 no. 
1: pp 166-167) who also questioned Ankersmit's notion of the sublime, a critique which to some extent 
reflected Chorell's position. For not only does Zammito reject the notion of experience without a subject 
of experience, but also, picking up Ankersmit's claim that the '.... changes in how people in the past 
experienced their world can be perceived only if they have a resonance in how historians experience their 
worlds' (Sublime Historical E*erience. p 105), he points out that this notion is ' .., as amenable to "dialectical" as to "sublime" experience; indeed, the former is more reasonable and likely' (op. cit. 
pp 166-167). Moreover, Zarnmito questioned Ankersmit's ambiguity with regard to the role that historical 
experience may actually play in the writing of history, finally concluding that, in any event, the sublime 
cannot become the basis of normal historical practice. Now, these five commentators produced individual 
yet distinctly negative assessments of Sublime Historical Experience, and it therefore came to me as a 
genuine surprise to learn - late in the day for this thesis - that the book had been awarded the 2007 
Socrates Prize for 'the best philosophy book in the Dutch language' (see 'Professor Ankersmit Wins Prize 
for Best Philosophy Book', University of Groningen, faculty of arts, http: //www. rug. nl/letlnieuwst 
LetArchieflAnkeramitSoc ratesWisaelprijs). Perhaps there are some favourable comments on, or reviews 
oiy the book, but my research has not yet found one published in English. 
I should mention here, to conclude what has become this brief footnoted survey of Ankersmit's critics, 
that in his recent publication (Jay, M., (2005). Songs of Experience. Berkeley: University of California 
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note here that Ankersmit hardly ever draws on female historians or theorists in any 
of his works. 
Coming back now to my main argument, I think that all of the various anecdotal 
accounts which Ankersmit appropriated in support of his original argument for 
historical experience can now, from this broadly construed sociological perspective, 
be taken as manifestations of the on-going all-embracing process of enculturation 
(identity acquisition). To take just one more case as a general example, Ankersmit 
recounts how the German philosopher and literary critic Johann von Herder, whilst 
participating in the 1765 feast of Saint John in Riga, observed during its celebratory 
dances `the living remains of ancient savage songs, of rhythmic movement and 
dance still present in a people living now' 120 Ankersmit interpreted this anecdote 121 
as a historical experience which afforded Herder `an immediate contact with a 
world that seemed to be lost and forgotten forever' 122 and an 'experience/sensation 
of a union of past and present'. 123 However, my counter-argument would be that 
Herder observed a representation of some aspect of the past seen through the 
medium of dance which, articulated at a particular moment in the development of 
the language of choreography as expressed in Riga, produced a reality . effect which 
referred internally to its own choreographic instruments of meaning production and 
not to the "real" of the past - this process, of course, being precisely Ankersmit's 
Press. pp255-260 and pp306-308), Jay devoted a number of pages to Ankersmit and his notion of the 
sublime. But, as Jay pointed out, the intention behind the writing of his own book was 
'.... not to provide yet another account of what experience "really" is or what it might be, but 
rather to understand why so many thinkers in so many different traditions have felt compelled to 
do precisely that, (Songs ofEtrperience. p1). 
Accordingly, rather than being the subject of any comprehensive theoretical analysis, Ankersmit's theory 
of sublime historical experience was registered by Jay mostly as part of a chronological listing of 
descriptions of various past attempts to grasp the notion of experience. Nevertheless, within it lay did 
question Ankersmit's lack of explanatory guidance in certain respects. For instance, he asked what 
exactly is it in the historian's own present experience that allows privileged moments of access to the 
past? (thus, for Jay, Ankersmit's explanation was clearly inadequate). And again, how is one to decide 
which historical experience, bearing in mind the rather private and hence unverifiable nature of them, is 
to win validation within the discipline of history? My answer to Jay's first question would be 'nothing', 
whilst to his second I would simply say (as I argue below) that the question is strictly speaking irrelevant, 
since Ankersmit effectively stopped talking about history when he started talking about experience. 120 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical Experience. p 146 '21 Which, along with many other stories of a similar kind (from Goethe, Byron, Baudelaire, Proust and 
many more), were collectively presented by Ankersmit as proof of the existence of historical experience. 122 Ankersmit. Sublime Historical &q erience. p 146 123 Ibid. p147 
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very own theory of narrative substances addressed to the narrative of dance. Such 
traditional dances with their symbolic figures and routines would indeed be 
inherited from, and continue to be part of, a natural on-going process of 
enculturation, but they should not be mistaken for a direct encounters with an 
unmediated past. 
Finally, and appropriately I think, I now want to gather these various conclusions 
together and locate them within what Kerwin Lee Klein's has called the `memory 
industry' as he described it in his seminal essay `On the Emergence of Memory in 
historical Discourse'; 124 a paper to which, to the best of my knowledge, Ankersmit 
has never referred. Of course, the memory industry is, as the concept of industry 
brings to mind, a massive phenomenon and no attempt is made here to do anything 
other than to point out a series of its associated characteristics that so "fit" the 
Ankersmit and Groningen style that such a close approximation of features suggests 
more than a mere coincidence. 
Klein argued in his essay, then, that outside experimental psychology and clinical 
psychoanalysis, few academics paid much attention to memory until the 1970s when 
a surge of interest in autobiographical literature, family genealogy and museums 
focused attention on it to the extent that 
... where we once spoke of folk history or popular history or oral history or 
public history or even myth we now employ memory as a metahistorical 
category that subsumes all these various terms. Indeed, one of the salient 
features of our new memory talk is the tendency to make fairly sweeping 
philosophical claims for memory, or even to imagine memory discourse as part 
of what is vaguely hailed as the rise of theory in departments of literature, 
history, and anthropology. 123 
Furthermore, he explained that this seemingly antithetical `memory discourse' had 
combined with the vocabularies of the post-modem (essentially anti-historical) 
discourse to, form a now rapidly expanding `new cultural history' articulated on the 
basis of a kind of common sense which prioritised memory as its governing concept. 
124 Klein, K. L., (2000). `On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse' in Representations 69 
(Special Issue: Grounds for Remembering). pp] 27-150 
125 Ibid. p128 
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Thus, the emergent key word memory is `.... replacing old favourites - nature, 
culture, language - as the word most commonly paired with history; 126 it is, in 
effect, reworking the boundaries of history as its replacement rather than its 
supplement. 
Examining the history of memory studies and drawing on the works of the American 
sociologist Michael Schudson, Klein investigated the notion of memory not as a 
property of individual minds but as a sundry, shifting collection of material artefacts 
and social practices. Memory, on this view, becomes `a structural phenomenon 
rather than an individual phenomenon, and it makes a seemingly endless array of 
physical objects part of memory .... [thus] a statue of Lenin is not just a mnemonic 
device to help individuals remember, but memory itself. "' At this point in his text, 
and to elaborate on the `memory as structure' argument, Klein quotes briefly from 
the writings of the theorist and Jewish historian Amos Funkenstein. For my 
argument, however, I need to somewhat enlarge his quotation as follows; 
No memory, not even the most intimate and personal, can be isolated from the 
social context, from the language and the symbolic system moulded by the 
society over centuries. We should not, therefore, abandon the concept of collective 
memory, but must reformulate the relationship between collective memory 
and the individual act of personal remembering. The following analogy may 
help. Modem linguistics has developed the fundamental distinction, first 
introduced by the Swiss linguist de Saussure, between "language" (langue) and 
"speech" (parole). Language is a system of symbols and the rules of their 
functioning: the inventory of phonemes, words, letters, rules of declension 
and syntactic rules available at all times to the speaker. Yet a language does 
not exist as an independent abstraction; it exists in that it is instantiated in every 
actual act of speech. And because every such act differs from the next even 
where its linguistic components are completely identical, every act of speech 
also changes the language in some way. This distinction should be useful in the 
attempt to define collective memory. The latter, like "language", can be 
characterized as a system of signs, symbols, and practices: memorial dates, 
names of places, monuments and victory arches, museums and texts, customs 
and manners, stereotype images ...:, and even 
language itself (in de Saussure's 
terms). The individual's memory - that is. the act of remembering - is the 
instantiation of these symbols, analogous to "speech"; no act of remembering 
is like any other. The point of departure and frame of reference of memory is 
the system of signs and symbols that it uses. 128 
126 Ibid. p12ß 
127 Ibid. p131 
128 Funkenstein, A, (1993). Perceptions ofJewfsh history. California: University of California Press. p6 
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Now, this extract, it seems to me, needs to be read with caution since the 
relationship that it establishes between collective and individual memory could 
perhaps be misunderstood. For whereas it places both collective and individual 
memory within a common structural framework of signs and symbols, it 
nevertheless identifies and separates the individual act of memory as a unique 
instantiation of that collective structural symbolic system. The point being that the 
structural system itself which constitutes `collective memory' is categorically 
different from any particular act of `individual memory' which, nonetheless, is 
inevitably mediated by that structure. That is to say, for example, that I cannot 
actually remember the Norman Invasion of 1066 because I wasn't there to observe 
it, but the social consequences of that invasion are part of my inheritances (a 
collective memory system of signs and symbols). Hence, any of my own acts of 
memory in relation to events that I have actually witnessed will, accordingly and 
unavoidably, occur within and thus be mediated by these and other sociological 
contexts which are in some part a consequence of multifarious collective 
inheritances, including those of the 1066 sort. On this reading of Funkenstein and in 
connection with this extract at least, it follows that collective memory and individual 
memory are of different kinds and that they cannot therefore be reducible one to the 
other. 
Nevertheless, Klein did indeed identify, I think, a significant drift towards the 
conflation of collective and individual memories in Funkenstein's subsequent 
arguments, but the distinction between them as implied in the above extract seems to 
me to deny the possibility of that sort of category reduction. However, as Klein 
continues, 
.... the most common strategy for justifying the analogical leap from individual memories to Memory-social, cultural, collective, public, or 
whatever-is to identify memory as a collection of practices or material 
artefacts. This is the new structural memory, a memory that threatens to 
become Memory with a capital M and although Funkenstein's account is 
unusual in its sophistication, the general. sense has grown so popular that 
Michael Schudson could describe it as the generic social science 
understanding of the term. The items adduced as memory are potentially 
endless, but certain tropes appear time and again. The most obvious are 
archives and public monuments from statues to museums.... [such tropes 
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emerging] as one of the common features of our new cultural history where in monograph after monograph, readers confront the abject object: 
photographs are torn, mementos faded, toys broken. 129 
Seen in these terns, memory takes on a material, empirical appearance which 
renders it suitable for historical study. Individual memory thus becomes `Memory' 
(collective cultural memory), a subject in its own right, and this new materialisation 
of memory sanctions its `.... elevation to the status of a historical agent, and [hence] 
we enter a new age where archives remember and statues forget'. 130 Klein gave 
examples of this mode of `new age' historical theory, some of which he argued `go 
to the edge', but (and this is a pity) he did not refer to Ankersmit although this 
following extract could be seen as a general admonition of Ankersmit's theoretical 
style, described by Klein as `memory as re-enchantment' which 
.... represents itself as an engagement with postmodernism and appeals to the ineffable - the excess, the unsayable, the blank darkness, the sublime, or some 
other Absolute whose mysteries can be grasped only by those initiates armed 
with the secret code. 131 
Exactly! 
This is all that I need from Klein for the moment then, except to say that he 
concluded his argument with the observation that the rapidly increasing use of 
memory as a supplement to or (as is more often the case) a replacement for history, 
reflected a growing discontent with the current academic historical discourse. In 
fact, he argued that it was the historiographic crisis itself which, by its own default, 
assisted the growth of memory studies as a therapeutic alternative to it. 
However, my immediate purpose in quoting these particular extracts and arguments 
from Kleine's essay is to add weight to my contention that Ankersmit's excursions 
into the sublime and the experiential (which are not of a historical kind as I have 
already argued) are of a sociological kind. And within the discourse of sociology 
they can, more precisely, be seen to belong to the field of memory studies which 
has, as Klein has again convincingly demonstrated, recently re-invented itself in 
the style of a `new age' history that presupposes the conflation of collective 
129 Klein. `On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse'. pp135-136 130 Ibid. p136 
131 Ibid. p137 
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memory, individual memory and history into a single category. Accordingly, I 
think that it is this same conflation of terms which (as I have already argued) 
underlies and "enables" Ankersmit's theory of sublime historical experience 
and, moreover, (referring back, for a moment, to the introductory remarks to 
Chapter Three of my thesis) David Carr is currently working towards a similar 
conflationary goal. His objective, as he himself announced it at the second 
Groningen conference on presence, is to combine historical representation and 
memory into a single study of experience which, it seems to me, amounts to much 
the same sort of project. Carr, as I have also pointed out, is one of the central figures 
at Groningen University's `Centre for Metahistory' (along with Ankersmit and 
Runia) and he appears to be voicing a collective "Groningen School" position. 
Another matter which invites comparison between Ankersmit's position and the 
`new age' field of memory studies is that of vocabulary, and Klein very usefully 
listed (or implied) key words from its preferred lexicon; trauma, melancholia, 
transference, mourning, darliness, sublime, historical agent, secret, initiate and, 
with something of a theological resonance, witnessing, testimony, ritual, and so 
on. 132 The evident "close fit" of these terms with the vocabulary of Sublime 
Historical Experience is remarkable and arguably cannot be ignored. 
Now to my concluding remarks which bring this Section and the Chapter as a whole 
to a close. In my Introduction and Section One of this Chapter, I traced the 
development of Ankersmit's notion of sublime historical experience and raised some 
arguably serious theoretical problems with it. In Section Two I explored and tried to 
explain Ankersmit's very personal and idiosyncratic obsession with his theory and 
then, in Section Three, I extended my critique to cover the closely linked 
phenomena of presence and parallel processing. Drawing all these matters together 
in this Section, I have argued that Ankersmit's thesis, when placed under scrutiny 
and measured up against the better (in my view) arguments of contemporary social 
theorists and philosophers, fails to adequately cohere. It simply collapses under the 
totalised weight of its own inconsistencies and contradictions, not least because (as I 
have argued) it effectively disavows his own theory of narrative substances which, 
132 Ibid. pp 137 & 141 
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Ankersmit continues to positively insist, he nevertheless does not recant. 133 
Moreover, Ankersmit's overall project is misplaced. That is, he is arguing for a 
historical theory without noticing that he has firmly planted himself and his 
theorisations in the sociological field of memory studies. 
Seen from this perspective then, and as just noted, Ankersmit's theory of sublime 
historical experience can arguably be seen to be indexical to (in the sense that it is 
part of the development of and can be gauged against) the inexorable rise and rise of 
memory studies of the popular and dominant `new age' history kind as identified by 
Klein in his seminal paper. Furthermore, if one can accept (as I do) Klein's 
argument that this new style of memory studies is becoming a replacement for rather 
than a supplement to academic history, then Ankersmit's thesis could also be seen as 
indexical to an inverse collapse in the relevance of the academic discourse of history 
per se. 
I shall now finally close this Chapter with the observation that, on the basis of all the 
preceding arguments, one could reasonably conclude that Ankersmit's book, 
Sublime Historical Experience, bears on its front cover the wrong or at least a very 
misleading title which, if corrected, would remove his book from its Dewey 
classification under `history' and insert it into an entirely different sphere of studies 
under the general classification of `sociology' and the sub-classification: 
`contemporary memory studies'. 
'33 It is interesting to note that (perhaps perversely in the circumstances) Ankersmit was even continuing 
to very effectively defend the central role of the narrative substance in historical writing in the same year 
that he published Sublime Historical Experience. I am referring here to his excellent 'Reply to Professor 
Saari' (see Ankersmit, F. R., (2005). 'Reply to Professor Saari' in Rethinking History 9 no. 1: ppZ3-33). 
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In essence, the central purpose and thrust of my argument as laid out in this thesis 
has been to challenge Ankersmit's own belief that he had found, or that it is even 
possible to find, a non-representational/textual form of history; of historical 
consciousness. Accordingly, Ankersmit's resolute journey from his early language 
centred/mediated post-modernist style of historical theory to the (unsupportable in 
my view) world of unmediated direct historical experience, has been presented here 
as a failed "historical" enterprise. In fact, Ankersmit's endeavour to move towards a 
definitive authentic history of a pure and unsullied kind - the past "plain" - through 
his theoretical notion of historical experience and its variants, has ironically, 
although he has shown little if any real sign of noticing it, steered him right back 
into the mediated world from which he had hoped to escape - namely, the complex 
world of enculturation with all its implications vis-ä-vis the human social condition. 
So, a broad summarisation of my thesis and some additional concluding thoughts. 
Since the 1980's Frank Ankersmit has been both a devastating critic of academic, 
epistemological histories (metanarratives having, of course, long gone) and, at the 
same time, a sometime promoter/promulgator of a certain kind of postmodern 
representationalism and its aestheticisation. Indeed, I think that one could say that, 
with the exception of Hayden White, nobody has "taken apart" academic history as 
thoroughly as Ankersmit. With his theories of the narrative substance, of anti- 
foundationalism, of linguistic performativity and so on, Ankersmit emptied all 
histories of their apparent meanings and in so'doing revealed them as vacant 
vessels/structures or empty signifiers such that they could be refilled with 
multiplicities of different imagined meanings - the past as the plaything of 
historians. But, with the publication in 2005 of Sublime Historical Experience it 
became clear that Ankersmit had moved on to a new style of theory in which 
experience, worked-up out of both collective and individual memory and also 
propped-up with the notion of its authenticity (the "real" of recalled experiences), 
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had become his new foundation. On this basis, as we have seen, Ankersmit 
Presumed to offer a way of accessing the past which was able to express its feelings, 
moods, impressions, etc., directly and authentically (not truthfully, for he says 
explicitly that sublime historical experience is not truth generating)'. It was precisely 
through such historical experiences, Ankersmit argued, that a relationship with the 
past could now be established without having to break through those distorting 
`thick crusts' of textualism, representation, linguistics, facticity, and so on. 
Proposed as an alternative to, rather than a replacement for, his previous position, 
this new theory nevertheless provided Ankersmit with the facility to "sidestep" 
aspects of his older theoretical works (most notably, of course, the narrative 
substance of Narrative Logic) and, when understood in this way, it can be taken as a 
kind of explanatory key to his texts on experience and the sublime. 
But my argument has been, and is, that none of this later theorising works for history 
conceived as 'the-past-as-history' (see Chapter Four, footnote 111). For, arguably, 
history to be a history has to be a representation, a figure or a device ('no 
representation no past', to recall), 2 and its manifold shortcomings, which vary from 
huge for the epistemologist to minimal for the aestheticist, are clear - Ankersmit 
brilliantly made them so. Ankersmit was (and is) therefore forced, not least by his 
own previous un-recanted theorisations, to leave that history behind - even in its 
more radical linguistic forms - as he embraced a non-representational memory based 
way of thinking about the past. Now, Ankersmit's attempt to circumvent his own 
critique of historical representation by accessing the past through sublime 
` It is interesting to note hem vb. -Wstnrth', that Ankersmit states clearly in Sublime Historical 
Experience that `Sublimity will, by its very nature, teach us no truths about the past, for from the 
perspective of cognitive truth this kind of encounter with the past simply does not and cannot exist. 
Sublime experience lives in a universe different from that of truth .... as 
I would like to insist. ' (Ankersmit. 
Sublime Historical Fxperience. p23 1). However, one might also note that for Huizinga - from who's 
theory of historical sensation, as we have seen, Ankersmit derived his notion of historical experience - 
sensation did produce historical truth. For, as Huizinga put it: '.... a contact with the past that is 
accompanied by the absolute conviction of complete authenticity and truth [sic], can be provoked by 
[sensation]: a line from a chronicle, by an engraving, a few sounds from an old song' (Ankersmit. 
Sublime Historical Experience. p120). There is clearly a contradiction here, perhaps no matter, but it is a 
contradiction and Ankersmit must know this since Huizinga's conviction that historical sensation is truth 
generating is written down, right there, in the middle of Ankersmit's own translation from Huizinga's 
original text, yet it is not brought into his own theory of historical experience. Ankersmit appears to adopt 
a "pick and choose" policy with regard to Huizinga's writings as he moves unreflexively from Huizinga's 
theory of 'historical sensation' to his own theory of `historical experience'. 
Seefioanone 3 in my Introduction to this thesis (page 2). 
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experience is all very well if that is what he wanted (or wants) to do, but it should be 
understood (or so it seems to me) that the concepts and vocabulary that he used to 
effect this access to the past are drawn essentially from memory studies. They 
cannot therefore work for history old style, nor for history new (postmodern) style, 
nor for experimental histories, all of which are still representational with all of 
representational isms associated limitations. And postmodernists (and 
experimenters), in particular, accept such limitations given that they are content with 
limited proposals and failed experimentations - the actual fate/destiny of all 
representations. 3 Moreover, it appears that, on the back of his critique of modernist 
/postmodernist histories, Ankersmit also rejected the positive and emancipatory 
positions adopted by postmodernist philosophers/theorists such as, say, Lyotard, 
Deleuze, Derrida, Baudrillard, Ermarth et al, in exchange for the sombre 
pessimisms of Huizinga, Schiffer and Burckhardt through whom he found his escape 
from the "history trope". But, it has been argued, Ankersmit's escape is illusory 
given that it only came about (if it came about at all) through his substitution of 
memory for history. 
These, then, are some of the reasons why I have argued that sublime historical 
experience is situated in the field of memory studies and, furthermore, that this 
siting can be taken as indexical to the huge and growing contemporary, popular 
interest in it. Such interest is everywhere today as evidenced through, for instance, 
museum and open air re-enactments of past events such that we can now ostensibly 
know and therefore "remember" who we were; through a multiplicity of radio and 
3 jean Baudrillard makes an interesting distinction between critical and fatal theory, the consequences of 
the latter for history being that all historical representations inevitably fail. Critical theory is a subject-led 
dialectic, for it is the subject which dreams of a transparent link between the signIfter/sign f ed and the 
referent, leading to kmiwledgi of the object (the thing in itself). But, the object always escapes such 
designs because it represents the "excess" situated outside the subject's restrictive, dialectical critical 
practices. Accordingly, the pay as object will always be beyond (and so, in a sense, deconstruct) the 
critical discourse which strives but fails to construct and impose full meaning on it. For Baudrillard, the 
object (the past) is always victorious since `.... the subject is no longer the master of representation .... 
it is, 
henceforth, the object which refiacts the subject and imposes upon it its presence and its random form, its 
discontinuity, its fragmentation, its stereophony and its artificial instantaneity. It is the power of the object 
which cuts a swathe through the very artifice we have imposed on it. There is something of revenge in 
this: the object becomes a strange attractor. ' (Baudrillard, J., (1996). The Perfect Crime. London: Verso. 
p76). For Baudrillard, then, whose position is informed by fatal theory, the object (the thing in itself, the 
"excess" which is the object) forever slips away intact beyond the critical discourse which seeks to grasp 
it, to "know" it in itself; the fate (fatal theory) of all such discourse thus being that it is destined to fail. 
One could then say that the object defeats language - and therefore, as language users, it defeats us. 
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television programmes in search of personal identities (by means of trans- 
generational memory recall, heritage and docudrama productions), through media 
articles and presentations, through the figuring/re-figuring of testimony into stories 
of identity, and through `... such well known phenomena as oral history, 
autobiography and commemorative rituals..... pasted together into something called 
memory'. 4 The rise of these individuated, individualising personalised modes of 
activity wherein everyone can be his or her own historian or, better still, his or her 
own authentic self - this `privatisation of the past's as Ankersmit himself once put it 
- precisely demands the experiential and the authenticity of "feeling". And it is into 
this whole complex of phenomena that memory studies, heritage studies, living 
history and other routes to a presence of the literally absent past in the present, 6 are 
currently being installed at a theoretical level: a grand memory makeover' of history 
as past and present meld into tropes of nostalgia, of retro, and of "being there". 
But, the arguable tragedy and irony of all this for Ankersmit is that, apparently 
unnoticed by him, his own journey towards a "pure" form of historical experience 
moved him not only away from history and into the complex sociological sphere of 
memory studies, but . also had the effect of 
drawing the attention of others (not least 
his followers) away from history towards this insatiable, authenticating memory 
industry which both generates and validates personal identities. Accordingly, it 
could perhaps be argued that Ankersmit, as a largely unwitting contributor to the 
declining interest in the discipline of history, has actually effected an undesired 
counter-move against history, even towards an end8 to history altogether. What once 
was history for Ankersmit (and for the public majority) is now becoming memory 
4 Klein, K. L., (2000). 'On the Emergence ofMem ry in Historical Discourse'in Representations 69: p128. 
' Such that, as Ankersmit argues, '.... there no longer is one or more self-evident disciplinary centre from 
which knowledge of the past is organised. Our relationship to the past has become privatised in the sense 
that it primarily is an attribute of the individual historian and no longer of a collective disciplinary 
historical subject' (Ankersmit, F. R., (2001). Historical Representation. California: Stanford University 
p153). 
ch, I have argued, is a natural process of human enculturation - our inheritances. 
7 The rise and rise of memory studies which, as I have noted already, cannot be charted at length 
here (for 
it is vast), arguably incltuies, as symptomatic of it, the breakdown of grand narratives and the shrinkage of 
history to its articulation as proper histories (academic histories) which have become cut off (as 
academics talk only to themselves in ever decreasing circles) from the wider community's interest in 
public, memory based (so-called) histories of the sorts outlined above. 
See the last section, 'Endisms', in, Jenkins, K. and Munslow, A. (eds. ) (2004). The Nature of History 
Reader. London: Routledge. pp243-332. Also Jenkins, K. (1999). Why History? London: Routledge. 
207 
per se, and if this general trend towards the exchange of history for memory were 
eventually to be successfully completed, then postmodern and other experimental 
alternatives to modernist histories (as once so effectively promoted by Ankersmit) 
would simply become irrelevant and drop out of use - as irrelevances do. 
Of course, as noted, this was never Ankersmit's intention. He still wants a history. 
But it would appear that Ankersmit is now "stuck" with the notion of sublime 
historical experience which cannot give him one. For (and this seems to be at 
variance with his claim that his "sublime book" should not be interpreted as a 
recantation of his earlier work) his purpose, as he himself said, was to replace `.... all 
that came to be known over the last twenty to thirty years by the name of "theory" 
.... [theory which] will be 
rejected here in the name of the notion of experience'9 and 
that, of course, includes postmodern reflexive histories. The good (early 
postmodern) Ankersmit of my thesis, then, is being repudiated by Ankersmit himself 
because he is still searching for something else - something historical yet... 
something else. A lost cause? .... Yes. 
For I think that neither he nor anyone else can 
ever get anything better than reflexive/experimental post-modem kinds of histories 
if it is, as I say, histories (and that ever problematical historical consciousness) that 
are wanted. 
And these, of course, are precisely the kinds of histories that Ankersmit actually had 
until he rejected them in favour of the sublime. Mystical experiences, mythological 
daydreaming and presence are all very well, but arguably they cannot produce a 
historical representation which (tautologically) is the only way that the past can be 
historicised (or presented historically). Having rejected postmodern kinds of 
historicisations for the experiential, Ankersmit's manoeuvrings have thus effectively 
seen him "trapped" between old modernist histories (which are not much use to him 
since Narrative Logic convincingly subverted them) and his current sublime theories 
and practices of presence which really have no "historical" traction at all. From this 
perspective one could say that Ankersmit's works reflect and refract the arguable 
disintegration of the hope, heralded by White and consolidated by the good early 
9 Ankeesmit. Sublune Historical Experience. p10 
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Ankersmit, for highly reflexive, adventurous, ideologically sensitive, ethically 
democratising and emancipatory histories. As that hope fades, the possibility of 
radical, reflexive, generous histories ends too and experience, sublime or not, is 
scarcely a worthy alternative to that. 
Coda 
Now, it had been my intention to end my thesis at this point, but an afterthought of 
some relevance -a post script or coda - occurred to me precisely at this moment of 
closure and I would like to briefly lay out this reflection, if I may, which goes like 
this. Looking back over my research and its product (this text), I find to my surprise 
(and I am aware that I may look somewhat immodest here) that, arguably, I seem to 
have been able to undermine and dislodge Ankersmit's more recent arguments in 
order to show that his move from language to experience does not, contrary to his 
own intentions, constitute any sort of substantial contribution to history. And I think 
that I have also been able to show that Ankersmit's endeavours can be interpreted as 
being of a tragic kind; the work of an otherwise erudite thinker who has simply lost 
his way and wandered out of the sphere of historical theory without noticing it. So, 
and this now becomes the final thought/question that I wish to address, if my 
critique of Ankersmit can be taken as valid, then how is it that I have been able to 
execute that task comparatively easily (or if not easily, at least execute it)? 
In order to try and answer this question, I need to briefly (very briefly) reflect 
somewhat widely on the idea of history and the changes to, or the re-shaping of that 
idea, over the last few centuries. I start (melo)dramatically and abruptly by saying 
that, once upon a time, here in the West and embodied deep in Western culture, 
there was a Christian God who provided the explanation and justification for 
everything - the omniscient repository of absolute truth - but that that God had, 
by 
the middle of the nineteenth century, (to put it into Nietzsche's words) died. A death 
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that gave rise to new secular manifestations in the style of metaphysical 
metanarratives which constituted, in essence, attempts to find a substitute for 
religion through the organisation of contingent events into some kind of unity of 
human trajectory (the `grand narrative' of Marxism being an example). However, 
the democratising twentieth century and its increasingly democratic `sovereign 
subject', fractured and splintered any such unity through individuated multiple 
claims on the past; self-validating claims from this or that perspective (ethnic, 
feminist, this class/that class, gay and so on). Consequently, this combination and 
concentration of expanding numbers of different individual historical points-of-view 
- this democratisation of history - appears to have dismissed and replaced previous 
notions of a `unity of historical trajectory' and, moreover, is currently in the process 
of dismissing, along with it, the idea of a history as being for more than one person. 
For - and this brings me to the crucial point - history qua history must always be for 
more than one. So if, for example, I were to research and work-up a written history 
of my home town, Haslemere, then that history would be for everybody - anyone 
could have it - it would not be a history just for me. But since individuating 
democracy engenders histories just for one, and since history qua history is always 
for more than one, then these individuating histories are not histories at all; they are 
memories. Consequently, this individualising democratisation of-history leads to a 
move from history (always for more than one) to a personal, solipsistic "projection" 
from the individual self for that selfonly. And, to again restate and further elaborate 
the point, as soon as history becomes a history for one person only then it ceases to 
be a history at all - it becomes privatised, a projection of one's memory onto things 
beyond memory: things made familiar through reading texts, hearing testimonies, 
being there at a particular re-enactment of a past event or standing at a place where 
some battle was once fought and (in consequence of that voluntary engagement) 
believing to have felt the past authentically; a direct "historical" [sic] consciousness, 
etc. The point is therefore this: that one's own memories, one's own solipsia 
(accumulated experiences of living in the world which, in part, individuate one's 
identity), do not and cannot constitute a history. A history is a representational 
substitute for, or retrospective proposition about, or a proposal for, the past 
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(primarily taking the form of a literary artefact) for more than one: memory is 
simply not "historical". 
Now, my reading of Ankersmit leads me to suspect that, ironically, he must to some 
degree have intuited all of this but disavowed it. For (as we have seen) Ankersmit 
says in his Preface to Sublime Historical Experience that his new theory (the product 
of his move from `the-past-as-history', or history for anyone, to an individuallo 
experiential phenomenon) `has no bearing whatsoever on what historians actually do 
.... [and is] meaningless from the perspective of historical writing'. 
" Here, 
Ankersmit appears to grasp that the subjects of his investigation (experience, 
consciousness and memory, both collective and individual), are not of a historical 
kind; that they have, as he put it, `no bearing whatsoever on what historians do'. 
Which is, of course, to produce histories. Now, ifAnkersmit had stopped right there, 
everything would (or could) have been fine. We would have been left with 
Ankersmit's quite separate and very substantial contributions to two different fields 
of study. That is, we would have had the good, early Ankersmit of the narrative 
critique of history (expanded somewhat over the years), and the new Ankersmit who 
is not, as he intuits here, really talking about history at all, but rather about how he 
personally wants to validate memory; not least his own. And, of course, since it 
follows that such a contribution to memory studies would have had nothing to say to 
Ankersmit's previous narrativist position/accounts, he would have had no need to 
deny or make any recantation of them. 
This reading of - let's call it - Ankersmit's current 
"dilemma" does, of course, still 
support and confirm my contention that Ankersmit's mistake was to call (in some 
places) his memory work historical, to then propose (in other places) that it was a 
replacement/substitute for history, but then (elsewhere) that it was never less than a 
10 Ankersmit's `historical experience' is for one person only and this must also apply to his `sublime 
historical experience : which, as he says himself; actually (and necessarily) takes place and unfolds on the 
'scene' of the historians own mind (a style of re-enactment) and it therefore manifests itself as an 
expression of the historian's own, singular experience of the past. (Ankersmit" Sublime Historical 
Experience. p265). 
11 Ibid. p(er) 
211 
substantial and governing supplement to it; 12 substantial in the sense that it 
Pawned to explain the very origins of, and the modes of acquisition of, historical 
consciousness. From this (in my view mistaken) position, it would appear that 
Ankersmit himself was convinced that he could say something about "experience" 
which would have an impact on history itself; not an immediate impact in the sense 
that it might inform historical writing, but an impact in the sense that it could have 
had the effect of shifting the understanding of what history is actually about. That is 
to say that Ankersmit, somehow confusing history with memory (or not rigorously 
maintaining their ontological difference), wanted us, his readers, to understand that 
"real" history comes only by way of individual and cultural (collective) traumatic 
experiences. And, furthermore, that it is through - and only through - the 
interception of unmediated traces of these traumatic experiences that the (gifted) 
historian can engage authentically with the past. 
Thus, my central point is that when Ankersmit started to confuse and break-down 
the ontological distinction between-history and memory in the manner described 
above (such that he could write a book essentially about memory and existential 
sensation whilst believing himself to be writing a book about history and historical 
theory), he was accordingly bound to generate, within that book, a structurally 
incoherent argument shot through with ambiguities and internal contradictions. And 
it was this vulnerablelde-constructible account of sublime historical experience 
(which overtly issued forth the substance of its fatal critique), that was received by 
Ankersmit's critics as in a sense a "gift" and, moreover, a gift to me personally as 
one of them. 
Nevertheless, even though in the end (and this is the end) Ankersmit might appear 
on my reading to be somewhat undeserving, he is, undoubtedly, an immensely 
important historical theorist. Nothing, absolutely nothing, I have said in this thesis is 
12 Ankersmit is ambiguous on this point throughout his texts and it is never satisfactorily resolved. For 
instance, he clearly states in the Introduction to Sublime Historical Experience (p 14) that he does not 
recant his previous narrativist position, yet (see citation on page 208 above) he clearly states here that all 
previous historical theory is rejected in favour of experience. This has allowed me, as may have been 
noticed, a certain flexibility when presenting my own arguments in relation to what is an ambivalent 
position. 
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meant to question his integrity and sincerity; nor would I want to diminish in any 
way the infectious enthusiasm which he brings to, and is so evident in, his works 
(works from which I have myself much benefitted). Ankersmit writes, I think, with 
the very best of intentions for history and for historians. But (and my thesis is, I 
suppose, this but) all that said, Ankersmit's enthusiasm and zest for new ideas 
(never less than provocative and ambitious), and his remarkable erudition, do not in 
my view, despite his reputation for logic, make his position as it moves from 
language to experience appear either tenable or attractive to either that history or 
those historians. Somewhere in that dark wood - and over the years Ankersmit's 
(elegiac) wood seems to have grown increasingly dark - the argument of this thesis 
is that he has lost his way. Whether or not he should be found and saved `for history' 
is a question that this thesis has, I think, at least raised. 
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